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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION
The basic hypothesis of this study contended that the National
War College, located in Washington, D.C., was planned by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff and was developed to be the capstone of the nation's
military educational system.

This was a departure from an earlier con

clusion made by Masland and Radway which indicated that the National
War College had already reached the pinnacle of military higher educa
tion.^

It was the contention of the author of this study, however,

that the National War College never reached that position.

Rather, the

institution has shared the summit of professional military education
with both the Industrial College of the Armed Forces and with the three
services War Colleges which were already in existence when the National
War College was founded.
In a second hypothesis of the study it was proposed that despite
inter-service rivalry which contributed to the situation, it appeared
that the mission of the College and that of its sister institutions re
quired a depth and breadth unique to each, and this prevented any

"'■John Wesley Masland and Laurence I. Radway, Soldiers and Scholars
Military Education and National Policy (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1957) p. 141.
See also War Department Letter, Office of the
Adjutant General, 4 April 1946, "National War College," Record Group 218
U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Papers (Combined Chiefs of Staff, 352, 19461947, Section 4, Box No. 72), The National Archives.
-

1

-
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institution from becoming supreme in the military education system.
These senior service colleges appeared to be alike in student
clientele, methods of instruction, curricula, organization and func
tions.

This similarity gave rise to perplexing questions about their

relationship with one another as well as the justification for all five
institutions.

Accordingly, it was contended in a third hypothesis that

while it appeared that one could describe accurately the interrelation
ship among the colleges, one could not answer simply whether or not all
are required.

The concern of the present study, therefore, was to in

vestigate the development of the National War College and its peer
institutions, and to examine the interrelationships that exist among
these Senior Service Colleges.

Accordingly, an investigation into the

reasons for the establishment of the National War College and the other
Senior Service Schools was made, and an assessment of why the multiple
institutions exist was carried out.
The present account is significant because the interrelationships
that exist among the National War College and the other senior services
schools seem to be both misunderstood by the civilian sector and ignored
by the military.

An attempt was, therefore, made in this report to

clarify for both elements the relationships existing between the National
War College and the other Senior Service institutions.

Additionally,

inasmuch as very little was written concerning the National War College
prior to the appearance of the work done by Masland and

Radway, and

since very little writing of academic significance has been added in the
ensuing years, the present research should help to fill the void.

Fur

ther, by probing factors leading to the development of the National War
College, reasons for the existence of a unique military institution for
the study of strategy and policy and training of political and military
analysts and decision makers should become clearer.
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The main focus of this study was the thirty year period 1945-1975.
These were the formative years of the National War College and include
a period of three great conflicts —
War, the Vietnam War —

part of World War II, the Korean

when military leaders were called upon not only

to conduct military operations but also to participate in the subsequent
peace negotiations.

The National War College was an important element

in the preparation of those leaders for their ultimate roles, thus this
period of the development of the National War College closely parallel
the period when strategy and policy studies became a key part of the
curriculum of advanced military higher education.

For background pur

poses it was necessary to discuss many events outside of the primary
period of this study.

However, such discussions were limited to those

that were necessary to validate the historical purposes.
Since the development of the National War College is a relatively
recent historical event, much of what has been written in other docu
ments about the College is based on eyewitness accounts which are
naturally subject to bias because of the contemporary nature of the
events.

While reliance had to be placed on a number of these eyewitness

accounts during the conduct of this study, care was taken to eliminate
biases as much as possible.

The techniques of oral history procedures

described by William W. Moss was utilized in order to fill gaps in both
eyewitness accounts and in the written materials that were available.
However, that in itself is a limitation because as Moss admits, a major
limitation of the oral history method is that the resultant study is not
an exhaustive presentation of all relevant data, rather it is a recollection of human experiences within the context of a remembered past.

2
William W. Moss, Oral History Program Manual (New York:
Publishers, 1974), p. 8.
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Journal articles, newspaper accounts, Department of Defense studies,
service publications, and unpublished sources were used in the study.
There were few, if any, other publications dealing with the College.
Most of these sources required extensive analysis and internal criti
cism to determine their accuracy.

Questionnaires, interviews, and some

quantitative data were employed to substantiate the evidence gained
from primary and secondary sources.

Comparative data, especially involv

ing the other Senior Service Colleges, were also extensively utilized.
It is important that the reader understand special terms used in
this inquiry.

Within the context of the investigation, the term "strategy"

refers to the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfill
the ends of policy.

The term, strategy, is concerned not merely with

the employment of forces, but also with their effect; particularly at
the national and international levels.

The term

"policy" as used in

this paper means the formulation of concepts, principles, and interests
of a State based on its national strength, will, resources and goals.
Another term that was frequently used is "The National Defense Univer
sity," that military institution located in Washington, D. G. which at
the beginning of the study was composed of the National War College
and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces.

The Armed Forces Staff

College at Norfolk, Virginia was added to the University before the
study was completed.

The university is a joint service institution

under the control of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Another term, "Senior

Service Colleges," was used throughout this study.

This referred to

the National Defense University (.less the Armed Forces Staff College)
and each of the separate armed services war colleges (i.e., the Army War
College, the Naval War College, and the Air War College).

Senior
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Service Colleges are generally considered to be upper level graduate
institutions corresponding to civilian graduate level universities and
colleges.

They do not include the Armed Forces Staff College or the

Command and General Staff Colleges of the separate services since these
are generally classified as lower level institutions corresponding to
undergraduate civilian colleges and universities.
institutions were not included in the study.

Therefore, these

Nor does the term "Senior

Service Colleges" include the separate services officer professional or
technical schools which are considered equivalent to vocational or
technical colleges.

The term "Senior Service Schools" is synonymous

with and was often used in the report in lieu of the term "Senior Ser
vice Colleges."
Two other terms should be especially noted by the reader —
ing" and "education".

"train

Although these terms as used in military parlance

usually indicate the same function and are used interchangeably, with no
clear distinction between the two, for the purposes of this study "train
ing" referred to instruction that was oriented to a particular military
speciality designed to develop a technical skill.

It includes technical

instruction of military units as well as individuals.

"Training" thus

is the type of instruction that may be given directly to the individual
and organizations, and is job related.

"Education," on the other hand,

implied instruction or individual study for the purpose of intellectual
development and the cultivation of the mind, wisdom, and judgment.
Accordingly, as used here, it is the type of learning that prepares one
to deal with novel situations and goes beyond job assigment.
The seminal work done by Masland and Radway

on military education

is the general reference usually found to be available in most libraries
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and thus has become a standard reference.

3

Nevertheless, the volume is

limited to a general discussion of military education and contains little
on the development of the National War College, and the requirement for
all the Senior Service Colleges.

Masland and Radway's investigation is

nonetheless a beginning and forms the basis for the study.

A book edited

by Lawrence J. Korb supplements Masland and Radway's work and was used
throughout the study.
service education.

Its authors provided some analysis of senior

For example, it contains "The War Colleges: Education

for What?" in which Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr. examines the goals, mis
sions, objectives and curricula of the War Colleges.

It also contains

Frederick H. Hartmann's "The War College in Perspective" which, while
not limited to the National War College, does offer the author's insight
into the need for its development by pointing up shortcomings in the
offerings of the three service War Colleges.

In addition to these secondary

sources, George S. Pappas' work Prudens Futuri: The U.S. Army War College:
1901-1967^ was used extensively and provided some details on the estab
lishment and organization of the Army War College and the National War
£
College.
In Professors of War Ronald Spector examined the establishment

3

Masland and' Radway, Soldiers and Scholars:
and National Policy.

Military Education

4
Lawrence J. Korb, ed., The System for Educating Military Officers
in .the U.S.. International Studies Association Occasional Papers, No. 9.
^Pittsburg: University of Pittsburg, 1967).
George S. Pappas, Prudents Futuri: The U.S. Army War College
1901-1967 (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Walsworth Publishing Co., 1967).
'Sfev

^Ronald Spector, Professor of War (Newport, Rhode Island:
War College Press, 1977).
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and growth of the National War College and the Naval War College.
Another secondary work used was Clarence W. Hannon's Graduate Education
Within the Armed Forces,^ in which he discussed congressional attitudes
toward graduate level education in the Armed Forces.

Further, Hannon

provided in his volume a historical perspective of graduate education in
the services.

He gave environmental forces and trend impacting on gradu

ate service education, and ha reviewed graduate degree programs within
each service.
As a supplement to this, Joseph S. King reviewed the weaknesses
of advanced civilian education programs, discussed officers perception
of advanced civilian schooling, and provided a projection of civilian
schooling for the future in his "A Study of Army Advanced Civilian
g

Schooling Programs."

This account was also used as was one that is

more directly related to senior service education by Paul T. Karschina
titled Education, The War Colleges and Professional Military Develop
ment in which he generally assessed the role of military education in
the professional development of American military leadership, and dis9

cussed supporting educational theory.

Karschina also reviewed the

history of military education, provided a fundamental thrust for
military education, and appraised the Senior Service Colleges in the
overall scheme of professional military education.

The National War

^Clarence W. Hannon, Graduate Education Within the Armed Forces
(Battle Creek, Mich.: Defense Documentation Center, 1974).
g

Joseph King, "A Study of the Armys' Advanced Civilian Schooling
Programs," MA Thesis, (U. S. Army Command and General Staff College,
1973).
9
Paul T. Karschina, Education, The War Colleges and Professional
Military Development (Washington: The National War College Strategic
Research Group, n. d.).
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College's pamphlet Fort Lesley J. McNair:

Home of the National War

College and The Industrial College of the Armed Forces is an account
in which the authors provides a brief history of the post and some
events leading to the establishment of the two Senior Service Schools.^
Finally, Lieutenant General Francis H. Griswald, a former Commadant of
the National War College, provided in a Sperryscope article a comprehen
sive review of the early days of the College, and this was very useful
in the st u d y . ^
Primary sources that were used in the study included The War
Department's "Gerow Board Report" in which the board members established
the need for the College,

12

The War Department's "Eddy Board Report"

wherein the board detailed the Army's position regarding the War College,

13

the U. S. Navy War College's second "Annual Report of the President" in
which the College's President depicted navy bias against the National
War College,

14

and which contained Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner's

The National War College, Fort Lesley J. McNair: Home of the
National War College and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces
(Washington: The National War College Press, 1967).
"^Lieutenant General Francis H. Griswald, "The National War
College," Sperryscope 16 (1962) 1: 2-5.

12

U. S. War Department, Report of War Department Military Educa
tion Board on Educational System for Officers of the Army (Fort
Leavenworth, Kansas:
Command and General Staff College, 1946).
13

U. S. Department of the Army, Report of the Department of the
Army Board on Educational System for Officers (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas:
Command and General Staff College, 1949).
^ U . S. Naval War College, "The Report of the President 1972-1973,"
Naval War College Review 26, (September - October 1973) 2.
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comments and comparisons of the Navy War College and the National War
College.

Additionally, The National War College Institutional Report

for the Evaluation of the National War College by the Office of the
American Council on Education was used extensively.^

Other reports

which played an important role in the investigation are the Report of
the POD Committee on Excellence in Education —
Colleges;

The Senior Services

Conclusions and Initiatives commonly referred to as the

Clements R e p o r t . ^

In this work, the Clements Board provided an over

view of the Senior Service Schools, discussed their curricula, teaching
methodology, their faculties, their cooperative degree programs, their
research programs, and recommended future initiatives in these, areas•
The Board’s most salient recommendation was one leading to the establish
ment of the National Defense University by combining the National War
College and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces.

Another primary

source used was the U. S. Defense Department’s Report on Senior Service
College Curriculum Study which supplements the Clements Report already
mentioned."*^

The authors of this report established a requirement for

U. S. National War College, The National War College Institu
tional Report for the Evaluation of the National War College by the
Office of the American Council on Education (Washington: The National
War College, 1974).
16

Office of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Report on the POD
Committee on Excellence in Education— The Senior Services Colleges:
Conclusions and Initiatives (Washington; Department of Defense, 1975).
^U.S. Department of Defense, Report on Senior Service College
Curriculum Study (Washington: Department of Defense, 1975).
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a Common Core Curriculum for use at all schools, established a MissionSpecific Curriculum for each separate school which would be supportive
of and complement the Common Core Curriculum while stressing its own
unique mission orientation, and established an Elective Program which
permitted the tailoring of each student's educational experience to his
background and service needs.

Still another Department of Defense Study

was the Plan for Establishment of The National Defense University wherein
the study members described plans and procedures for consolidating the
National War College and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces.

18

Included were specific procedures for establishing a single presidency,
administrative staff, board of visitors, research program, management
systems activity, external program activity, and auxiliary services.
Another most useful primary source was the National War College's
19
Statistical Data for Classes of 1947 thru 1959.

Presented in chart form

in this document are certain data that was descriptive of the individual
in the various classes.

The charts reflected information by branch of

service for each year during the period and contained average age of stu
dents when entering the college, their length of service and rank on enter
ing, information on academic degrees held, prior attendance at Senior Ser
vice Schools, types of assignment on completion of the courses and percent
age of those graduating who were promoted to general or flag ratings.
is especially significant that no attempt was made in this document to
analyze

or to draw conclusions from the data presented; this was left

18

U.S. Department of Defense, Plan for Establishment of the
National Defense University (Washington: Department of Defense, 1976).
19

U.S. National War College, Statistical Data for Classes of 1947
Through 1959 (Washington:
The National War College, n. d.).
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to the reader.

The facts were presented as information only.

The final

primary sources used were the National War College "Commandant's Annual
Reports."

20

These not only provided observations of the College's

leader during the academic year, but it also provided an annual report
of the Board of Consultants.

Additionally, in it the Commandant ex

amined research, seminars, area studies, lecture programs,the budget
and operating cost for the college during the year.

He also reviewed

the curriculum and provided statistical data on the students attending.
Other primary sources used included information found in the National
Archives, the Library of Congress, at the National Defense University
Archives and Library, and in the Pentagon's Army Library.

Additionally,

other important secondary sources were found at the U. S. Army Training
and Doctrine Command Technical Library (Fort Monroe, Virginia), the
Armed Forces Staff College Library and Archives (Norfolk, Virginia),
the Military Collection at the Hughes Library at Old Dominion University,
and at Swem Library, the College of William and Mary.

Sources were

also obtained through military inter-1iberary loans involving libraries
at the Army Archives (Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pa.), the
Naval War College (Newport, R.I.), and the Air War College (Maxwell Air
Force Base, Alabama).
Results of the investigation begin in Chapter two with an in depth
study devoted to antecedents of the National War College, thus establish
ing the historical beginnings of war college type of education.

Factors

influencing the development of Senior Service Colleges in general, and

20

U. S. National War College, Commandants Annual Report (Washington:
The National War College, 1947-1975).
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the National War College specifically, are. established in Chapter III.
Roles, attitudes, and influences of military and civilian leaders in
the development of the National War College are identified in Chapter IV.
A comparison of the development of the National War College curriculum
and instructional strategies in relation to that of the other Senior
Service Colleges is made in Chapter .V.

Finally, reasons for the exis

tence of the National War College and the other Senior Service Colleges
are examined in Chapter VI, and summary and conclusions of the study
are presented in Chapter VII.
The National War College is called a college even though it is
not an accredited, degree-granting institution.
evaluated a number of times

The College has been

by the Office on Educational Credit of the

American Council on Education in

order to determine how well it is

achieving its objectives as a higher educational institution, and to
assist in determining the amount of graduate-level transfer credits
which can reasonably be recommended for its programs.

21

It is not the

type of college one usually thinks of, and its curricula emphasis is
placed on things other than war.

In fact, one former president of a

War College said "It is far from correct to assert that the War College
prepares only for war."

22

It deals both with technical military sub

jects as well as conventional civilian academic studies.

Therefore, its

development was an important aspect of not only military education but

21

The National War College, Institutional Report for the Evalua
tion of the College by the Office on Educational Credit of the American
Council on Education 1973-1974 (Washington:
The National War College,
1974).
22

Admiral Richard G. Colbert, "War College Education and the
Future" in United States Naval Proceedings 99, Number 11/849 (November
1973), p. 108.
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also all of higher education because it exemplified how unique needs
resulted in the creation of post secondary educational institutions.
It was the intent of the completed investigation to discover through
the development of the National War College, the interrelationship that
existed among the Senior Service Colleges and reasons the multiple
institutions exists.

To accomplish this, it was necessary to first

understand and appreciate its historical antecendents.

Those beginnings

are reported in the following chapter.
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CHAPTER I I

HISTORICAL ANTECENDENTS
Several attempts were made during the Constitutional Convention
>

in 1787 to authorize a national institution of higher education but all
of the proposals were rejected.'*'

Even though the Constitution as

finally written and passed made no reference to education, there was a
continuing interest among its authors and others.

2

The first six

Presidents of the United States all agreed on the desirability of a
national university, and Washington, Jefferson, Madison, and John Quincy
Adams even sent requests to Congress asking for the establishment of
3

such an institution.

In addition, George Washington willed fifty

shares of his stock in the Potomac Canal Company to be used to establish
a national university.

James Smithson, an English scientist, bequeathed an

For a discussion of the historical development of
tion in the United States and early American desires for
university see Lawrence Gladieux and Thomas R. Wolanian,
the Colleges; The National Politics of Higher Education
Mass.: Lexington Books, 1976), p. 3-13.

higher educa
a national
Congress and
(Lexington,

2

Homer D. Babbidge, Jr. and Robert M. Rozenweig, The Federal
Interest in Higher Education (London: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc.,
1962), p. 1. Also see Clifton Conrad and Joseph Cosand, The Implications
of Federal Education Policy (Washington: The American Association for
Higher Education, 1976), p. 4.
3

Richard Hofstadter and Wilson Smith, American Higher Education:
A Documentary History 2 vol. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1961), 1:157.
-14-
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amount of money for the purpose of founding the Smithsonian Institution
4

and he left an additional amount for establishing a national university.
In spite of all this support for a national university, such an institu
tion was not established.

Rudolph contends that the idea became a dream

that often recurred in American History but never reached fruition
primarily because of hostile interests and beliefs.^

This dream was

partially realized in 1946 when the National War College was established.
Purposes of the College were "To prepare selected personnel of the
armed forces and the State Department for the exercise of joint high
level policy, command and staff functions, and for performance of
strategic planning duties in their respective departments, and to pro
mote the development of understanding [among the armed forces and other
agencies of government as well as industry] which a.re an essential part

g
of a national war effort."

This mission appears to coincide with the

idea expressed by Benjamin Rush in October, 1788 for a federal university.
Rush wanted a university that would prepare graduates for federal service.

4
Babbidge and Rozenweig, The Federal Interest in Higher Education,
p. 5. See also The Smithsonian Booklet, The Castle and Beyond prepared
as a service to members of the Smithsonian Associates.
^Frederick Rudolph, The American College and University:
(New York: Vintage Books, 1962), p. 42.

A History

g

Memorandum from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Joint Chiefs
of Staff "Directives for the National War College (J.C.S. 962/38," 13
October 1947, Modern Military Branch, Military Archives Division, Record
Group 218, Records of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff (CCS 352:
12-26-42. Section 7, Box 72) The National Archives, Washington, D.C.
^See notes to "Benjamin Russ on a Federal University, 1788" in
Hofstadter and Smith, A Documentary History, vol. 1, p. 153.
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This mission further appears to answer the desire of Washington for
establishment of a national institution with the "Primary object [of
educating] our Youth in the science of Government [and in the art of
g

war]."

Establishment of The National War College would also seem to

be in agreement with the notions of Jefferson, Washington and Noah
Webster that Americans should be provided with an alternative to a
9
European education.

The idea of

a national war college appears to fit

closer than any other institutionto the notion of establishing a
national university.
Just as the origins of American colleges of the colonial period
can be traced to European universities, so can the National War College
trace its antecedents to Europe.

Henry Barnard, contended thatthe

officers of the armed forces of the

colonies were trained abroad;

especially the prominent colonial artillery and engineer officers who
served during the Revolutionary War.

xl

We, therefore, must look for

the beginnings of high level American military education to England and
Germany.

See "Washington to Congress on a National University, 1790,
1796," Ibid., p. 158.
9
Babbidge and Rozenweig, The Federal Interest in Higher Education,
p. 5.
■^For discussions of early American colleges see Frederick Rudolph,
The American Colleges and Universities, pp. 1-135, and also Hofstadter
and Smith, A Documentary History, pp. 1-583.

11

Henry Barnard, Military Schools and Courses of Instruction in
the Science and Art of War in France, Prussia, Austria, Russia, Sweden,
Switzerland, Sardinia, England, and the United States, revised from the
original published by E. Steiger in 1872 in New York (New York:
Greenwood Press, 1969), pp. 719-720.
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During 1840-1849, Henry W. Halleck became the first person to call
for a professionally educated American military person.

12

Halleck was

impressed with the training that was carried out by French military
educators, particularly Jomini.

13

However, Lieutenant Colonel Emory

Upton should be given credit for bringing the European system of military
education to the United States; particular the German techniques.

14

Writing in Professors of W a r , Roland Spector contends that "The Army
Schools derived their inspiration from the example of Germany military
education.

Their model was the great Berlin Kriegsakademie which had

been founded by General Gerhardt von Scharnharst in 1810 to train officers
for high command and general staff work.

15

Upton, a protege of General

12

George S. Pappas, Prudens Futuri; The U.S. Army War College 19011967 (Carlisle Barracks, Pa: The Alumni Association of The U.S. War College
in Association with Walsworth Publishing Company, 1967), p. 7.
13
While impressed with Jomini, Halleck did not care much for the
Prussian military educator Clausewitz. Antoine Henri Jomini and Carl
Maria von Clausewitz were the foremost military thinkers and theorists
of the nineteenth century; particularly during the Napoleonic era.
Jomini, although a native of Switzerland, became the leading teacher of
military tactics and strategy in the French Army and was a great favorite
of early twentieth century American military men.
Clausewitz was perhaps
the most renowned teacher at the Berlin Kriegsakademie (War Academy) and
is most remembered for his military philosophy stressing the intangibles
of leadership and politics in war.
Clausewitz became a favorite of mid
twentieth century American military officers. The theories and
philosophies of both are still taught at the National War College and
each of the separate services' war colleges. For discussions of Jomini,
see Antoine Henri Jomini, The Art of W a r , trans. C. H. Mendell and W.P.
Craighill (Westport: Greenwood Press, Publishers, 1971) and also Jomini
and his Summary of W a r , ed. and intro. J. D. Hittle (Harrisburg, Pa:
Stockpole Books, 1965). For discussions of Clausewitz see Michael Howard
and Peter Paret, eds. and trans. Carl von Clausewitz: On War (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1976); also see Peter Paret, Clausewitz and
The State (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1976).
14

Ronald Spector, Professors of War (Newport, R.I.:
College Press, 1977), p. 16.

Naval War

15Ibid., p. 15.

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

18

William Tecumseh Sherman, in the company of Major George A Forsyth and
Captain J. P. Sanger, took a trip around the world in 1876 to study
military activities and military schools that were established in Asia
and Europe.

His visit took him to Japan, China, India, Persia, Italy,

Russia, Austria, Germany, France and England.

It was the German military

educational system in which he was most interested.

Prior to leaving

the United States, he received a letter from the War Department in
Washington, dated June 23, 1875 and signed by William W. Belknap,
Secretary of the Army, which instructed him to visit in Germany "The
schools for the instruction of officers in strategy, grand tactics,
applied tactics, and the higher duties in the art of war, and the
collection and compilation of such other information as might naturally
16
•jbe expected to be of utility to this Government." u

While Upton was

generally impressed by the armies of Asia and Europe that he visited,
he was particularly impressed by the German military education system,
and on his return to the United States wrote a report in 1878 which
set the standard for American military higher education.

In his

Armies of Asia and Europe, Upton concluded:
The corner-stone of the European staff system is the War
Academy, and next in importance is the constant interchange
between the staff and the line
. The War Academy, and the
staff and the line, thus constitute the school of instruc
tion for all of the great commanders of Europe, no less than
for the staff officers whose province it is to assist them.-^

16

Emory Upton, The Armies of Asia and Europe: Embracing Official
Reports on the Armies of Japan, China, India, Persia, Italy, Russia,
Austria, Germany, France and England (New York: Appleton and Company,
1878), p. iv.
17Ibid., p. 328.
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He further stated that:
Abroad, it is the universal theory that the art of war should
be studied only after an officer has arrived at full manhood
and therefore most governments have established post-graduate
institutions for nearly all arms of service where meritorious
officers from whatever sphere they may enter the army, may
study strategy, grand tactics, and all the sciences connected
with modern war. . . . . The institutions for the training of the
staff are known as War Academies, war schools and staff
colleges; for the artillery and engineers and cavalry they are
known generally as schools of application, or as advanced
artillery and engineer courses. °
America did have some post-graduate training of its artillery
officers; however, there were no war academy schools in the German,
French and British tradition.

The United States first approach to post

graduate military education was made in 1867 with the establishment of
the Artillery School of the United States Army at Fort Monroe, Virginia.
The institution was designed largely for the instruction of artillerymen
in light and heavy artillery tactics, the science of artillery, infantry
tactics, history, strategy,, engineering, law (including military law,
international law, U. S. constitutional law), and mathematics (including
19
algebra, geometry, and plane trigometry).

The instruction at this

school was so successful that Upton, who later became its commander,
suggested that the U. S. Army establish a similar post-graduate school
for the infantry and cavalry; one to be located in Atlanta and the other
at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

He further suggested that the United

State pay officers as military professors thereby obtaining a corps of
professional instructors.

He also recommended establishing a military

■^Ibid., pp. 362-363.
■^Ibid., pp. 363-364.

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

20

educational department within the War Department to inspect army colleges
and to which military professors could be attached.

20

Although a special

bureau did not result, a post-graduate school for infantry and cavalry
was established.
In 1881, General Sherman ordered that:

"As soon as the requisite

number of troops can be assembled at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, the com
manding general Department of the Missouri will take measures to
establish a school of application for infantry and cavalry similar to
the one now in operation for the artillery at Fort Monroe, Virginia."

21

Timothy K. Nenninger argues that although Sherman strongly believed in
military education and did much to improve the quality of the officer
corps, he was not prompted by high ideals in ordering the establishment
of the schools at Fort Leavenworth.

Rather, he issued the order as a

concession to friends and families so their boys could escape company
duty in the Indian country.

Sherman said:

"The school at Leavenworth

may do some good, and be a safety-value for those who are resolved to
escape from the drudgery of garrison life at small posts."

22

As it

turned out, the Fort Leavenworth schools became excellent institutions
for the training of infantry and cavalry officers for their roles in
modern warfare.

However, they still were not war academies in the

European sense.

According to Nenninger, Sherman wanted the Leavenworth

^Ibid., pp. 366-367.

21

Timothy K. Nenninger, The Leavenworth Schools and the Old Army:
Education, Professionalism, and the Officer Corps of the United States
Army, 1881-1918 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1978), p. 22.
22

Ibid., pp. 23. Also see Sherman to Sheridan, July 31, 1881.
Letterbook 95, Sherman Papers, Library of Congress.
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schools to be like war academies and prepare officers for high command,
however, the officers assigned there were junior lieutenants who did
not have the stature for high level training.
to develop competence in tactics, not strategy.

Their greatest need was
23

It was not until de

cades later that men of higher rank were assigned to Leavenworth.

Even

then, the curricular emphasis was on administrative, professional and
tactical instruction.

The first

senior

level military institution in

the United States did not occur until the Naval War College was established.
The Naval War College was established on October 6, 1884, by order
of the Secretary of the Navy.

The driving force behind the establishment

of the new institution was Stephen Bleecher Luce and his concept of professional education.

24

In an address before the Newport Branch of The

Naval Institute on April 4, 1883, Commodore Luce proposed establishment
of

a

post-graduate course where officers might have the opportunity of

studying the science and art of war as well as the laws of war based on
marine international law.

25

While he had previously expressed his ideas

in an article titled "War Schools" published in Proceedings of the United
States Naval Institute in 1883, Luce attributed the original idea for

23Ibid., p. 23.
24

Rear Admiral John D. Hayes, "Stephen B. Luce and the Beginnings
of the U. S. Naval War College", Naval War College Review, 23, (January,
1971), p. 51.
25

United States Naval War College, History of The United States
Naval War College, 1884-1958 (Washington: Naval Department Library,
Washington Naval Yard Microfilm number MIC lh, 1959) p. 1. See also
Stephen B. Luce, "The U. S. Naval War College," U.S. Naval Institute
Proceedings, 36 (1910), p. 560.
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such a course to his meeting with General Sherman in 1865.

26

However,

it was from the Army’s Artillery School at Fort Monroe and the new
Infantry and Cavalry Schools at Fort Leavenworth that he really derived
his inspiration.

27

He was particularly impressed by the Department of

Military Art and Science at Fort Monroe led by Emory Upton with whom he
exchanged correspondence.

Upton at the time was the leading member of

faculty of the Artillery School.

28

Luce said in a letter to his friend

W. C. Church "I used to talk with my old lamented friend General Upton
about it a great deal.
move in regard to it.

He was enthusiastic and urged me on to make a
But I have never seen my way clear until now."

29

Luce firmly believed that both intensive study and intellectual
effort were necessary preparations for conducting succes.
at sea.

ul operations

In his mind those in command at sea needed to comprehend the

theory of naval operations in addition to the techniques of the profession.
With both a theoretical and technical background, through which their own
actions could be seen, the student would posses a perspective of national
and international affairs.

30

To this end, the first concern of Luce was

26

Rear Admiral John D. Hayes, "Stephen B. Luce and The Beginnings
of the U. S. Navy War College," p. 51. See also Rear Admiral Austin M.
Knight and Lieutenant William D. Pulson, History of the United States
Naval War College (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College, 1916), p. 1.
27Ibid., p. 52.
28

Rear Admiral John D. Hayes, "Stephen B. Luce and The Beginnings
of the Naval War College," p. 52. Also see Ronald Spector, Professors
of W ar, p p . 14-15.
29

John D. Hays and John B. Hattendorf, ed. The Writings of
Stephen B. Luce (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College, 1975), p. 11.
30

Hayes and Hattendorf, Writings of Luce, p. 37.
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to organize a highly qualified faculty.

He employed a friend, Captain

Alfred Thayer Mahan who was at the Naval Academy with him, and assigned
him to teach naval history and tactics.

One of the most promising

officers of the navy at the time, and already distinguished as a writer
on naval education and naval warfare, Mahan was to later distinguish
himself both as an Admiral and as the second President of the Naval War
College.

Luce also asked for "an officer learned in military science

who could best be supplied by the Army" and obtained Lieutenant Tasker
A. Bliss, who was discribed by the Army's Adjutant General as the most
accomplished officer in the profession.
at Fort Monroe.
War I.

Bliss was Adjutant of the school

He later served as Chief of Staff of the Army in World

For the position as instructor in international law, Luce chose

James Russell Soley, prolific writer and distinguished lecturer at The
Lowell Institute.

Soley had been head of the Department of English

Studies, History and Law at the Naval Academy.

31

In addition to Mahan,

Bliss and Soley, Commander Henry C. Taylor, the College's third presi
dent, lectured on naval tactics.

Also, Union Generals John C. Palfrey

and George H. Gordon, and historian John C. Ropes lectured on military

For a complete discussion on the founding and early days of the
Naval War College, see the United States Naval War College's History
of The United States Naval War College, 1884-1958 (Washington: Naval
Department Library, Washington Naval Yard: Microfilm number MIC.lh,
1959), pp. 1-21.
Also see, John D. Hayes and John B. Hattendorf, ed.,
The Writings of Stephen B. Luce (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College,
1975); Rear Admiral Austin M. Knight and Lieutenant William D. Puleston,
History of The United States Naval War College, (Newport, R.I.: Naval
War College, 1916); and Captain S. M. Barnes, Commander W.M. Kaufman
and Commander H. T. Gannon, The United States Naval War College— A
Staff Study of its Historical Background, Mission and Educational
Philosophy, Principles and Concepts from Which the Second Year of the
Course, in Naval Warfare Was Derived (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College,
1954).
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operations of the Civil War.
of the College.

These seven men formed the first faculty

A series of lectures by Soley highlighted the first

session, and became the foundation for the international law program
that gained worldwide recognition for the Naval War College.

The army's

Lieutenant Bliss's contribution to The Naval War College was no less
outstanding.

According to Ronald Spector, Bliss contributed the use of

a comparative method which ultimately helped to make naval warfare a
science.

Spector says "He was a link between the new military science

as developed in the European staff schools and the naval officers who
were to apply it to sea warfare."

32

He was nevertheless an anomaly at

the Naval War College because he was a soldier and not in the navy.

33

However, Tasker Bliss not only became a distinguished instructor at the
Naval War College, he also became one of the founders and the chief
architect as well as the first President of The Army War College.
There were some senior military officers who during the last
quarter of the nineteenth century called for the creation of an Army
War College or for some other type of post-graduate school specifically
designed for Army officers.

General Emory Upton, like many who followed

him, wanted an Academy patterned after that in Germany.
cautioned that Upton

George Pappas

did not maintain any thought of completely copying

the Prussian organization nor the policy of its War Academy.
Upton was known to have said:

32
33
College:
p. 2.

In fact,

"West Point is, in my judgement, far

Ronald Spector, Professors of W a r , p. 29.
Philip A. Crowl, "Education versus Training at the Naval War
1884-1974", Naval War College Review, 26 (Nov-Dee. 1973),
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superior to any academy abroad for preparatory training of officers.
But once in service, we have nothing to compare with the war academies
of Europe except the Artillery School."

34

So, the call went out from

Upton and others to create an Army War College.
As a result of the pressure for such an institution, particularly
from Major General William H. Carter who made him aware of Upton's
report, Secretary of War Elihu Root formally proposed an Army War Col
lege.

Just as the case with Stephen B. Luce when he proposed the Naval

War College, Root met strong resistence from some senior officers of
the War Department.

Also like Luce, he realized that congressional

support was necessary for an official reoganization

to accommodate

such an institution, but he did not seek the support of key members of
the Congress as did Luce.

Rather, "He took unilateral and executive

action in the name of the President by establishing a War College with
general staff functions.

. . .by Special Order Number 42, 19 February

1900. . . .and Special Order Number 145, 21 June 1 9 0 0 . " ^

In the early

days of the institution, there were fears among its proponents that it
would become merely a general staff organization even though Brigidier
General William Ludlow, who served as President of the board charged
with bringing the College into existence, and General (then Lieutenant
Colonel) William Carter planned it as an institution where emphasis
would be placed on education and not general staff functions.

It was,

"^George S . Pappas, The U. S. Army War College 1901-1967, p . 8.

^ I b i d . , pp. 13-14.
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however, not until 1903 that the Army War College became a functioning
reality.

The first class did not report until 1904 and consisted of

nine majors and captains; one of whom was to gain lasting recognition
as an eminent American military hero— Captain John J. Pershing.

36

It should be noted that according to George S. Pappas, The Naval
War College and The Army War College were quite similiar in character:
Instructional methods were almost identical, although
the Naval War College scheduled more lectures. The
Naval College placed greater reliance on outside ex
pertise, including civilian academicians, although
The Army War College was gradually scheduling more
and more visiting lecturers. Each, moreover, empha
sized the tactics and strategy of its own service.37
However, unlike The Naval War College, the faculty of The Army War
College and The General Staff continue to work so closely together that
at times it was difficult to distinguish the two.

In fact, until 1916

when The National Defense Act forbade individuals of The General Staff
from serving both as general staff officers and as members of the
College faculty, it was customary for the military members to serve
the dual capacity.

in

Nonetheless, close cooperation between the two con-r

tinued to exist until 1917 when The War College closed for the duration
of World War I as an academic institution.

When the College was

reopened in 1919, it was called The General Staff College; and in 1921
in order to reflect mandates of The National Defense Act of June, 1920,

36

Ibid., p. 41. It should be noted that although Pershing was a
member of the first class, he did not graduate because of reassignment
to the Far East.
(See Pappas, p. 47).
37

lb id., p . 78.
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the original name - The Army War College was reestablished.

As World

War I drew to a close, a weakness in the curriculum of The Army War
College became evident.

There was found to be insufficient instruction

in industrial preparedness.

As a result, the need for an industrial

course for the military became obvious.
Problems of industrial mobilization during World War I were well
known to both military and civilian leaders.

Public disclosures of war

time failures in the field of supply led to a congressional investiga
tion.

Out of this investigation came the requirement to train military

men to plan for industrial mobilization.

As a result, on February 25,

1924 The Army Industrial College was established.

The Army Industrial

College continued to function until 1941 when it was closed for the
duration of World War II.

When the College resumed operation in January,

1946, its name was changed to its present title, The Industrial College
of The Armed Forces.

It was reconstituted

as a joint educational

institution operating under the Joint Chiefs of Staff in September 1948
with The Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps serving as equal partners
in the staff, faculty, and student body.

38

The Industrial College of The Armed Forces became the only Senior
Service College with the primary mission of providing a course of study
in resource management for purposes of national security.

Its curriculum

was designed to address management skills and practices related to human
and material resources, analytical techniques, global resource issues

38

Hayden J. Price, "Student Diversity— ICAF's Unique Solution"
Armed Forces Management 15 (March 1969):
68.
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and the national economy.

39

Just as the need for instruction in industrial subjects became
evident in World War I, the need for education in greater interservice
cooperation became obvious during World War II.

This led to the

creation of the Joint Army and Navy Staff College during the war.
A War Department memorandum in June 1943 authorized the establish
ment of The Joint Army and Navy Staff College (ANSCOL) under the juris
diction of The Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The purpose of this College was

to provide a special course of instruction for qualified Army, Navy,
Air Corps, and Marine Corps officers who were selected to increase their
efficiency in the performance of command and staff duties in unified and
coordinated operations of Army and Navy forces.

40

The College, intended

as a temporary activity during the War, was located in Washington, D.C.
in order to maintain close contact with the high command of the services
and also in order to take advantage of existing facilities.
The Joint Chiefs established the criteria for the faculty and
students.

The Commandant had to be a graduate of both The Army War

College and of The Naval War College.

Military faculty members had to

be graduates of one of the Senior Service Colleges and also had to pos
sess experience in joint operations.

Civilian instructors and lecturers

had to be distinguished in fields such as government and military history.

39

National Defense University, "Fact Sheet", (March 1, 1978).

^ W a r Department Memorandum No. W350-154-3, "Army and Navy Staff
College" (Documents Number A45254 and A44766)" 4 June 1943 Modern
Military Branch, Military Archives Division, Record Group 218, Records
of The United States Chiefs of Staff (CCS 352:12-26-42 Section 1, Box
241), The National Archives.
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Sixty percent of the students were to be from the Army, forty percent
from the Navy and from the Air Force.

As a minimum, each had to be the

equivalent of a Lieutenant Colonel with the exception of some Majors who
had distinguished service records.

In this regard, Colonels could not

be over 45 years old, Lieutenant Colonels not over 40 and Majors could
not be over 35 years old.

41

Based on an agreement between Admiral Leahy

and Secretary of State Edward.R. Stettinus, three foreign service officers
of the State Department were assigned to each class beginning in September, 1944.

42

Lieutenant General John L. DeWitt was selected as the first Com
mandant of ANSCOL.

The curriculum of the College was to be prepared by

the Commandants of the Army's Command and General Staff School, the
Naval War College and the Air Force's School of Applied Tactics.

ANSCOL

opened on Jun 1, 1943 at Georgetown University as a mid-level service
college.

It later evolved into the National War College.

There was, however, one other Senior Service School.

The Air War

College, the top professional school of the United States Air Force,
was established at Maxwell Air Force Base (Montgomery), Alabama in March

41

Joint Chiefs of Staff Paper 185, 3 January 1943 Modern Military
Branch, Military Archives Division, Record Group 218, Records of The
United States Chiefs of Staff (CCS 352: 12-26-42, Section 1, Box 241),
The National Archives.
42

Joint Chiefs of Staff Paper 952/1, 8 August 1944 Modern Military
Branch, Military Archives Division, Record 218, Records of The United
States Chiefs of Staff (CCS 352: 12-26-42, Section 2, Box 241), The
National Archives.
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1946 with Major General Orvil A. Anderson as the first commandant.

43

Formed as a constituent part of the Air University, the Air War College
became an important part of the family of Senior Service Schools.
However, because of the lateness of its founding (only four months
prior to the National War College), and partly due to the fact that
planning for the National War College had been underway for almost a
year when it was estblished, the Air War College does not serve as a
significant antecedent of the National War College.
One can conclude, therefore, that the establishment of the
National War College partially fulfilled the desire expressed by George
Washington and others for a national university.

However, like all its

antecedents and like the American universities of the Colonial period,
the National War College was greatly influenced by European educational
institutions; particularly, military schools.

Emory Upton, having

studied the military schools of Europe, especially the German techniques
for training military officers for service at the highest levels, imported
the German system of military training to the United States.

Although

America had already established post-graduate training for officers at
the Artillery School, Fort Monroe, Virginia, it was not like that of
the German War Academy.

The establishment of the schools at Fort

Leavenworth were also not up to par with the German standards.

It was

not until the Naval War College was established that the United States

/ Q

Ed Gates, "New Look at The Air War College," Air Force Magazine
60 (January, 1977), p. 54. See also Masland and Radway, Soldiers and
Scholars, p. 328.
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had a comparable institution.

This college, along with the Army War

College which was founded twenty years later, gave the United States
the capability to train officers for their traditional technical roles
in military operations, and also enabled the armed forces to train their
military students to become proficient in strategy and policy thereby
making it possible to assign them to the highest levels of government
operations as well as permitting them to assume high level military
command and staff positions.

The late date of establishment of The Air

War College made that institution an insignificant factor in the estab
lishment of the National War College.

However, the Industrial College

of the Armed Forces and the Army and Navy Staff College (ANSCOL) were
not only significant forerunners of the National War College but both
added new dimensions to post-graduate training of American military
officers; the former in industrial mobilization training and the latter
in training for joint and combined operations.
Although ANSCOL was not a Senior Service School as envisaged in
this study, its importance in the founding of the National War College
should not be underestimated because it was from this temporary school
that the National War College emerged as a permanent Senior Service
College following World War II.

Therefore, in order to determine

factors influencing the development of the National War College, it
was important that reasons for establishing ANSCOL be investigated along
with causes leading to the establishment of the Industrial College of
the Armed Forces, the Army War College, and Naval War College.

An

analysis of the establishment of each of these schools will help to
provide insight into the founding of the National War College.

Since

the Naval War College was the first established, an examination of
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reasons leading to its founding will be the first concern of the next
chapter.
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CHAPTER III
FACTORS INFLUENCING DEVELOPMENT OF SENIOR SERVICE COLLEGES

Senior Service Schools were established for purposes other than
that of command and staff schools, and officer career schools.

These

latter institutions were lower level schools designed to teach
officers fundamental military skills, leadership, tactical operations,
logistics operations, and staff responsibilities.

The senior insti

tutions dealt less with these day-to-day military concerns and more
with concepts like strategy, defense management, and national security
policy.

On balance, the Senior Service Schools were established to

prepare the most promising officers at mid-career for duty at the
highest levels.

Yet, each had its own reason for being.^

In a speech, August 20, 1906 at the U.S. Naval War College,
Stephen B. Luce said that institution was established "For an advanced
course of professional study where officers could bring to the inves
tigation of the various problems of naval warfare the scientific
method adopted in other professions . . .

to raise naval warfare from the

empirical stage to the dignity of a s c i e n c e . T h e reasons for estab
lishing the College were apparently clear to Luce in 1906 in contrast

Maureen My lander, "The War Colleges: A Wasted Resource,"
Times Magazine. March 7, 1977, p. 7.

The

^United States Naval War College, History of the United States
Naval War College:
1884-1958 (Washington: Naval Department Library,
Washington Naval Yard, Microfilm, MIC,
lh,
1959) p. 1.

33

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

34

to the first presentation of his draft proposal for a naval war col
lege in November, 1882.

John D. Hayes made a strong case of the lack

of clarity by Luce when he attempted to draw a distinction between a
3

war college and a line graduate school.

Even the board of officers

appointed by Secretary of the Navy William E. Chandler to determine
the feasibility of establishing such a college never made a clear
4
distinction between the two.
A review of the curriculum that Luce proposed for the school tend
to support the contention by Hayes that Luce was not clear on the type
post-graduate training he proposed.

While the science of war, mili

tary and naval history, military and international law, and modern
languages would seem to be the type of studies in a curriculum appro
priate for a high level post-graduate naval war academy; the inclusion
of naval tactics, astronomy, hydrography, naval architecture, and
marine engineering (subjects appropriate for a lower level naval
operations and tactics course) would appear to make the school a
staff college rather

than a war academy.

Yet, one must keep in

3
Rear Admiral John D. Hayes, "Stephen B. Luce and The Beginnings
of the U.S. Naval War College," The Naval War College Review 23 (Jan
uary, 1971): p. 52.
4
Luce prepared a draft general order on March 10, 1884 that
would officially set up the Naval War College, and on May 3, 1884
Secretary of the Navy Chandler appointed a board consisting of Luce,
Commander William T. Sampson and Lieutenant Commander Casper F.
Goodrich to report upon the whole subject of a post-graduate course
for naval officers including the reason for establishing such a school,
the scope and intent of the proposed course of instruction, and an
opinion as to the best location for the school. For further details
see Hayes, "Stephen B. Luce and the Beginnings of The War College,"
pp. 53-54.
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mind that Luce had no model for the kind of institution he was pro
posing.

Surely there were war academies and staff colleges in

Europe, but these were essentially army rather than naval schools.
Additionally, although the United States had post-graduate schools
at Fort Monroe and Fort Leavenworth, these also were army schools.
There were no naval war colleges from which a model could be drawn.
The United States Naval War College was to be unique.

Not only was

it to be the first armed services war college in the United States,
it was recognized by many to be the first formally organized naval
war college anywhere.^

It should then be no surprise that Luce

turned to the most available source he had for a curriculum guide—
the U.S. Army Schools at Fort Monroe and Fort Leavenworth.

However,

while he adopted a curriculum similar to that at the Army’s schools,
he nonetheless "fostered the assumption of a true war college status
by emphasizing the study of national strategy as a combination of
g
sea and land power."

The three principal European staff colleges were the
Kriegsakademie founded in Germany in 1810, the British Staff College
opened in 1858 and France’s Ecole Suparieure de Guerre established in
1878. The British Royal Naval College at Greenwich was also in
existence; however, this school offered only technical courses which
had no relation either to the process of fighting or to the princi
ples of war. For additional information, see W. Royce Powell, "The
United States Naval War College," Navy 2 (October, 1959)p. 37; also
Timothy K. Nenninger, The Leavenworth Schools and the Old Army; Edu
cation, Professionalism and the Officer Corps of the United States
Army 1881-1918 (Westport, Conn. and London: Greenwood Press, 1978),
p. 11; and see Ronald Spector, Professors of War (Newport, R.I.: Naval
War College Press, 1977), p. 38.
0
W. Royce Powell, "The United States Naval War College," p. 37.
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One reason for the establishment of the Naval War College is
found in a letter written by Luce to Secretary of the Navy Richard
W. Thompson in August, 1877.

As reported by Barnes, Kaufman, and

Gannon, Luce advocated in the letter "A school wherein our junior
officers would be carried through a post-graduate course consisting
of the higher branches of their profession.

The leading features of

the post-graduate course was to be the carrying of the young officers
7

through a course of instruction in the art of war."

This letter

was written five years before Luce drafted the proposal for the
establishment of a naval war college.

Moreover, this letter revealed

his real motivation for the establishment of a naval war college.

He

wanted the navy to have a post-graduate school similar to the Army’s
Artillery School at Fort Monroe.

He was inspired by what the Army

was doing for the professional improvement of its officers, and felt
g

the Nayy could do the same.

Luce was enthusiastic about his proposal

and prior to its final acceptance wrote to his son-in-law, Lieutenant
Boutelle Noyes in July, 1883:
My great hobby, now that the training system is
fairly established, is to erect a "War School"
for officers . . . I have the plan roughly mapped
out . . . I have presented my plan to the Secretary
but he has not had time to give the matter his
attention. . . Whether it will end up in smoke or
not I cannot say.^

Captain S. M. Barnes, Commander W. M. Kaufman and Commander
H. T. Gannon, The United States Naval War College— A Staff Study of
its Historical Background, Mission and Educational Philosophy: Prin
ciples and Concepts from which the Second Year of the Course in Naval
Warfare was Derived (Newport, R. I.: Naval War College, 1954), p. C-l.
Q

Admiral John D. Hayes, "Stephen B. Luce and The Beginnings of
The U.S. Naval War College," p. 52.
^Ibid.
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According to Thomas B. Buell, Luce definitely knew the type of
school he wanted.

This would appear to refute charges made by Hayes

that things were not clear in the mind of Luce.

More importantly,

Luce realized that his proposal would not be popular within the navy,
so in order to gain support he delivered a speech, to the Naval
Institute on April 4, 1883.

This speech on "War Schools" was really

a tongue-in-cheek assessment of naval post-graduate education vis-avis the Army's training.

Buell contends that Luce gave an impressive

summary of the Army's advance warfare schooling in the speech and
admonished his fellow naval officers that "The Army had been studying
war while the Navy had been studying f o s s i l s . T h e r e f o r e , while
there is some controversy over whether or not Luce knew exactly what
type of naval post-graduate war academy he wanted, there is little
doubt as to the major reason for its establishment; the traditional
Army-Navy rivalry.
time.

The two services had been competitors for a long

Neither wanted to be out-done by the other.

Now that the Army

had taken an early lead in the provision of post-graduate professional
education, some in the Navy fretted and wanted to catch up.

Army

officials were just as determined to maintain its pre-eminence since
that seryice was the first in America to establish post-graduate mili
tary education although not at the senior level.
According to Timothy K. Nenninger, the need for post-graduate
military education was obvious by the close of the nineteenth century.
The experience in Europe and the demands of the military profession

■^Lieutenant Commander Thomas B. Buell, "Admiral Raymond A.
Spruance and the Naval War College: Part I— Preparing for World War II,"
Naval War College Review 23 (March, 1971), pp. 32-33.
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in the United States required it.

He argues that the question was no

longer academic but bureaucratic— when, how, and in what form would the
American A m y undertake a systematic education of its regular officers
and men?

11

Nenninger explains that it was important for the United

States Army at the time to have well-trained, professional officers to
cope with the technological, organizational, and tactical changes
occuring in warfare during the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries.

12

One should note that by the end of the nineteenth cen

tury, the idea that war could be carried on by amateurs became obso
lete.

Further, the earlier idea that war was in the province of the

charismatic leader or the "Great Captain" genius was also rejected.

13

Nenninger contends that even though one's experience and socio
economic background as well as his place in the social organization
of the profession had an effect on his professional development, edu
cation was also needed.

He says:

Professional education is also important because it
affects the development of corporateness, responsibility
and expertise. For the military profession schooling is
particularly significant because of the limited oppor
tunities officers have to practice their profession— to
command and manage troops in combat. Other than war,
school is among the principal means by which officers
can develop professional expertise.^

"^Timothy K. Nenninger, The Leavenworth Schools and the Old Army,
p. 18.
12Ibid., p. 3.
13

Ronald Spector, Professors of W a r , p. 15. For a discussion of
war in the nineteenth century see Theodore Ropp, War in the Modern
World (New York: Collier Books, 1962), pp. 143-194.
14

Timothy K. Nenninger, The Leavenworth Schools and the Old
Army, p . 6.
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Some senior Army officials had long recognized the need for profes
sional training of their regular officers.

They had studied the

effects of professional training on their regular officers.

They had

studied the effects of professional schooling on officers in the
armies of Russia and Germany.

They saw how this type training

improved the effectiveness of the European officers and they wanted
to do the same for American Army officers.

However, the situation in

the United States was further complicated by a number of factors.
While the United States Army was headed by a Commanding General
and there was a War Department staff, the commander did not always
have the support of the staff officers.

These bureau chiefs, accord

ing to Pappas, regarded themselves as subject directly and only to
the orders of the Secretary of War and not the Commanding General."^
Consequently, difficulties arose as to how the Army would be adminis
tered and would function in the future.

Emerging from this complex

command and staff structure was the inability to fix the responsibility
for the professional education of the regular army personnel.

It was

true that there were post-graduate schools operating at Fort Monroe
and Fort Leavenworth, and that in 1866 the Engineer School at Willets
Point, New York was established.

However, the responsibility for the

conduct of these schools and the determination of their curricula,
fell to the individual arms and services concerned with the type
training conducted at the schools.

Pappas says "Little coordination

and even less centralized control could be exercised under the exist-

■^George S. Pappas, Prudens Futuri; The U.S. Army War College,
1901-1967 (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: The Wadsworth Publishing Company,
1967), p. 5.
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ing staff and command structure."

16

Another complication was the fact

that permanent assignment of officers to the various bureaus of the
War Department caused these officers to become entrenched in the
Washington scene.

Therefore, they made their own contacts among the

members of the Congress and the civilians of the executive branch,
and as a result felt they had gained sufficient status to justify
their providing advice directly to the Secretary of War rather than
to The Commanding General.^

These complications caused anxiety

among many senior officers and pointed up the need for a reorganiza
tion of the Army before a system of professional military education
at the higher levels could be instituted effectively.
It is therefore little wonder that Secretary of War Elihu Root
proposed a reorganization that included the creation of an interim
general staff and the establishment of an army war college to house
that staff.

It was Root's intent that the head of each department of

the general staff and his assigned officers be detailed for limited
periods to the college not only to direct the instruction but also to
acquire the necessary experience in planning to enable them to provide
sound advice to the commander.

18

This creation of an interim gene

ral staff became the immediate cause for establishing the Army War
College.

However there were, according to Pappas, three concomitant

purposes in establishing the College.

These were "To further higher

Ibid., p . 6.
17T,. ,
Ibid.
18Ibid., p. 13.
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instruction of Army personnel, to develop and organize existing means
of education into a coherent and unified system, and to serve as a
coordinating and authoritative agency through which all kinds of pro
fessional military information would be available to the War Department
at any time."

19

Even Pappas admits that functions assigned to The

Army War College went far beyond that expected of an educational insti
tution, and that it would appear "The initial concept primarily con
cerned the function of The War College as a general staff rather than
as an education institution."

20

Although the Congress in making appro

priations supported Root in his determination to use The War College
as the vehicle for an interim general staff, it was primarily through
the efforts of Brigadier William H. Carter that the focus of the War
College was turned toward educational functions rather than its use
as a general staff training ground.

21

His constant lobbying with Root

convinced him that a real educational institution was needed.

As a

result, an act authorizing the creation of a true general staff became
effective in August, 1903 and Major General Samuel B. M. Young, who as
the president of the first War College Board directed both the interim
general staff and the College, became the first Chief of Staff of the
Army.

This enabled the War College to become a separate activity with

Brigadier General Tasker Bliss as its first president.

To him fell the

task of making the Army War College not only the second Senior Service
College in the U.S. military but also a true educational institution.

19

Ibid., p. 15.

2^Ibid., p. 16.
21Ibid., p. 28.
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The Army's leadership in promoting education as a means of pro
viding a professional military force has already been detailed.
Although the establishment of its own War College as one of the pre
miere military training institutions was preceded two decades by the
Navy's War College, it nonetheless wasted little time in making the
school a comparable institution.

Additionally, the Army was quick to

recognize inadequacies in its program and to call for corrective mea
sures.

Between the two world wars, education for and within the Army

received far greater attention than ever before.

This was a reflection

of both the emphasis placed on preparedness in peacetime and on the
increasing complexity of modern war.

22

The need for a different type

high level institution— one to prepare personnel for advanced national
security management assignments became evident.

The result was the

founding of the Industrial College of The Armed Forces (ICAF).
*
ICAF did not begin as a Senior Service School.
part of the Army.

It began as a

Known at first as the Army Industrial College, "It

was established in recognition of the high importance of logistical
training for the conduct of modern war."

23

To understand this need,

one must understand the status of logistics in the A m y through the
end of World War I.

24

The matching of the means with the ends— the

coordination of logistics with strategy— had been a continuous problem

Maurice Matloff, (ed.), American Military History (Washington:
Office of the Chief of Military History, 1969), p. 409.

23t
u-j
Ibid.
24

The Army's Chief of Military History defines logistics as "The
art of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces...
Logistics deals with the deployment of military forces and their equip
ment to the area of war, and with innumerable services, such as feeding,
clothing, supplying, transporting, and housing troops." For additional
information see Maurice Matloff (ed.) American Military History, p. 12.
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for the Army since its beginning.

Obtaining and delivering

supplies and equipment to troops was often a hit and miss proposition
from the colonial period through World War I.

In spite of this,

logistics continued to be revealed as important factors in determining
where and when battles would be held.

At times the supply system that

was devised failed such as during the War of 1812.

At other times

prior detailed logistical planning and the judicious use of supplies
and equipment insured victory as it did for Generals Grant and Sherman
during the Civil War.

However, there was no military school solely

dedicated to teaching higher level logistical planning.
In this respect, the Army Industrial College became a pioneer
institution.

Training in marshalling the nation's economic strength

and planning industrial mobilization became a reality.

25

Having been

closed during World War II by the War Department, pressure was exerted
by senior Army officers in 1943 to reopen the College as the Army
deyeloped demobilization plans.

Although other Army officers suggested

sending personnel to the Harvard School of Business for industrial
training, advocates for reopening the school prevailed and the Indus
trial College was reopened; but not as an Army school.

According to

Hayden J. Price, it was reconstituted as a joint educational institu
tion operating under the direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with
Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps personnel serving as equal
partners in the staff, faculty, and the student body.

It was renamed

25

Hayden J. Price, "Student Diversity— ICAF's Unique Solution,"
Armed Forces Management 15 (March, 1969), p. 68.
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the Industrial College of The Armed Forces.

26

The failure of indus

trial preparedness during World War I had been the primary cause for
the establishment of this institution.
Experiences of war helped both military and civilian leaders to
realize the importance of educational preparation of armed service
personnel for high level responsibilities.

Moreover, wartime experi

ences also tended to point to the need for studies in staff coordination and joint operations among the various military services.

27

It is to such experiences that one can trace the establishment of The
National War College.
Early in World War II, American leaders became aware that the
growing complexity of planning and conducting military operations at
high levels demanded greatly increased training, as well as more

78
emphasis on joint operations and staff coordination."

As a result,

in the Fall of 1942 General "Hap" Arnold recommended to the Joint
Chiefs of Staff that an all service college be created to provide
training in joint planning and operations.

The idea was to "train

officers of the arms in the exercise of command and performance of
staff duties in unified and coordinated Army and Navy Commands".

29

The establishment of the Army-Navy Staff College (ANSCOL) resulted in
June, 1943.

Reflecting a growing recognition of the inseparability

26Ibid.
. .
t i

27

John Wesley Masland and Laurence I. Radway, Soldiers and
Scholars: Military Education and National Policy (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1957), p. 140.
28

The Rotunda: The Graduating Class of 1974 (Washington: The
National War College, 1974), p. 10.
29

Ibid.
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of foreign policy and military policy, and thus the advisability of
combined training of both future military and civilian leaders who
would influence the planning and conduct of national security affairs,
Foreign Service Officers became students at ANSCOL along with individuals from the Army and Navy.

30

The wartime success of this tempo

rary institution helped to cause military and civilian leaders to call
for the creation of a permanent post war joint service school.

As

usual in the military, a board of officers was created to study the
suggestions.
In 1946, Lieutenant General Leonard T. Gerow was appointed
President of the War Department Military Education Board.

Commonly

known as the "Gerow Board", it was the final report by this group that
contained the first description of what was to become the permanent
successor to ANSCOL— The National War College.

31

The recommendations

of the Gerow Board contained a proposal that an education system be
established for officers of the Army consisting of a National Security
University, an Armed Forces Staff College, and schools and colleges
operating under the supervision of Army Major Commands.

32

It was the

intent of The Board that the National Security University consist

of

an Administrative College, an Intelligence College, a National War
College, an Industrial College, and tentatively a State Department
College.

33

31_, .j
Ibid.
32

U.S. War Department, "Report of War Department Military Educa
tion Board on Educational System for Officers of the Army," p. 10.
33

Ibid., p. 27. Also see George S. Stansfield's unpublished
Chronology, "The National Defense University: Background-Army War Col
lege and Industrial College," 1980, The National Defense University.
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The purpose of The National Security University as determined
by The Board, was to assure the development of officers capable of
high command and staff duties in connection with the prevention of
war, preparation for and prosecution of war on a global scale, and
the execution of responsibilities of the Armed Forces subsequent to
hostilities.

34

It was stated in the Board report:

a.

That there exists a requirement for a National
War College to cover part of the instruction
formerly included in the scope of the A m y War
College and the Army and Navy Staff College is
indisputable.
Instruction dealing with the
operational aspects of field forces is included
in the proposed Armed Forces Staff College.

b.

World War I demonstrated the need for an
Industrial College and this institution is
now accepted as an essential part of our
military educational system.

c.

Experience in World War II established the need
for more thorough training of officers in the
handling of personnel and intelligence problems,
particularly on the national and highest military
level. The Administrative College and the
Intelligence College are proposed to meet that
requirement.^

Even though a National Security University was not founded, two
of the proposed colleges were established.

The National War College

and the Industrial College were founded along with the proposed sepa
rate Armed Forces Staff College.

The Board intended that The National

War College be concerned with grand strategy and the utilization of
the national resources to implement that strategy.

In this connection,

34

Idem, "Report of War Department Military Education Board on
Educational System for Officers of the Army," p. 27.
35Ibid., p. 28.
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the scope of instruction was to include the political, civil, logis
tical and operational interests and responsibilities of The Joint
Chiefs of Staff, The War, and Naval Departments.
the Board intended that studies include:

Within this scope,

grand strategy and war

planning, foreign and domestic policies of all nations and their
effect on world stability, causes and prevention of war, the economic
and social resources of nations and their relationship to war potential,
joint policies and joint doctrines, mobilization and demobilization,
policies for operations with allies, trends of future wars and their
implications, and Armed Forces responsibilities after cessation of
active hostilities.

36

Looking back over the factors influencing the establishment of the
various Senior Service Schools, it was found that experiences stemming
from war was the foremost reason for founding the institutions.

This

was the case regarding the establishment after World War I of The
Army Industrial College that later became The Industrial College of
The Armed Forces.

In like fashion experiences gained in World War II

served to cause the establishment of the Army-Navy Staff College that
later evolved into The National War College.

Yet, war experience was

not the only cause for establishing Senior Service Schools.

The Army's

success with its post-graduate training and the need for like type
training in the Navy appears to be the real reason for establishing
the Naval War College.

Secondary reasons for founding the Naval War

College were the desire of Luce to provide a place where scientific
method could be applied to problems of naval warfare, and a place where

"^Ibid., p. 29.
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officers could become professional through post-graduate studies.
While it seemed desirable to have a place where Army officers could
gain professional training at the post-graduate level, this does not
appear to be the main factor in the establishment of The Army War
College,

Rather, the need to reorganize the Army and to provide for

a general staff served as the immediate cause for establishing that
College.

Other purposes for founding the Army War College included

elements such as expansion of higher education for Army personnel, the
development and organization of a united Army education system, and
the provision of a coordinating and authoritative agency for the
dissemination of military information.
Factors influencing the establishment of the Senior Service
Schools provide one with ideological and practical reasons for the
existences of the schools.

Since the reasons for these schools were

devised by individuals, it would be necessary to examine attitudes
and influences held by the military and civilian leaders involved in
order to understand the causes.
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CHAPTER IV
ROLES, ATTITUDES AND INFLUENCES OF INDIVIDUALS IN THE FORMATION
OF SENIOR SERVICE COLLEGES

Senior service education has not always been popular.

Most of

the senior schools had just as many enemies as friends during their
formative years, and the support they did receive from many military
and civilian leaders was often lukewarm at best.^"

The military had

been particularly affected by a syndrome that Professor Philip A.
Crowl and Ronald Spector refer to as "technicism."

According to

Spector, technicism was the tendency among some officers to emphasize
training in technical skills at the expense of general military knowledge.

2

Crowl contends that Stephen B. Luce was an early leader in

the fight against technicism.

Arguing that a naval officer should

cease to be exclusively a navigator, a seaman, a gunner, or an engi
neer and become a professional in the art and science of war, Luce was
thrust into the forefront of the military educational revolution of
the 1880's and 1890's "that was to propel the armed services of the
3

United States out of what has rightly been called the dark ages."

■*"John Wesley Masland and Laurence I. Radway, Soldier and Scho
lars: Military Education and National Policy (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1957), p. 142.
2

Ronald Spector, Professors of War (Newport, R. I.:
College Press, 1977), p. 10.

Naval War

3

Philip A. Crowl, "Education Versus Training at the Naval War
College: 1884-1972," Naval War College Review 26 (November-December,
1973), p. 4.
49
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In spite of the efforts of men like Luce, Emory Upton, Alfred Thayer
Mahan, Tasker Bliss and Elihu Root, this military intellectual revolu
tion did not come easy.

Old animosities against post-graduate educa

tion of military officers and the desire by many to maintain techni
cism as a basis for military professional development were strong and
4

not easy to overcome.

Infusion of these old prejudices into the

early development of the Naval War College is a case in point.
According to Crowl, "During the first two decades the mere
existence of a [Naval] War College seemed to provoke only two reactions
among most naval officers and Washington politicians: one, indiffe
rence; two, outright hostility, and of these, the second was predomi
nant."^
Crowl.

Lieutenant Commander Thomas B. Buell appears to agree with
Buell said:

The Navy response [to the proposal for a Naval War
College] was indifference and hostile. But Luce pre
vailed and the Naval War College was established. . . It
had many enemies and few friends.6
Rear Admiral John D. Hayes also points out the attitude held by many
concerning the Naval War College.

Hayes contends that Secretary of

the Navy Richard W. Thompson to whom Luce first submitted a proposal
for a naval war college never acknowledged receipt of the letters
from Luce.

He further argues that "It is something of a paradox that

William E. Chandler [Thompson's successor] whose ideas on the purpose
of a nayy left much to be desired and who had no interest in foreign

4
Ronald Spector, Professors of War, p. 3 and p. 10.
'’ibid., p. 3.
Lieutenant Commander Thomas B. Buell, "Admiral Raymond A.
Spruance and the Naval War College: Part I-Preparing for World War II,"
Naval War College Review 23 (March, 1971), p. 33.
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affairs should have initiated the pioneer endeavor in higher military
education."^

At the beginning of the discussions to establish a col

lege, Secretary William C. Whitney, who succeeded Chandler, had a
neutral attitude toward the college.

At the same time Whitney was

aware that the notion of the college was unpopular.

The position of

neutrality held by Whitney later changed to indifference and finally
g

antagonism because of misunderstandings with Luce.

Crowl said Secre

tary Whitney developed such an intense personal dislike of Luce that
he had the Naval War College moved from its original site at Coasters
Harbor Island where it had functioned under the Bureau of Navigation
9

to Goat Island to be consolidated with the Torpedo School.

The col

lege had been housed from its beginning in a former almshouse on
Coasters Harbor Island; and according to Crowl when Luce first saw
it he was moved to say "Poor little house, I christen thee the United
States Naval War College . . . .

In the name of the Father and of the

Son, and of the Holy G h o s t . H a y e s

said this invocation of the

Trinity was given while Luce made the sign

of the cross and it caused

some naval wits in Washington to dub the new institution "Trinity
College.

When the Naval War College was consolidated with the

^Rear Admiral John D. Hayes, "Stephen B. Luce and The Beginnings
of The U.S. Naval War College," Naval War College Review 23 (January,
1971), pp. 51-52.
8Ibid., p. 58.
9
Philip A. Crowl, "Education versus Training at the Naval War
College: 1884-1972," p. 3.
^8Ibid., p. 1.
"^Rear Admiral John D. Hayes, "Stephen B. Luce and The Beginnings
of the U.S. Naval War College," p. 56.
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Torpedo School on Goat Island in 1889 Whitney nearly accomplished his
aim which was the end of the college.

The school did however survive

because of efforts by Luce and Mahan to save it and was moved back to
Coasters Island in 1892 where it was housed in a new building named
Luce H a l l . ^
Not only was the Naval War College plagued with indifference
and hostility by some secretaries of the Navy, it was also attacked by
many politicians.

One of the few politicians to befriend the Naval

War College and to promote its establishment was Senator Nelson W.
Aldridge of Providence, Rhode Island.

Hayes said of him: "In an

attempt to gain congressional recognition [for the College.], Aldridge
on 4 Feburary introduced a resolution in the Senate requiring the
Secretary of the Navy to report the steps that had been taken to
establish an advanced course of instruction for naval officers and the
reasons which suggested such an action.

In his answer Chandler

repeated the arguments that Luce had originally presented to him."

13

According to Hayes, support in the House of Representatives was not
nearly so favorable.

Representative Hilary A. Herbert of Alabama,

Chairman of The House Naval Committee, was an early opponent of the
Naval War College.

Luce testified before The House Naval Committee

as part of an attempt to gain appropriations for the College.

However

when the bill for naval appropriations came before the House in June
1886, Herbert left no doubt as to his attitude about the Naval War

12

Philip A. Crowl, "Education Versus Training at the Naval War
College: 1884-1972, p. 3.
13

Rear Admiral John D. Hayes, "Stephen B. Luce and The Beginnings
of The U.S. Naval War College," p. 54.
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College when he said: "Now is the proper time to consider carefully
whether or not that college is to become a permanent institution.
the opinion of a large majority of your committee, it ought not."

In
14

Crowl report that further criticism came from Congressman William
McAdoo of New Jersey who said:
The idle rich in their sumptuous mansions on Bellevue
Avenue [in Newport, R.I.J would surely corrupt the young
naval officers sent to Newport for study and professional
training.
It was "a great misfortune," he said, "that
our military schools should be established in connection
with watering places characterized in certain seasons of
the year as scenes of social display and d i s s i p a t i o n . ^
Perhaps the most dramatic attack on the college was that by
Hilary A. Herbert after he had left Congress and became Secretary of
the Navy (.1893-1897) during the second term of President Cleveland.
Crowl writes that Herbert had decided to abolish the Naval War College
altogether as an economy measure.

However, it was saved at the last

minute in 1893 when Herbert, on his way to Newport, Rhode Island, was
loaned a copy of Alfred Thayer Mahan's book The Influences of Seapower
on the French Revolution and Empire.

After reading it, he was converted

into a lifelong friend of the College.
Mahan was a devotee of the college from the very beginning when
he was appointed the first Professor of Naval History.

Crowl, in

writing about Mahan, says:

14Ibid., p. 58.
15

Philip A. Crowl, "Education Versus Training at the Naval War
College: 1884-1972," p. 3.
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Mahan . . .believed that from the study of naval history
would emerge certain principles of maritime strategy,
certain permanent truths as equally applicable today
as yesterday and tomorrow as today. And in exploring
history and demonstrating these truths at the Naval
War College, Mahan hoped and expected that the
institution would become a true nursery of maritime
strategists and naval statesman.
The desire of Mahan and Luce for a successful war college was not
shared by all naval officers.

There were some technicists who could

see little value in studying strategy and policy or the campaigns of
famous military leaders, or even the maritime strategy of other countries.

18

Early in his quest for support for a war college, Luce wrote

to many influential fellow officers who were in a position to influence
retention of the Naval War College.

One of them, Captain Francis M.

Ramsey was the Superintendent of The Naval Academy and a technicist
who disapproved of the College and who saw no reason for establishing
another Naval Academy.

He wrote Luce in 1884: "My view, in regard to

this matter differs materially from those expressed by you in your
article published in the Proceedings of The Naval Institute."

19

Also,

there were some officers assigned to the Naval Training Station at
Newport, Rhode Island who disliked the College for no other reason
than they coveted the building and grounds for their own purposes.
They felt that the College's facilities were more permanent and com
fortable than their own headquarters.

Fortunately for Luce, the

officers with attitudes such as those just described did not prevail.
With the help of individuals such as William T. Sampson and Casper F.

■^Ibid., p. 4.
Ibid.
19

Rear Admiral John D. Hayes, "Stephen B. Luce and The Beginnings
of The U.S. Naval War College," pp. 52-53.
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Goodrich, Luce was able to get the Naval War College started.

Sampson,

an educator who succeeded Ramsey as Superintendent of The Naval Academy,
shared the views of Luce regarding the need for post-graduate education
for Naval officers; and Goodrich, an admirer of Sampson, also believed
in the idea.

Their support becomes more significant when one considers

the fact that it was these two who along with Luce comprised the board
which reviewed the merits of such an institution and who recommended
its establishment by the Navy.

20

Finally, many students were hostile to the Naval War College.
Crowl points out: "Most of the first class of eight officers who had
heen sent from the Torpedo School at Goat Island, felt that they had
been shanghaied.

To almost all the early students, the curriculum at

the War College seemed irrelevant to the point of absurdity."

21

Crowl

continues by saying that "Eyen as late as 1911 William S. Sims, later
to become President of the War College, was most reluctant to be
assigned as a student."

22

Probably more than anyone else except Luce, Mahan should be
given credit for helping to change attitudes held by military personel
and civilian leaders.

As the second president of the institution, he

went about explaining its reason for existence and showing that the
school would neither duplicate nor compete with the post-graduate
school at Annapolis.
technicists.

In the final analysis, Mahan won over many

He argued: "The navy had many hardware experts, but none

20

Philip. A. Crowl, "Education Versus Training at the Naval War
College: 1884-1972," p. 3.

21....

Ibid.

22

Ibid.
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were authorities on the Art of War."

23

Having seen the roles, atti

tude and influences of individuals instrumental in the establishment
of the Naval War College, attention can now be turned to the Army War
College.
Early attitudes in the Army concerning post-graduate education
were a little different than that in the Navy when that service's war
college was founded.

The Army had benefit of the long establishment

of its schools at Port Monroe and Fort Leavenworth, and a number of
senior Army officers had traveled to Europe after Emory Upton's trip
primarily to inspect German training establishments.

Consequently,

much literature was published concerning post-graduate education in
the Army.

The foremost book on the subject was Upton's The Armies of

Asia and Europe as previously indicated.

However, there were other

significant early writings, and according to George S. Pappas: "Almost
without exception these writings included a recommendation for estab
lishment of a war academy, a war college, or some other form of postgraduate schooling for officers."

24

Among these writings were: a

pamphlet written by Brigadier General Thomas M. Vincent in 1870
entitled "Plea for the Staff of the Army of The United States"; an
essay by Lieutenant Arthur L. Wagner on "An American College" which
appeared in the 1889 edition of The Journal of The Military Service
Institution; Captain E. L. Zalinski's essay "Army Organization, The

23

Lieutenant Commander Thomas B. Buell, "Admiral Raymond A.
Spruance and The Naval War College: Part I-Preparing for World War II,"
p. 33.
24

George S. Pappas, The U.S. Army War College 1901-1967 (Carlisle
Barracks, Pa.: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1967), p. 10.
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Best Adopted to a Republican Form of Government, Which Will Ensure an
Effective Peace" appearing in the same journal; Captain T. A. Bingham's
essay "The Prussian Great General Staff and What It Contains That Is
Practical from an American Standpoint"; and finally Major Theodore
25
Schwan's 1894 book Report on the Organization of the German Army.
While these and other writings created a positive attitude for the
establishment of some type of post-graduate education, the titles
suggest that the calls for such training were tied either to a reor
ganization of the Army or the creation of a General Staff.

It was

this "marriage of convenience" that contributed to differing roles,
attitudes and influences of individuals in the development of the Army
War College.
One of the earliest supporters of military education in the Army
was Henry W. Halleck who served as Commanding General of the Army
during The Civil War period.

According to Pappas, Halleck during the

period 1840-1849 emphasized that the principles of military art and
science constituted the body of a profession and that it made no
sense to entrust the professional duties of a military officer to a
civilian.

Accordingly, Halleck contended that it was necessary to

have military officers devoted to the cultivation of military science
so.as to be able to compete with individuals overseas who were already
schooled in military science.

Halleck saw the teaching of military

science not only as a means of educating the military officer, but
also as a means of insuring the preparedness of the military; thus
military science becomes a means of insuring peace.

26

While Halleck

Ibxd.
26t,
Ibid., p. 7.
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did not speak directly of the necessity for post-graduate education,
his Elements of Military Art and Science served as an inspiration to
Emory Upton who after his trip to Europe and Asia argued for such
advanced training of Army officers.
The ideas expressed by Upton regarding post-graduate training
greatly influenced Major General William H. Carter who as a young
officer in the Adjutant General Department became a confidant of
Secretary of the War Elihu Root and subsequently persuaded him of the
need for an Army War College.

Like Chandler of the Navy, Root appointed

a board of officers consisting of Carter (who was then a Lieutenant
Colonel), Brigadier General William Ludlow, Colonel Henry C. Hasbrouck,
and Colonel Joseph P. Snager (who accompanied Upton on his around-theworld trip) for the purpose of "considering regulations with a view to
establishment of a War College for the Army."

27

This board, commonly referred to as the Ludlow Board, was faced
with the task of studying the feasibility of a true War College in
face of strong pressure from some senior army officers for the organi
zation of a General Staff as the primary need of the Army with a War
College secondary.

Even the fact that Root was successful in obtain

ing a congressional appropriation of $20,000 for the establishment of
a war college before the Ludlow Board had completed its work did not
quiet the strong sentiment for establishment of a General Staff.

The

members of the Ludlow Board were not able to overcome the opposition
for a separate War College, and in its recommendations provided Root

“^Ibid., p. 14.
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with the means for establishing a War College to function as a Gene
ral Staff, although the Board indicated there should be a separate
war college at the first opportunity.

Pappas contends that there is

little doubt that Root's own concept and General Ludlow's influence
on the Board's deliberations resulted in the final recommendations.

28

Carter, however, continued at every opportunity to press for a sepa
rate General Staff and a separate War College.

Even as a member of

the Board appointed by Root to organize and operate the War College,
Carter continued to insist that the college should be separated from
the General Staff.

29

In spite of opposition from many senior A m y

officers and members of Congress, Carter's efforts were realized in
February 1903 when a campaign waged by Root ended in the passage of
"An Act to Increase the Efficiency of the A m y " , which set up a sepa
rate General Staff thus freeing the War College to become a true
educational institution.
When the War College Board was dissolved, General Tasker Bliss
became President of the War College with Colonel Alexander Mackenzie
and Major William D. Beach as directors.

30 These three began the job

28Ibid., pp. 19-20.
29

Root appointed a board of officers to convene not later than
July, 1902 to organize the War College.
Serving on this War College
Board were: Major General Samuel B. M. Young, President; Brigadier
General Carter; Brigadier General Tasker H. Bliss; Major Henry A. Green;
and Major William D. Beach. Added as ex officio members were The Chief
of Engineers, The Chief of Artillery, The Commandant of The General
Service and Staff College, and The Superintendent of The Military Academy.
30

Neither General Young or General Carter who were the principals
in the establishment of a separate General Staff and a separate War Col
lege continued to serve the college after it became separate. As previous
ly indicated, General Young was appointed the first Chief of Staff of the
A m y and General Carter was sent to duty in the Philippines.
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of making the Army War College a part of the Army educational system.
Bliss introduced at the College his learn-by-doing method in which
lectures were given to the students and then they executed what they
had learned as part of a "great war game."

31

Bliss also fostered

improved relations with The Naval War Academy.

Under his leadership,

The College participated in the preparation of operational studies and
plans as requested by the Chief of Staff, the planning and conduct of
maneuvers and exercises, and supervised the Army's educational system
including military instruction conducted at civilian colleges and universities under the Morrill Act of 1862.
assigned to duty in the Philippines.

32

In 1906, General Bliss was

Because there was no general

officer immediately available to replace him Lieutenant Colonel William
H. Wotherspoon became the Acting President with the consent of The Chief
of Staff.

33

Wotherspoon was ultimately replaced by Brigadier General

Thomas H. Berry whereupon he assumed the position of a director along
with Lieutenant Colonel Smith S. Leach.

Perhaps the most significant

undertaking during the period of their service was closer cooperation
with the Naval War College in planning amphibious type operations
which benefited both services in organizing the expeditionary force
sent to Cuba in 1906.

This was an early example of Army-Navy coopera-

31Ibid., p. 35.
32

The Morrill Act of 1862 provided for military instruction in
landgrant colleges. The number of instructors providing courses in
military science and tactics at these civilian institutions increased
over the years and became the basis for later organizing the Reserve
Officers Training Corps (ROTC). The ROTC was officially established
by the National Defense Act of 1916. For additional information see
Maurice Matloff (ed.), American Military History (Washington: Office
of The Chief of Military History, 1969), p. 290 and p. 367.
33

Pappas, Prudens Futuri, p. 48.
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tion and was a prelude to joint services education.
The Army-Navy Staff College (ANSCOL) was the culmination of
efforts by many to establish joint service training.

In the forefront

was Lieutenant General Henry H. "Hap" Arnold who forwarded a memorandum
to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, suggesting the creation of ANSCOL.

It

is alleged that the memorandum was actually prepared by two of Hap
Arnold’s assistants; Lieutenant Colonel Cabell and Lieutenant Colonel
Smart.

34

Lieutenant General John L. DeWitt was brought back from duty

in the Aleutian Island Campaign (during World War II) to become its
first commandant.

35

General DeWitt had been Commandant of The Army

War College from 1937 to 1939.
dant.

Commodore Foy became the Deputy Comman

Foy was a former Navy faculty representative at the Army War

College.

36

General DeWitt was not long on duty station before talk

began concerning the need for a permanent postwar institution to
replace ANSCOL.
as. Commandant.
officials —

Vice Admiral Harry W. Hill succeeeded General DeWitt
It was during Admiral Hill’s term that "prominent

including Secretaries of War Henry L. Stimson and James

V. Forrestal —

concerned themselves with the creation of permanent

postwar joint service schools."

37

Prominent military personnel who

joined in this call for a permanent joint staff college included

34

George S. Stansfield’s unpublished Chronology, "The National
Defense University: Background-Army War College and Industrial College,"
(The National Defense University, 1980), p. 8.
35

The Rotunda: The Graduating Class of 1974 (Washington: The
National War College, 1974), p. 10.
36
George S. Stansfield, "The National Defense University: Background-Army War College and Industrial College," p. 9..
37

The Rotunda, p. 10.
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Admiral William D. Leahy, President Roosevelt's personal representa
tive to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Ernest J. King, the
Chief of Naval Operations and General George C. Marshall, wartime
Army Chief of Staff.

38

However, at the beginning the support by

these prominent individuals did not foreshadow the type of permanent
joint army-navy staff institution that would finally emerge.

That

can be clearly seen in a review of the controversy surrounding the
selection of a name for the permanent institution.
As early as October, 1945 and prior to his departure as Comman
dant of ANSCOL, General DeWitt wrote to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that
it was desirable to settle on an appropriate title for the postwar
joint college.

General DeWitt said: "The name of the present college

has not fully described its mission, which was to increase the effi
ciency of officers ordered to command as well as staff assignments in
unified or coordinated Army and Navy commands.

The title Staff College

led to the conclusion that its only function was that of training
officers for staff duty, and is reported to have resulted in a reluc
tance on the part of some officers to accept assignment to it as
students."

39

DeWitt continued by explaining various titles containing

the phrase "War College" had been considered but were not found accep
table because of probable confusion with the Army War College and with

90

Joint Chiefs of Staff Paper 185/3, 10 April 1943, Modern Mili
tary Branch, Military Archives Division, Record Group 218, Records of
the United States Chiefs of Staff (CCS 352: 12-26-42, Section 1, Box
241). The National Archives.
It should be noted that the combined
Chiefs of Staff (.CCS) was a World War II committee consisting of the
professional Chiefs of America and England responsible to the President
and Prime Minister for planning and directing the grand strategy of
the coalition.
Its American members were Marshall, King, Lehey, and
Hap Arnold. For further information see Maurice Matloff (ed.), Ameri
can Military History, pp. 427-428.
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the Naval War College.

He suggested that in order to describe more

accurately the functions of the postwar college, to assign a more dis
tinctive designation, to lend more dignity to the title, and to in
crease its appeal to the public the successor to ANSCOL should he
titled "The College of National Defense" and it should become effective
41

upon completion of ANSCOL's final war-time course on December 8, 1945.
Admiral King agreed that the name of ANSCOL would not fully describe
the mission of a permanent successor; however, he disagreed with Gene
ral DeWitt's proposal.

He indicated that the title "The College of

National Defense" appeared to be too inclusive, and with such a name it
would b.e difficult to judge from it anything as to the nature of the
school."

Accordingly, Admiral King suggested "As the eventual scope

and curriculum of the Army-Navy Staff College will depend in some
measure on the post war organization of the armed forces, it is con
sidered that, in the interim, the present title is adequately descrip
tive . . . The title Army and Navy Staff and Command College (ANSCOL)
would seem fully descriptive and is suggested, if any change is con
sidered necessary.

39

Joint Chiefs of Staff Paper, 962/11, 5 October 1945, ANSCOL
Memorandum, Subject: "Army and Navy Staff College: Proposed Name for
Post-War Successor," Modern Military Branch, Military Archives Divi
sion, Record Group 218, Records of the United States Chiefs of Staff
(CCS 352: 12-26-42, Section 4, Box 72), The National Archives.

41

JCS Paper 962/13, CNO Memorandum, 22 October 1954, Subject:
"Proposed Name for The Post-War Army and Navy Staff College," Modern
Military Branch, Military Archives Division, Record Group 218, Records
of The United States Chiefs of Staff ('CCS 352: 12-26-42, Section 4,
Box 72), The National Archives.
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General Hap Arnold also became concerned over a proper name for
the post-war college and suggested the name of ANSCOL be changed to
"College of National Security".

He wrote:

Public opinion and the attitude of the services,
particularly in so far as education within the
services is concerned, are affected by the titles
of our military schools and establishments. The
United States is committing itself to maintain
armed services of sufficient size and strength
to maintain national security and fulfill certain
international commitments. This goes beyond
national defense.
It can more appropriately be ^
described under the heading "national security."
The controversy continued after the departure of General DeWitt and
his replacement by Admiral Hill.

A record of a telephone conversation

between Major General Alfred Grunther of the Army (who later became one
of the Deputy Commandants of The National War College along with
Admiral Foy and Brigadier General Landon of the Air Force) and Major
General McFarland on the staff of The Joint Chiefs of Staff disclosed
that Admiral Hill was concerned that the delay regarding the selection
of a name might prejudice public opinion; particularly, if the State
Department agreed to participate in the post-war college, and if a
press release was given to the newspapers with a name omitted.

Gene

ral Grunther indicated that General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Chief of
Staff of the Army, had talked with General Carl Spaatz, and Admiral
Hill had talked with Admiral Chester W. Nimitz and all were ready to
select a name from a final list of three which included: National War
College, National Defense College, National Security College.

It

appeared however that Admiral Leahy was the only individual that was

42

JCS Paper 962/14, Memorandum from CG, Army Air Force, 26 October
1945, Subject: "Proposed Name for Post-War Army and Navy Staff College,"
Modern Military Branch, Military Archives Division, Record Group 218,
Records of The United States Chiefs of Staff (CCS 352: 12026-42, Sec
tion 4, Box 72), The National Archives.
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not prepared to select a final name.

General Grunther also suggested

that it may come down to the participants flipping a coin for the name,
and finally indicated that if a name wasn't selected soon Drew Pearson
or Senator Thomas would hear of it and embarass everyone.

43

The Joint Chiefs of Staff on February 1, 1946 finally decided on
a name and agreed to change ANSCOL to The College of National Security;
however, this was rescinded on February 4, 1946 in a memorandum from
Captain C.J. Moore, Deputy Secretary of The Joint Chiefs of Staff, to
Admiral Hill.

So, the controversy continued.

Credit for breaking this

long stalemate should go to Admiral Hill who attended a conference with
The Secretary of War where the name "National War College" was suggested.
Hill obtained the concurrences for this change from General Eisenhower,
General Spaatz, Admiral Nimitz, Secretary Forrestal and Mr. Russell
(an assistant Secretary of State).

James Byrne the Secretary of State

later confirmed Mr. Russell's concurrence.

Accordingly, on April 4,

1946 the War Department announced to its major subordinate commands the
establishment of the National War College for Army, Navy and State
Department officers, and that the college would be the highest level
education institution of the Armed Forces.

44

The individuals whose attitudes, roles and influences were instru
mental in the founding of the primary Senior Service Schools were both

Record of telephone conversation between General Alfred Grunther
and General McFarland, 1 February 1946, JCS Papers, Modern Military
Branch, Military Archives Division, Record Group 218, Records of the
United States Chiefs of Staff (CCS 352: 12-26-42, Section 4, Box 72),
The National Archives.
44
War Department Letter, Office of The Adjutant General, 4 April
1946, Subject:
"National War College," JCS Papers, Modern Military
Branch, Military Archives Division, Record Group 218, Records of the
United States Chiefs of Staff (CCS 352: 12-26-42, Section 4, Box 72),
The National Archives.
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military and civilian leaders.

In the case of The Naval War College

which endured twenty-five years of indifference and hostility on the
part of Secretaries of The Navy, Congressmen, some senior naval offi
cers and even some students who wanted to continue with technicism as
the basis for training naval officers, it took all the persistence
that supporters of the College could muster to save it from extinction.
Stephen Luce, Senator Nelson W. Aldridge, William T. Sampson and Casper
F. Goodrich and even Hilary A. Herbert are but a few of the individuals
who labored to save the Naval War College.

However, if one person

should be given credit for doing most to insure the survival of the
College, that individual would be Alfred Thayer Mahan.
Army leaders were no less confronted with animosities against the
Army War College than individuals in the Navy had been against its
College.

The Army leaders fight was not against prejudices and techni

cism as in the Navy.

Rather, their fight was against those who saw the

Army War College as an adjunct, and even a subsidiary, of a General
Staff.

General William H. Carter is to be given credit for convincing

Secretary of War Elihu Root to separate the General Staff and the Army
War College.

Addititionally, Brigadier General Tasker Bliss, Lieutenant

Colonel William H. Wotherspoon and Brigadier Thomas Berry, all of whom
served as Presidents of the College should be credited for making the
Army War College a true educational institution.
Lieutenant General Henry "Hap" Arnold was the driving force be
hind The Army-Navy Staff College while Lieutenant General John L. DeWitt
and Vice Admiral Henry W. Hill, as commandants, made ANSCOL a func
tioning reality.

However, DeWitt became a leading figure, along with

most of the outstanding and well-known military leaders of the period,
in a controversy over the selection of a name for the permanent
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successor to ANSCOL because Army-Navy Staff College did not fit the
mission or image for the post-war institution.

Admiral Hill finally

got everyone to agree on the title "National War College" and that
Senior Service School was finally established as the highest level
military educational institution of The Armed Services.
As things turned out, The National War College did not in fact
become the highest level educational institution among the services.
Rather, it had to compete with the individual services own war col
leges and with the Industrial College of The Armed Forces because of
the attitudes and influences of both military and civilian supporters
and opponents of all the institutions.

This point becomes more clear

when one examines curricular development of the Senior Service Schools.
Chapter V will attempt to show the similarities and differences among
those schools by taking a critical look at the curriculum development
and instructional methodologies of each.

Special emphasis will be

given to the development of curriculum and instructional strategies of
the National War College.
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CHAPTER V
CURRICULUM DEVELOPMENT AND INSTRUCTIONAL STRATEGIES
The curriculum of an institution tends to distinguish if from
other institutions and gives it a clear identity among its peers.

More

importantly, the curriculum is often a factor in attracting students to
the academy.

Alan 0. Pfnister argues further that curriculum is the

critical key to greater retention of students who elect to attend a col
lege or university.^

It follows that curriculum is important to the

growth and development of an institution of higher learning whether its
orientation be military or civilian.

Military Senior Service Schools,

unlike civilian colleges and universities, have not had to compete for
students nor to worry about their retention.

The military system en

sures the ready availability of student clientele whereas civilian insti
tutions have not enjoyed such an advantage.

This difference between the

two sectors, military and civilian, in attaining and retaining students
does not reduce the importance of curriculum development or instruc
tional strategies at the military schools vis-a-vis civilian colleges
and universities.

In fact, curriculum development at the various War

Colleges in the United States became a critical element in the growth
of each War College, and tended to give to each its own character
thus clearly distinguishing one from the other.

2

^Alan 0. Pfnister, Planning for Higher Education (Boulder,
Colorado: Westview Press, 1976), p. 175.
2

John Wesley Masland and Laurence I. Radway, Soldiers and Scholars:
Military Education and National Policy (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1957), p. 342.
-
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Masland and Radway looked at the curriculum at the Senior Service
military schools and determined that it was the breadth of the curri
culum at each that made it different from its peers and unique in
higher education.

Their findings support the contention that at no

other institution of higher learning can an individual receive instruc
tion on the full range of factors, considerations and circumstances
that bear upon their studies as one can obtain at the military Senior
Service Schools.

The question arises as to how and why the curriculum

at the various Senior Service Colleges developed as they did.
what are distinguishing features of each?

Also

To answer these question one

must begin before the United States military higher educational insti
tutions were founded.
At the time the United States military schools were established,
curricula for the proper teaching of military science and tactics had
been developed and were in use in European military schools.

In fact,

when General Emory Upton visited the military schools of the great
powers of Europe and Asia, he found a diverse curricula which not only
appeared to prepare the young students for a life in the military forces
of their countries, but also helped to prepare them for the cultural
and social life among their people.

Military schools at Modena and

Turin in Italy are good examples of training gounds for their culture.
Students attending those schools were expected not only to become pro
ficient in military subjects such as military history and geography,
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fortifications, military law and administration, and the study of arms,
but they were required to become proficient also in engineering during
their three year course.

Therefore, the students had to master sub

jects such as arithmetic, plane geometry, elements of physics, chemistry,
minerology, mechanical drawing and topography as well as purely military
subjects.

Additionally, the military trainee had to learn Greek and

Roman history, the Italian and French languages, literature of Italy
and France, and they had to become proficient-in writing.

The same
3

type of studies were required at the Russian military schools.
Upton also observed that before a student could be admitted to
the Nicholas Staff Academy at St. Petersburg, he would have had to
complete an educational level that is comparable to the secondary*
school in the United States.

More important he would have to pass

competitive examinations in mathematics, plane trigonometry, history,
geography, fortifications, tactics, the theory of arms, the Russian
language, and either the French or German languages.

Once admitted,

the student would spend three years studying what the Russians referred
to as principal and secondary subjects.

Principal subjects included

tactics and strategy, military history, military administration,
military statistics, geodesy, cartography and topographic drawing.

The

secondary subjects included world history, international law, riding,
Russian, French or German, artillery and fortifications.

4

3
Emory Upton, The Armies of Asia and Europe: Embracing Official
Reports on the Armies of Japan, China, India, Persia, Italy, Russia,
Austria, Germany, France and England (N.Y.: Appleton & Co., 1878)
pp. 131-133.
^Ibid., pp. 152-153.
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The same procedures as practiced in Russia generally held in the
war schools of other European countries.

Competitive•examinations in

Austria contained more mathematics and science requirements than in
Russia, and its two year course of study included studies of the politi
cal economy, the history of civilization, and the natural sciences."*
The competitive examination requirements at the Staff College at
Sandhurst, England were very similar to that in Austria except the
British candidate had to pass elementary mechanics, the Hindustani
language as well as French and German, and geology.

The British two

year course was divided into obligatory military subjects and voluntary
subjects such as additional languages, experimental sciences and photo
graphy.^

The French Academy of War was in the process of being

organized when Upton made his tour; it, therefore, was not open during
his visit in France.

However, its curriculum was already under develop

ment, and was patterned after that of the famous War Academy of Berlin.^
Candidates for the Berlin War Academy not only had to pass a com
petitive examination in various military, scientific, and social studies,
but also had to select and write on a theme from a predetermined list
in order to show his literary and scientific mastery.

Also, he had to

submit a written theme, much in the form of a case study, in which he
discussed the movement and disposition of troops in certain offensive
and defensive operations.

When admitted to the War Academic, the German

student studied compulsory and voluntary subjects for a two year period.

5 Ibid., pp. 179-180.
^Ibid., pp. 264-265.
^Ibid., p. 249.
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Unlike the other European schools which relied mostly on the lecture
method of instruction, the Berlin War Academy added the disputation
method and used it widely.

Instructional strategies at the German

academy were different from the rest of the European war schools in that
its main emphasis was not only on acquiring positive knowledge, but also
on the habit of developing critical thinking among its students so as to
ensure action from insight rather than from impuse.

It should be noted

that another departure from other European War Schools was the teaching
of General Staff duties as required study, inclusion of experimental
philosophy, ancient history, history of the Middle Ages, and the history
g

of literature as electives.

Many of the innovations in the Berlin War

Academy mirrored similar new methods in the country's civilian institu
tions.

These innovations were significant to many Americans who

visited Germany and who brought back reports on the German ideas of
9

academic freedom and advanced scholarship in the universities.
Just as American civilian educators brought back innovative ideas for
educating civilians, so did the military visitors
furthering military higher education.

such as Upton, for

On the basis of these reports

the United States Senior Service Colleges developed their curricula.

8Ibid., p. 216-127.
9
George Ticknor, Edward Everette and Joseph Green Cogswell were
among the very first Americans to study at the German University.
Their visit was during the 1815-1817 time frame and opened the way for
more American educators, both from civilian and military institutions,
to make the trip overseas to study new German methods in higher educa
tion. For additional information see Richard Hofstadter and Wilson
Smith, American Higher Education;
A Documentary History, 2 vol.
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1961), 1: 257-263.
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The U. S. Naval War College, the first War College to be established,
became the first such activity to use the German methods.
From the beginning of the Naval War College, emphasis was placed
on fundamentals and principles, on stimulating logical thought pro
cesses, and on the study of war as a serious art.

W. Royce Powell con

tends that it was on these solid intellectual bases that the curriculum
of the Naval War College was developed and has helped to maintain the
continuation of the course offerings."^

However, it is ironic that

while the Naval War College curriculum and methods of instruction
reflected that of the Berlin War Academy, it was after observation of
the curricula at Fort Monroe and Fort Leavenworth that a course of
study was adopted by the Naval War College.

Could it be possible that

this action reflects the rivalry between the services?
The initial curriculum of the Navy War College was, therefore,
adopted by its founder, Admiral

Luce, from that of the Army schools

previously mentioned.

programs of study strategy, history and

In their

international law were taught along with studies in military tactics.

11

However, Luce departed from the curriculum devised by the Army by
placing emphasis on the study of national strategy as an outgrowth of
a combination of sea and land power.

His premise was that in studying

the art of war, one must realize that national strategy is derived from
national power, and this power is achieved by strength in both land and
sea operations.

Thus, from its very beginning, the modern concept of

■^W. Royce Powell, "The United States Naval War College," Navy,
2 (Oct. 1959), 10: 37.
Ibid.
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joint operations became the fundamental basis for the Naval War
College curriculum.

12

The Naval War College's first curriculum in the winter of 1885
was very limited and consisted of six weeks of lectures and discussions.
Unlike the German method, papers were not originally required of the
officers in attendance, and such work as done by them was entirely
voluntary except perhaps attendance at lectures.

As indicated in

ChapterII, the works of Alfred Thayer Mahon on sea power formed the
core of the naval instruction, and the lectures of Lieutenant Tasker H.
Bliss on tactics and Professor James Russell Sorley on international
law provided related subjects.

13

In the summer of 1886, lectures in

naval history, costal defense and tactical exercises with steam launches
were added to the course of study.

14

War gaming"^ was introduced in the Naval War College's curriculum
in 1892 after a series of lectures by Captain William McCarty Little,

13
Alfred Thayer Mahan's works on the influence of sea power upon
history were written between 1890 and 1905 and are considered some of
the world's most influential military treaties. They contain theories
of sea operations that were taught to the early Naval War College
students. For an excellent rendering of Mahan's theories see Alfred
Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1805
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1980), pp. 7-251. This
edition combines an abridgement of The Influence of Sea Power Upon
History 1660-1783 with excerpts from The Influence of Sea Power Upon
the French Revolution and Empire 1793-1812. It has approximately 400
illustrations of which 200 are in color.
14

Rear Admiral Austin M. Knight and Lieutenant William D. Puleston,
History of The United States Naval War Colleges, (Newport, R.I.: Naval
War College, 1916), p. 8.
^Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary defines war gaming as the act
of studying and testing military concepts through simulated battles or
campaigns conducted in conferences by officers acting as opposing staffs.
See Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary, (1977), s.v. "War Game."
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one of the staunchest advocate of this method of instruction.

16

"The

modern war game had been invented by Lieutenant von Reisswitz of the
Prussian Guard Artillery in 1824, and by the time of Bismarck and von
Moltke [Chancellor of Germany and Chief of Staff of the Prussian Army
respectively who are credited with modernizing the German Armed Forces]
it was in general use throughout the Prussian A r m y . " ^

However, the

naval war game as instituted by the U. S'. Naval War College was not the
same as that suggested by von Reisswitz.

Rather, the kind of games

advocated by Captain Little that finally were established as part of the
College curriculum had been developed in 1878 by Captain Philip H. Colomb
of The Royal British Navy.
of games:

The Colomb method consisted of three kinds

"The Duel" which simulated battle between two ships; "The

Tactical Game" which was a simulated maneuver involving two opposing
fleets of battleships and cruisers; and "The Strategic Game" which involved large battle over great ocean distances between opposing fleets.

18

Under the war gaming concept used at the Naval War College, a "main
problem" was assigned to the class for resolution.

Officers were

grouped in committees for studying the problem and arriving at a solu
tion.

Reading assignments were given the committee members in order to

16

History of The United States Naval War College, 1884-1958 (Naval
Department Library, Washington Naval Yard: Microfilm Number MIC. lh,
1959), p. 3.
17
College:
p. 5.

Philip A Crowl, "Education versus Training at The Naval War
1884-1972," Naval War College Review, 26 (Nov Dec 1973):
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assist in their deliberations.

Finally, the solution of each committee

was discussed in class with the instructor serving as a monitor.
method tended to approach German methodology.

This

However, closer to it

was the "applicatory" method.
In 1910, the "applicatory" method was introduced at the Naval War
College.

The system was not new in that it had been previously used at

the Army's schools at both Fort Monroe and Fort Leavenworth.

However,

while it was originally adopted by the Army from the system used by the
German staff colleges and war schools, it gained a new sophistication
at the Naval War College.

19

The objective of this method at the Naval

College was to cultivate in the minds of the naval officers the habit
of systematic reasoning in resolving tactical and strategic problems.
The method required an individual rather than a group solution for the
problems.

The process consisted of estimating the situation involved

in a given problem, making a concrete decision on the problems, and
formulating orders for carrying out the decision.

The applicatory

method marked a new phase in the College's curriculum and it is con
sidered to have influenced naval thought in the direction of a more
concrete conception of war and the Navy's relation to war.

20

The next

instructional method introduced at the Naval War College was the "case
study."

^ History of the U. S. Naval War College 1884-1958, p . 7.

20

Rear Admiral Austin M. Knight and Lieutenant William D.
Puleston, History of the United States War College, p. 13.
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W. Royce Powell says the "case study" method of instruction was
introduced at The Naval War College from abroad.

21

This, however, could

not be confirmed from the literature used in this investigation.

Rather,

what was confirmed is that the earliest known use of cases was in the
diagnostic training of social workers shortly after the Civil War.
Later in the nineteenth century, the method was introduced in the
Harvard Law School by Christopher Langdell to present judicial decisions
in a revolt against the less functional method of legal education.

22

Charles F. Fisher describes the case study method of instruction quite
simply as "The use of cases to effect problem-centered learning".

He

further contends that the case is a factual written record of a situa
tion, condition, and/or experience that may or may not contain a
readily identifiable problem, but definitely contains the results and
sometimes the implications and analysis of actions.

23

Whether the case
•> •

study method was introduced to the Naval War College from aboard or
from Harvard is irrelevant.

Of significance is the fact that by the

early twentieth century the case study method had become one of the
main instructional strategies used at the Naval War College.
studies were also popular in the civilian graduate school.

Such

24

21w. Royce Powell, "The United States Naval War College," p. 37.
22

Charles F. Fisher, "Being There Vicariously by Case Studies," in
On College Teaching, ed. Ohmer Milton and Associates (San Francisco:
Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1978) , p. 260.
See also Ronald Spector,
Professors of W a r , (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 1977) , p. 25.
23

Ibid.

24
W. Royce Powell, "The United States Naval War College," p. 37.
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The curricular emphasis on tactical studies with the lecture, war
gaming, the applicatory method, and case studies as the major instruc
tional strategies continued at the Naval War College throughout much
of the early twentieth century.

Neither Admiral William Sims nor

Admiral Raymond Spruance, who served as Presidents of the College through
out much of the period, substantially changed the curriculum.

In fact,

Sims believed in the value of the German method and often defended the
value of theoretical knowledge applied to the naval profession,

25

but Spruance found work at the college a little more than "an intellectual desert."
of World War II.

26

The situation changed dramatically after the close
The curriculum was broadened to include many matters

not strictly naval or even military.

The sights of the students were

raised from purely tactical, command and staff concerns to a much
higher level of decision making in the areas of strategy and national
policy according to Professor Philip A Crowl.

27

"In a broad sense, one

can say that in 1947 the War College began a full 180 degree turn back
to the original concepts of Luce and Mahan."

28

The practice of extending invitations to professional historians
and social scientists to lecture at the Naval War College began during
the administration of Admiral Spruance.

25
College:

Spruance also invited a number

Philip A. Crowl, "Education versus Training at the Naval War
1884-1972," p. 5.

26Ibid.
27Ibid.
28Ibid.
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of representatives from the State Department to speak to the students
at the Naval War College.

The formal study of logistics was reintro

duced into the curriculum as were advanced studies in politics and
economics.
educators

Professioxal chairs to be filled by distinguished civilian
were established.

Other studies that were introduced included

a core curriculum consisting of the fundamentals of strategy studies
with associated sub-courses in International Relations, Evolution of
Strategy, Theory, Military Management, Economics, and Comparative
Cultures.
In spite of these somewhat radical changes in the curriculum, the
Naval War College came under increasing criticism both from within the
naval command and from civilian scholars and educators.

According to

Professor Crowl, after World War II excessive attention was given to
the Soviet Union at the expense of the'rest of the nations of the world.
Further the superficial treatment of its many subjects, its endless and
rapid succession of visiting lecturers, along with an over concentra
tion on the contemporary scene, and an corresponding underemphasis on
the historical and sociological context in which current events were
transpiring were the main criticisms of the curriculum.

29

It was

against this background that Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner, a later
President of the College, inaugurated a new course of study which, in
his mind, represented "A return to our great traditions— to the
strategic and historical contribution of men like Mahan.

29

..."

30

Ibid., p. 8.

30

Ibid. Details of this new study may be found in Stansfield
Turner, "Naval War College 1972-1973: Report of the President1 in
Naval War College Review 26 (Sept. - Oct., 1973) pp. 2-6.
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A major component in the establishment of the new curriculum at
the Naval War College by Admiral Turner was the Contemporary Civiliza
tion Lecture Series.

This voluntary program served to promote the

College in the dual role of an academic and community cultural center
as well as a center for higher professional education.

Admiral Turner

said of the program:
This series provided a personal enrichment program for student,
staff, faculty, and wives of the War College . . . . The subjects
covered were intended to be material not [necessarily] related
to the college curriculum, but of general interest to the
students as citizens and informed persons. 31
More directly related to the new curriculum was the Current
Strategy Forum.

Initially this program was begun in 1948 to allow the

students to exchange ideas with a wide cross section of the civilian
community.

The program was first called "Roundtable Discussions" and

later "Global Strategy Discussions." Under Admiral Turner, the Current
Strategy Forum brought students face to face with leaders in government,
the civilian community and with flag officers.

The students discussed

with these leaders selected problems affecting the military and the
nation at large.

The subjects of various discussions were dealt with

both by student papers prepared in advance of the forum as seminar
stimulators and by distinguished guest speakers.

32

As one looks back over the decades of curriculum and instructional
development at the Naval War College, three developments appear to have

31

Stansfield Turner, "Naval War College 1972-1973:
President," pp. 25-26.

Report of the

32Ibid., pp. 26-27.

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

81

changed the demands which the Navy faced, thus requiring a change in
the College's curriculum.

They were changes in U. S. foreign policy

and national strategy, difficult choices in the ordering of national
priorities due to the limitation in funds, and the fact that the time
when the U. S. Navy had a clear qualitative and quantitative advantage
at sea had passed.

33

As these changes took place, so did the curri

culum of the Naval War College to keep up with the demands brought by
the new developments.

The primary objective of the curriculum changes

at the Naval War College was to sharpen the critical faculties of the
students rather than teaching operational methodology.

The curriculum

was, therefore, structured to a problem-solving approach treating the
areas of strategy, resource management, and naval tactics.

34

The most

significant change in the curriculum in the modern era was a general
deemphasis of contemporary data and events in favor of providing studies
that would enable the officers to project into the future a number of
years rather than at their next tour of duty.

Instruction began to

stress such areas as international law, communications, public affairs
in the total context of the Navy rather than in a series of separate
and discrete fragments.

35

To accomplish this new direction, students were plunged into a
scholastic discipline that forced them to stretch critical faculties.

■^Ihid., pp. 1-2.
34

Ibid., p. 3.

"^Ibid., p. 5.
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For instance, they were forced to probe the multiple meanings of such
basic concepts as "limited war," "spheres of influence," "balance of
power," and they were pushed to make connections between historical
examples and current practices.

36

Less reliance was placed on outside

lectures and more of the teaching workload was passed to the resident
faculty.

37

Dialogue between the Naval War College and civilian acade

mic institutions was increased through exchange programs and coopera
tive arrangements with civilian institutions of higher education.

An

advanced research program was established to permit students to delve
into problems affecting the military that had defied solution.

Most

important is the fact that three trimesters were established to treat
the major areas of Strategy and Policy, Defense Decision Making, and
Naval Tactics.

This program not only divided the student load, but

it also meant that each faculty member would now have the opportunity
for research and further study during, one trimester period while teaching for two trimesters.

38

The Naval War College had indeed returned

to the original ideas of Luce and Mahan, and had established for itself
a distinctive character emphasized by its preeminence in the studies of
national strategy and policy.

Further, it had shown that adaptations

of the German methods of critical thinking and problem solving to pre
pare one for future decision making was the most appropriate instruc
tional strategy for military higher education.

The Naval War College

Ibid.
37tu.,
Ibid.
38Ibid., p. 38.
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had set the standard which was to he generally followed by most of the
other Senior Service Colleges.

The second such college to he estab-

blished picked up that tradition and, using its own peculiar require
ments, added to the development of curricula and instructional strategies
for military Senior Service education.

The Army War College adopted

many of the standards of the Berlin War Academy, and followed many of
the procedures established by the Naval War College.

Yet, it had its

own distinctive curriculum.
When General Tasker H. Bliss was given the responsibility for the
new Army War College, one of the first things that concerned him was
In 1899 he pondered the questions "What shall be taught?

its curriculum.

How shall it be taught? and "How shall the teaching be extended to the
greatest number [of students]?"

39

Bliss determined that it was

almost impossible to devise a curriculum for the Army War College which
did not repeat at least part of what was taught in one or more of the
Army's schools.

40

He, therefore, concluded that the college should

deal with the study of the larger problems of military science-; devis
ing plans related to the question of military preparation and movement
in the time of war.

Not.to be included were subjects such as military

intelligence which was the prerogative of a special bureau of the General
Staff; logistics or those subjects designed to teach officers to improve
equipment, arms and other materials of war (because these were already

39

George S. Pappas, Prudens Futuri: The U.S. Army War College
Walsworth Publishing Co., 1967) ,

1901-1967 (Carlisle Barracks, P.:
p. 34.
40

Ibid., pp. 33.
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taught at other army service schools); and the theory of tactics as
well as the practical application of such tactics.

41

Like the Naval

War College, Bliss decided on teaching Army officers higher level
military strategy and tactics; and also like the Naval War College, he
proposed to use the war game as the most practical method of instruction.

Lectures, however, were to supplement the war games.

42

Bliss organized the Army War College faculty into committees which
emphasized area studies of other countries or which considered other
services1 operational missions and tactics.

Committee emphasis was

later changed under Brigadier General William W. Wdtherspoon to con
centrate on resources of the United States and other countries of the
western hemisphere.

European and Far Eastern countries were not con

sidered worthy of study since formidable ocean barriers provided a
natural defense to any unfriendly nations from these areas.

The lone

exceptions were those areas of the Pacific where the United States had

• i j possessions.
. 4 3
island
A program of coordinated lectures was introduced at the Army.War
College in 1906-1907.
of war" were held.

Seven lectures on military history and "thoughts

To this were added latest developments in industry

and science affecting military operations.

Problems, divided into area

studies, were devised following the lectures and became the focus of

41Ibid., pp. 33-34.
42

Ibid., p. 35.

4^Ibid., pp. 47-48.
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tactical and strategic studies.

44

The most significant modification

of the curriculum as compared to that developed by the Naval War
College was the addition of field trips to Civil War Battlefields where
the strategic implications of various Civil War campaigns could be
studied on site.

45

Courses at the Army War College were suspended during World War
I and were not reinstated until 1919 when Major General James W.
McAndrew was appointed Commandant.

Because 19 of the 24 officers

selected for the faculty were stationed in France and Germany with the
American Expeditionary Forces, McAndrew held the first meeting of the
new faculty at Treves, Germany.

The faculty tackled the problem of a

new curriculum based on lessons learned during combat.

Since the new

emphasis was to train officers for duties on the General Staff and for
preparation'for war, the faculty decided on a curriculum that emphasized
the study of military, economic, political, sociological and geo
graphical capabilities of Great Power countries; particularly those
with whom the U. S. might become' engaged in combat in the future (for
47
example Russia and Germany).
The responsibility for the preparation and overall supervision of
the curriculum was given to an Academic Board in 1921.

44

The first Board

,
Ibid., PP . 51-52.

4 5Ibid.,
--,

P- 60.

46t
^
Ibid.,

P- 90.

47^.,
Ibid., P- 93.
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consisted of the Commandant of the College, the Assistant Commandant
and the Directors of the various divisions of the faculty.

48

Concomit

antly with its development of the curriculum, the board selected con
tinuance of small committees as the primary method for students perfor
mance.

The board also established a requirement for individual research

projects.

Even so, the research project reports were submitted through

the appropriate committee structure.

However, these and other regular com

mittee reports which were normally prepared as staff papers were later
presented orally to the entire college.

49

Following World War II, the major impact on the curriculum of the
Army War College was the realization that global conflict involved
political, economic and other considerations far beyond conventional
military and naval affairs."*^

This suggested changes in national and

intenational studies similar to that instituted by the Naval War
College.

National strategy and its supporting military programs became

the central unifying theme of the curriculum at the Army War College.
The fields of study under this concept dealt with National Power and
International Relations; Military Concepts, Theater Operations and
Readiness; and National Strategy and Military Programs.

According to

Major General William P. Ennis, Jr., a former Commandant of the Army
War College, "These three fields emphasize the role of the Army not

48
49

Ibid., p. 107.
Ibid., 121.

50Ibid., p. 139.
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only in its purely professional aspect, but in the broad context of the
Army as a key element in the defense team.

[Further they stressed the

Army] as the traditional and dependable source of trained leaders to
fill top-level national and international command or staff jobs as required by the nation's need for leadership skills

. . . . "

51

It was, however,

the introduction of the Long Range Development Plan (LRDP) in 1971 that
revealed the necessity to institute changes in the curriculum that would
enable the graduates of the Army War College to master changes wrought by
civilian and military decisions and concepts rather than be driven by
them.
Instructional methods following World War II were based primarily
on individual student study, research, and the analysis and resolution
in committee of assigned problems of current significance.
advisors were assigned to assist student committees.
not act as an instructor.

52

Faculty

The advisor did

He was free to join the discussion and, if

asked, to voice his opinion, but the committee was at liberty either to
accept or reject his opinion.

Thus, the final views of the committee

members were their own and not that of the advisor.

53

Most students,

(except those involved in war gaming) were required to prepare and to
present an original thesis on a subject of importance and of either
current and/or future value to the Army.

This paper enabled the student to

demonstrate his ability to analyze a problem objectively and to do original and creative thinking.

54

A National Strategy Seminar provided the

-^Major General William P. Ennis, Jr., "The Army's Top-Level
College," Army Information Digest, 15 (Jan. 1960), 1:56.
52Ibid., p. 57.
53Ibid., p. 58.
54Ibid., p. 59.
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culmination for the curriculum.

This essentially was "a student-

developed national strategy and its principal implementing courses of
action, with emphasis upon supporting military program [which was]
examined and refined in collaboration with distinguished military and
civilian guests.
The Army War College was not particularly known for innovations
in its curriculum development.

However, it did become a leader in the

use of business-oriented computer information systems in order to improve
the teaching of management techniques.

The thrust of the information

systems at the War College was to involve the student in computer-based
models and simulations which were integrated with one's learning ex
perience.

The aim was to familiarize the student with modern informa

tion techniques and retrieval systems to relieve the student of time
consuming statistical research.

56

Another innovation was the creation of a department of management
and the expansion of management courses in order to keep up with the
changing educational environment in both the military and civilian
sectors.

Like the Navy, the Army sharply curtailed its lectures from

outsiders and began concentrating on courses designed to develop the
managerial abilities of its students as well as to improve overall pro
fessionalism among its attendees.
included six major sub-courses:

A 43 hour course was developed that
"The United States and The Interna

tional Environment"; "International Strategic Appraisals"; "Management
and Executive Development"; "Strategic Military Studies"; "Military

56

"The Role of Information Systems in the War College Curriculum,"
Parameters: The Journal of the Army War College 2 (Feb. 1972) 2:76-77.
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Forces Alternative Studies"; and "National Security Issues".
tion, other offerings were added to the curriculum.

In addi

These included a

National Strategic Seminar of one week's duration, a student research
program, elective courses, and a 3 day field trip to the United Nations
with longer trips to the Canadian capital in Ottawa and to American
installations in Panama.
In retrospect, the changing curriculum at the Army War College
was designed in anticipation and response to changes on the world scene,
changes in academia, and to ensure that the Army's senior graduates
could master those changes rather than be driven by them.
result

The primary

was a reduction in the common core phase of the curriculum, the

elimination of excessive rigidity as well as the heavy concurrent de
mands on study.

Rather, greater recognition was given in the curriculum

to the importance of the student's past experiences and to his educational
levels.

Both of these factors were considered important in the students

overall professional educational development.^^

To assure the accomplish

ment of appropriate changes in the curriculum, its development was ulti
mately placed in the hands of a faculty board consisting of The Deputy
Commandant of the College, each of the faculty division chairmen, the
Chief of the Plans and Policy Group, and the Secretary of The College.
The Board reviewed the individual courses proposed by the various divi
sions of The College or by the Department of the Army, and decided which
ones should be retained, modified, or eliminated.

Their action, how

ever, was subject to approval of its next higher headquarters, the
United States Continental Army Command, and/or the Deputy Chief of

"^Lt. Col. Benjamin E. Doty, "Opening Some Windows at the Army
War College", Army 23, (February 1973) 2: 22-23.
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Staff for Personnel at Department of the Army since these headquarters
had responsibility for the conduct of the entire Army School System.
However, the Board's action was usually approved at the other levels.
While the Army and Navy had set as their goals the

teaching of

higher level domestic and international strategy and policy subjects to
the students at their War Colleges, and to train them in decision making
at the higher levels, the newest of the services War College took a
different direction in the development of its curriculum.

The Air War

College's curriculum did not mirror that of the Army War College or the
Navy War College.

Therefore it established for the youngest of the

three service's Senior Schools a distinctive flavor that was to become
unique in military higher education.
The foundation of the Air War College's curriculum was "airpower
as an instrument of national policy".

This base remains today.

Of

,

course the direction of the curriculum has changed over the years, but
the basic intent has not.

Airpower as a national asset still remains

the cornerstone of the curriculum.

For many years, most of the seminars

and guest speakers concentrated heavily on the formulation of national
security policy.

The students found themselves being prepared mainly

for high-level policy making posts with less emphasis on the employment
of air power. Individuals at the Air War College who were responsible
for development of the curriculum saw this as a drawback to the mission
and purpose of the College.

They did not want to follow the example of

the Army and the Navy in creating a curriculum whose major thrust was on
national policy and strategy; rather, they decided to focus on the cur
rent airforce missions and the capability to accomplish them, especially
in a NATO environment.

As a result, studies in courses such as close

air support, interdiction, electronic warfare, surveillance and recon-
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naissance, airbase defense, airlift, air logistics, command control and
communications, and defense surpression were emphasized in great detail.

58

The Air War College also turned to more use of in-house faculty
than either the Army oi Navy War Colleges, and concurrently reduced the
number of outside speakers.

At its height, the College relied on approxi-

mately 250 instructors, most of them military.

59

Further, the College

downgraded emphasis on cooperative advance degree arrangements with
civilian institutions.

Like both its sister service's war colleges, the

Air War College initially established programs wherein their students
could obtain credit for courses taken either at their own institution
or at selected distinguished civilian universities (such as George
Washington University).

The credits could be applied toward an advanced

degree from the civilian university.

Many of the Air Force students,

like those from the Army and Navy, rushed to obtain the advance degrees.
However, authorities at the Air War College began to discourage the
students because they felt the Air War College's program came first, and
there was little time to attend to the Air War College's requirements
and do justice at the same time to advanced graduate studies at civilian
universities.

60

Consequently, outside advanced degree programs became

strictly off-duty programs and secondary in priority.

Work at civilian

institutions such as George Washington University, Harvard University,
and the University of Alabama was eliminated and whatever off-duty ad
vance degree studies that were accomplished was done at nearby campuses

58

Ed Gates, "New Look at the Air War College", Air Force Magazine
60, (January 1977): 55.
Ibid.
Ibid.
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of colleges such as Troy State and Auburn.
Thus, the Air War College's curriculum was developed to concen
trate on four basic areas:
Economic, and Social Problems

Leadership and management; Domestic,
and Crisis Management; Strategy and

Capabilities (particularly as they relate to the Soviet Union and Red
China); and Military Capabilities and Employment.

Additionally, the

College had a research requirement for graduation.

The culminating

experience of the academic years was a large scale computer-assisted
Theater Warfare Exercise.
One factor, organization, seems to account for the reason that the
Air War College's curriculum was such a departure from that of the Army
War College and the Naval War College.

Both the Army War College and

the Naval War College, as the top professional school of their services,
were not an integral part of the rest of their school systems.

They

were under different administrative and/or supervisory authority.

The

Air War College, however, is a constituent part of the Air University —
the umbrella organization for AirPorce schools located at Maxwell Air
force Base, Montgomery, Alabama. The Air Force has combined within this
one university system institutions comparable to the Command and General
Staff Colleges of the other services and to the Senior Service Colleges.
This integrated system apparently fosters a closer relationship between
the upper and lower level schools in the system whose orientations are
different, while at the same time engendering throughout the systems a
greater need to know how the Airforce fights rather than how to develop
national policy.

This departure from traditional military Senior

Service School organization and the Airforce's decision to emphasize air
power as an instrument of national policy rather than emphasize education
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in subjects relating to national policy and strategy decision making cer
tainly made the Air War College's curriculum distinctive.

However,

the remaining Senior Service Colleges did not follow the Air Force's
example.

The remaining schools continued the emphasis on decision mak

ing at the national and international levels started by the Army and
Navy.

The Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF), however, went

part of the way with the Air War College and tied its curriculum closely
to its mission, but with a difference.

The ICAF curriculum dealt with

the economic, industrial, scientific and technological aspects of
security; therefore, ICAF viewed them in the broad context of national
and world affairs and the interrelated military, political, and social
factors impacting on national security.

61

The emphasis in ICAF's cur

riculum seems to have been a cross between the Air Force theory of cur
riculum development on one hand and the Army and Navy on the other.
The ICAF curriculum was really unique unto itself because it was
the only one of the Senior Service Schools dealing entirely with re
sources management.

In the early days of the College, the curriculum

consisted of six basic courses covering the main facets of national
security and the resources management policies of the Department of
Defense.

Additionally, there were four foundation courses (economic

analysis, quantitative analysis in management, executive action, and
automatic data processing systems); finally, there were seventeen elec
tives offered the students.

Later, core courses were added and these

were designed to be presented in a logical order.

Sequentially, they

6X

Hayden J. Price, "Student Diversity-ICAF's Unique Solution",
Armed Forces Management 15, (March, 1969) 6:68.
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progressed from general background information and environmental
studies (such as Environment of National Security, Basic Resources,
Management of Industrial Resources) to intensive study of specific
areas of national security management (such as National Security Prob
lems and Policies, National Economic Problems and Policies, and Manage
ment in the Department of Defense).

Emphasis throughout the core pro

gram was placed on the integration of problems, current issues, and new
developments.^
The curriculum included independent student research whereby the
student, either individually or as a team member, prepared a substantial
research report which might have taken the form of a thesis, article
for publication, staff study, or case study (often the case studies
were used in subsequent years in various courses).

Or, as an option to

preparing the long paper, the student could elect to prepare three
ter papers on subjects related to the core'

curriculum.

shor

Field trips were

added to the curriculum and soon became an important part of the learn
ing process at the College.

Trips were conducted to industrial plants

such as Sperry Rand Corporation, General Electric, General Motors, and
Radio Corporation of America where students had an opportunity to investi
gate first hand some of the management problems they had been studying
all year.

Additionally, through

agreements with certain civilian uni

versities such as George Washington University, certain ICAF courses
and their associated research (thesis) projects were credited toward a
masters degree in Business Administration.

63

^Ibid., p. 69.
63Ibid., p. 70.
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ICAF's basic orientation lent itself to certain distinctive inno
vations which either had not been introduced at the other Senior Service
Schools, or if introduced was utilized on a much reduced scale.
orientation is a case in point.

Student

Even before a student selected to

attend ICAF registered, his special instructional needs were identified
through use of a questionnaire, responses of which were stored in a data
retrieval system.
for him.

64

This information enahled the faculty to tailor courses

Another innovation that proved successful was student critiques

which were employed to help determine changes in various courses.

Each

student turned in a data card evaluating each of the d a y ’s sessions.
The comments were analyzed by the college’s staff and steps were taken
to remedy any problems uncovered.

Finally, Computer-Assisted Instruction

(CAI) became a very important part of the College's methodology.
Expecially widely used was TUTOR, a series of 36 CAI lessons on basic
programming of computers.
The rising sophistication of the ICAF students challenged the
designers of the ICAF curriculum as the College entered the post World
War II period; especially the 1960's and 1970's.

In one year (1971),

for example, it was discovered that a total of 103 students had master
degrees, and 6 students had doctoral level degrees.
class had advanced degrees.

Thus, 60% of the

In contrast, just 6 years earlier only 66

students had masters degrees and 7 had doctorates totaling 40% of the
class.

Most of the advanced degrees were in business and public admini

stration.

Since graduate-level work in these fields was especially

akin both to the b.road theme and to several specific parts of the ICAF

64Ibid., p. 68.

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

96

program, it was an every-present concern at the College to avoid need
less duplication of a student's previous academic work.

At the same

time, comparable courses had to be presented to those students who had
not had them.

65

The college tried to avoid duplication by examining students'
background, counseling with them and excusing those who had already had
comparable course work from taking one or more of

the foundationcourses.

For each required course previously completed, he

had to enroll in

an

equivalent elective course.
Dr. Fred Brown, a professor of management at ICAF and Adjunct
Professor of Public Administration at the American University sums up
curriculum development at ICAF this way:
ICAF's problems of course design and presentation are
quite similar to those of all educational programs which
cater to the needs of adults with highly varied and exten
sive professional and educational experiences.
In the . . .
development of the ICAF curriculum, changes have been made
in content and methodology to meet the increasing academic
sophistication of incoming students.
Our recent study of
students with previous master's degrees in business or pub
lic administration has re-emphasized the importance of
intensified attention to tailoring a student's ICAF studies
to fit his specific background.66
Because of its orientation in resources management, ICAF's curriculum
was more closely identified with curricula at civilian institutions of
higher education than most of the other military Senior Service Schools.
This is especially true in the areas of business administration and
management.

However, one other Senior Service School's curriculum was

also closely identified with curricula at civilian institutions.

The

^5Fred R. Brown, "Challenge to ICAF: More and More Highly Educated
Students", Perspectives in Defense Management (Jan. 1971): A3.
^Ibid., p. 45.
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National War College's curriculum paralleled International Studies, Politi
cal Science and the History of Strategy and Policy taught at a number
of civilian colleges and universities.
No less concerned with its academic offerings, the National War
College also made its contribution to development of curricula for the
Senior Service Colleges.

Although preceeded by the Army War College

and the Naval War College, the eminence of the National War College in
national and international policy and strategy studies are unsurpassed.
Covering

all disciplines in the field of national security, the National

War College became to the Senior Service Colleges what the "Research
Universities" had become to civilian institutions of higher education
(based on the Carnegie.. topology of grouping American colleges and
67
universities).

As a result of its curriculum, faculty and student

body, the National War College became the standard by which the other
were judged.
The curriculum of the National War College was a prototype for
courses leading to excellence in research and creative thinking.

Courses

covered in the National War College's curriculum, for example, have in
cluded such important national and international studies as The World

In 1970, the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education divided
American Colleges and Universities into five major categories so that
they could be grouped for comparison or discussion purposes based on
similarities in curricula, faculty and students. The typology included:
(1) Research Universities (those that were the most research oriented,
received the most federal financial support for this purpose and awarded
at least 50 Ph.Ds' in 1969-1970); (2) Doctorate-Granting Universities
(those who awarded from 10 to 40 Ph.D.s in 1969-1970; (3) Comprehensive.
Universities and Colleges (those who offered a liberal arts program,
and or more professional courses of studies, and a limited doctoral
program); (4) Liberal Arts Colleges (those with a strong liberal arts
tradition and modest, if any occupational programs); and (5) Two-year
Colleges (sometimes called community and junior colleges). For further
details see Arthur Levine, Handbook on Undergraduate Curriculum (San
Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1978), pp. xxiii-xxv and pp. 629-637.
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Situation; Factors Influencing National Power; Formulation of National
Security Policy; Strategy and Warfare; and The Communists States. With
in this background, students took suhcourses that combined studies in
the classroom with field trips to the United Nations Headquarters and
to five strategic areas of the world where they met and talked with pro
minent world leaders.

Coincident with these visits, the college had a

requirement of individual study and research leading to a thesis in the
field of National Security.

The research program was designed not only

to enable the student to take a fresh look at a subject of national
interest, but also to give him a chance to demonstrate his ability to
do individual creative work.

68

Encouragement in developing critical

faculties through individual study and research have been the greatest
strength of the curriculum of the National War College over the years.
While there has been refinements in the conduct of the courses at the
College, individual study and research have remained its forte.

The

earliest effort to provide individual study and research was the even
ing graduate study program started in cooperation with the George
Washington University, and followed by the sending of selected individuals
research papers of exceptional merit to the head of the author’s service
or department on a regular basis.

To make the results of such student

research more widely known, unclassified summaries were published in the
annual volume of Abstracts of Individual Research Papers and other publica-

Lieutenant General Thomas L. Harold, "Leadership for National
Security, The General Electric Forum, 6 (Oct. - Dec. 1961) 3: 14.
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tions.

69

Another strength of the College has been its visiting guest

speaker program.
Since its beginning, the curriculum of the National War College has
focused on a broad guest speaker program designed to provide the students ex
pert views and a firm basis for the exchange of ideas in discussion
seminars on a wide range of national security related issues and problems.
The guest speakers, drawn mostly from groups of responsible governmental
officials and distinguished thinkers, were used to cover specific topics
of the College’s curriculum.

Use of these lecturers at the National

War College was somewhat different from those at the Army and Navy War
Colleges where the guest speakers usually talked on a topic of current
interest that was not necessarily a part of the curriculum.

It was not

unusual for the National War College to utilize over 100 distinguished
speakers to supplement its faculty in presenting curriculum courses
during an academic year.

The College zealously guarded the privacy of

its guest speaker program by prohibiting those attending the lectures
from attributing any statement to the speakers outside of the College.
Consequently, the speakers knew that they could state their views freely and
frankly.

Further, it provided an atmosphere of free exchange in an

uncontrolled environment.

This was especially important in creating and

69

In 1965, the National War College Forum was established for the
purpose of publishing student research papers; later, it also published
lectures for distribution to National War College students, Defense
Strategy Seminar alumni (individuals who attended short summer courses at
the College), senior government officials and to select civilian univer
sity research centers. The Forum was retitled "The National Security
Affairs Forum in 1973.
See U.S. National War College, "The National War
College Institutional Report for the Evaluation of the National War Col
lege by the Office of the American Council on Education", National War
College Historical Summary 1946-1973 (Washington: National War College,
1974), p. 1.
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maintaining academic freedom since the College was a military institu
tion subject to control from outside of the College.

Unlike the other

schools which cut back outside lecturers, wide use of guest speakers was
an asset at the National War College in that it enabled the College to
free its residential instructors of much of the classroom details in
order that they could devote more time as advisors and monitors of
students research efforts, and so they could spend more time in develop
ing creative thinking abilities of the students.
The principal academic techniques the instructors used in guiding
student efforts were discussion groups and committee problems.

Discus

sion groups were convened after each lecturg, and the topic of the day
was discussed in detail.

This learning technique was especially useful

in helping to break down inter-service prejudices that might have
existed among the students.

More importantly, it enabled class members

to understand and speak on different aspects of the problem being con
sidered.

Many of the problems discussed became subjects for further

consideration by committees.

However, most

committee assignments

resulted from problems such as those which the National Security Council
and/or the Joint Chiefs of Staff might face.

Following the lead of the

Army War College, an innovation in the committee technique at the
National War College was the presentation of solutions to the problems
to the entire class by the committee, and each class member was given the
opportunity to challenge the solutions which the committee had to defend.
In the final analysis, the committees had to develop a national strategy
based on their findings.
In developing a national strategy, the students had to consider
such things as an analysis of factors of national power of the United
States and of other nations; the study of the integration of military
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and foreign policy; and the role of the United Nations, and other means
of avoiding armed conflicts.

Further, they had to become proficient in

determining the influence of economic, political, psychological and
social resources upon national security; and they had to be able to
determine the parameters of the national interests and objectives.

The

course designed to teach the students techniques in developing a national
strategy also included a study of military forces necessary to implement
national policy, strategy and war planning as well as the impact of
science and technology on the armed forces and their employment.^
An exercise during the last two months of the year served as the
culminating experience for the students.

Lieutenant General Thomas L.

Harrold, a former*commandant or the National War College, neatly'sums
up curriculum development and instructional strategies at the College
while speaking of the grand culminating exercise.

He said:

In this period the class devotes its entire effort,
reinforced by especially selected lectures and reading,
to a grand exercise covering top-level U.S. security
policy formulation and implementation. From assumed
positions of highest government authority, national
goals and policy are developed. Based upon these
goals and policy, a U.S. national strategy is con
ceived and prepared, along with supporting world-wide
plans and programs. As the climax to the National War
College program this final period brings to focus
the knowledge and experience gained from all earlier courses
of the year.73In retrospect, one finds that inextricably mixed in the entire pro
gram of instruction at the National War College was the development of skill
in both

research and in decision making.

The curriculum and techniques

^Lieutenant General Francis H. Griswald, "The National War Col
lege", Sperryscope 16 (1962) 1: 4.
71

Lieutenant General Thomas L. Harrold, "Leadership for National
Security", p. 15.
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of learning were, therefore, geared to these ends.

Further, they were

devoted to a broadening of the knowledge of the student about the United
States and the rest of the world.

The students were encouraged to

think on the problems facing the world and to devise their own solutions
to the problems.

Finally, they were encouraged to discuss freely and

debate the problems and the merits of the solution.

72

Commenting on

the curriculum, one member of the Civilian Board of Consultants had
this to say after a visit and evaluation of the school in 1949:
With respect to the curriculum, we have noted with
satisfaction that flexibility has been maintained and
that the course of study has been adapted to changing
needs.
In general we believe the present program
strikes a fair balance between the international and
military aspects . . . . W e commend also the effort being
made to tie up the political and military aspects of
the course during the concluding week of the y e a r . 73
A review of curriculum development and instructional strategies
at the five Senior Service Schools points up one consistent similarity

72

Lieutenant General Francis H. Griswald, "The National War Col
lege", p. 4.
73

Since early in the history of the National War College, a
Civilian Board of Consultants composed of distinguished educators have
been appointed to evaluate and guide the college in its curriculum
development and administration.
One of the first such boards to issue
a comprehensive written report was the board of 1949-1950 which con
sisted of: Dr. J. E. Wallace Sterling (President of Stanford University);
Dr. George D. Stoddard (President of the University of Illinois); Dr.
James P. Baxter, 3rd (President of Williams College); Dr. Calvin B.
Hoover (Dean of the Graduate School of Duke University); Dr. William L.
Langer (Department of History, Harvard University); Dr. Arnold 0.
Wolfers (Director of the Division of Social Sciences and the Social
Science Planning Center, Yale University).
For additional details,
see "Report of the Board of Consultants of the National War College" in
Joint Chiefs of Staff Papers 962/92, 7 October 1949, Modern Military
Branch,Military Archives Division, Record Group 218, Records of the
United States Joint Chiefs of Staff (CCS 352: 12-26-42, Section 7),
The National Archives.
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among

the schools.

That is the sameness in general courses and

methodologies in spite of apparent differences in missions and objec
tives of each college.

There is a reason for this which can be summed

up in one word "uniformity."

Uniformity among the curricula of the

five schools did not happen by chance.

It was planned that way, and

the Clements Board was responsible for the results.
The Clements Board was a blue ribbon panel convened for the pur
pose of making a comprehensive study of the curricula at the five
Senior Service Colleges and to recommend guidelines to be followed by
each school in refining its curriculum in accordance with the goals of
educational excellence shared by the Board and the Colleges.

Headed by

the Honorable W. P. Clement, Jr., Deputy Secretary of Defense, it in
cluded Howard H. Calloway (Secretary of the Army), J. William Middendorff
(Secretary of the Navy), John L. McLucas (Secretary of the Air Force),
and William K. Brehm (Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and
Reserve Affairs).

The Board developed three mutually reinforcing compo

nents of the curriculum for the Senior Service Colleges. A Common Core
outline was developed as suitable for implementation at each college.
A Mission-Specific curriculum outline was developed for each separate in
stitution which would be supportive of and would complement the Common
Core curriculum while at the same time stressing its unique mission
orientation.

Finally, the Board developed a Tailored Elective Program

outline which permitted the tailoring of each student's educational ex
perience to his background and service needs.

Of these three elements

of the recommended curriculum, the Clements Board

felt that the

Mission-Specific phase should be the dominant factor both in intensity
and magnitude because it was in this ingredient that the specific focus
of the college could best be developed in all of its dimensions.
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Further, it would serve as a unifying factor at each school thus main
taining and giving emphasis to the requirement for separate institutions
*7 /.

within the services.'n
In addressing the Common Core element, the Board believed that
the Department of Defense (DOD) could not support five Senior Service
Colleges at a level of excellence if each school focus was too large.
It;therefore,tried to build an outstanding core program addressing only
those common needs of each school.

This, the Board believed, would re

lieve the faculties of certain basic requirements and would permit them
to concentrate on developing and maintaining a program of true intel
lectual substance based on the school's particular mission orientation.^
Consequently, the Board determined that the "Common Core should include
courses which would develop a sound basic understanding of the following:
— The decision-making process within the Department of
Defense and the interrelationship of its components.
— National Security Policy formulation and the relation
ship of DOD to the other Executive Departments, the
White House, and the Congress.
— Management skills and selected analytical techniques;
to include specific attention to the uses and limita
tions of computers in the decision process.
— The National and International environment."

76

While the Board did not specify exactly how much of the curriculum

Office of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Report of the DOD
Committee on Excellence in Education— The Senior Services Colleges:
Conclusions and Initiatives (Washington: Department of Defense, 1975),
pp. 2-3.

75_,

.,
Ibid.

^Ibid., pp. 3-4
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should be Common Core, it did suggest approximately one-third of the
total curriculum.

For administrative purposes, the Board suggested

that the President of the Naval War College be given responsibility for
coordinating the Common Core program.
In recommending Mission-Specific Courses, the Board "[did] not
mean that the colleges should confine their inquiry to existing practices
or narrow single-service concerns; rather that in addressing the full
range of issues judged appropriate, each should do so from the conscious
perspective of the implications for its special mission field.
Consequently, the Army War College was to devote itself to courses
dealing with land warfare, the Naval War College to those courses deal
ing with naval warfare, the Air War College to courses dealing with
aerospace warfare, the Industrial College of the Armed Forces to courses
dealing with defense management and material acquisition, and the
National War College would deal exclusively with national security
policy formulation.

The Board foresaw two primary results of the

Mission-Specific Curriculum:
First, the environment of the Colleges [would] nurture
the development of an executive minded set. Second,
it [would] reinforce the effort of each college to
strengthen its position as a recognized and respected
center of intellectual excellence to which profes
sional officers are attracted for study, and to which
scholars are attracted to teach and conduct r e s e a r c h .
Again, the Board suggested that Mission-Specific subjects comprise
approximately one-third of the total curriculum at each school.

The

Board further suggested that the Commandant of the Air War College take
the lead in coordinating Mission-Specific subjects.

^Ibid., p. 5.
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The Clements Board concluded that the individual should

have the

opportunity to tailor his electives based on his career experience.

In

this connection, the Board pointed out that officers attending the
Senior Service Colleges bring with them fifteen to twenty years of dif
fering experience, and that this experience could benefit both the col
lege and the individual officers if it could be nurtured and revealed
through formal study.

79

However, the Board felt that certain criteria

had to be met in developing the electives.

First, they should be' con

fined to topics which fell within the specific mission field of the col
lege.

Second, they should require thorough and rigorous examination of
*_

the subject matter.

The Board further felt that the electives, and

accompanying research should be tailored to the individual needs of the
student, and should consist of approximately one-third of an individual's
curriculum.

For administrative purposes, the Commandant of the Army

War College was given the lead in coordinating electives.
The Clements Board looked into one other important aspect of the
Senior Service instruction:

teaching methodology.

It found that all of

the colleges used a combination of techniques which included guest lec
turers, faculty lectures, student-led seminars, and faculty led seminars.
The colleges, however, differed as to the emphasis placed on the various
techniques.

The committee concluded that while there was no rule for

optimizing the learning environment, but there should be some general
guidelines to be followed by all the Senior Service Colleges.

First,

peer learning should only be emphasized as a secondary technique and

79

Ibid., p. 6.
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should not be relied on as a primary means of developing the central
curriculum themes.

Second, guest lecturers should be used to expose

students to differing perspectives,
of current real-world situations.
lecturer should also be secondary.

and to bring to the student a sense
However, the role of the guest
Third, the resident faculty must be

the ones who develop the curriculum themes in classroom and seminar
settings.
A positive result of the Clements Board efforts was closer coopera
tion among the Senior Service Schools in curriculum and instructional
planning and development.

This is most vividly displayed through meet

ings of the Military Education Coordination Conference (MECC) which was
established in 1962 especially for the purpose of coordinating military
education at the Senior Service College level.

The MECC was composed

of the heads of the senior institutions with the Commandant of the
National War College as chairman.
In summarizing curriculum development and the development of in
structional strategies at the Senior Service Colleges, certain conclu
sions can be drawn.

First, each school’s curriculum tended to distin

guish it from the others because, while there was a certain degree of
uniformity among all the Colleges, the mission and objectives of each
required a curriculum that was unique to the particular institution
concerned.

Second, the very nature of the Senior Service Schools being

military activities made it so the institutions did not have to worry
about the recruiting and retention of students.

Therefore, the developers

of the curriculum were free to concentrate on courses of study that would
accomplish the mission of the institutions rather than having to con
sider courses that would merely attract and retain students.

Third,

courses at the Senior Service institutions not only contained depth in
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subject matter but also were of the type that gave great breadth to the
curriculum.

Fourth, the curriculum and methodologies of instruction in

the American military Senior Service Colleges were originally adapted
from European military schools; especially the Berlin War Academy.

Fifth,

emphasis at all the American Senior institutions was on stimulating
logical thought processes although the method of accomplishing this
goal varied with each school.
While there was uniformity of goals there seemed to be differences
in implementation.

Decision making on matters affecting national

strategy and policy, and the supporting military programs to carry out
the decisions made at the highest levels were emphasized at both the
Naval War College and the Army War College.

The Air War College's

emphasis on airpower as an instrument for national policy and the con
current emphasis on the study of mission-oriented topics gave this
institution a distinctive character that caused it to be different from
the other Senior Service Schools.

The Industrial College of the Armed

Forces concern with resources management at the national level brought
to it a great number of students already possessing advanced degrees.
This caused a problem in developing a curriculum that would avoid need
less duplication of a student's prior educational attainments.

Close

attention to student questionnaires, critiques and suggestions brought
about an excellent program of tailoring subjects to the students needs.
More importantly, visits to civilian industrial plants provided the
students with an ingredient that was invaluable to rounding out their
classroom discussions.

Finally, the National War College's emphasis on

the development of skills in creative thinking and in research as aids
to decision making on matters of national and international importance
led to a curriculum that more closely parallel curricula at civilian
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institutions than any of the other Senior Service Schools except the
Industrial College of the Armed Forces.
Also important was the emphasis on individual creative work
vis-a-vis committee or group endeavors; this gave the National War Col
lege a distinctive character when compared to the other Senior military
institutions.

Curriculum development and the development of instruc

tional strategies at the Senior Service Colleges were distinguished by
a desire for excellence.

The high level Clements Board attempted to

achieve this educational excellence by specifying the types of courses
which should concern all the Senior Schools.

Core courses, mission-

essential courses, and a tailored elective program were thought to be the
most logical means of insuring educational excellence while at the same
time establishing a need for each of the schools and distinguishing the
differences among them.

The degree to which this was accomplished is

the subject of the next chapter.
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CHAPTER VI
REASONS.FOR EXISTENCE OF MULTIPLE
SENIOR SERVICE SCHOOLS
Is there really any fundamental difference between the Senior
Service Colleges that would substantiate their existence?
put, are all five of the Senior Schools needed?

Or, simply

These questions have

plagued both military and civilian leaders since the founding of the
War Colleges, yet

they have never been fully answered.

There have

been examinations made of the programs, costs and achievements at each
of the Senior Colleges.

However, few of the researchers writing about

those schools have attempted to investigate why they exist, and almost
none have attempted to answer the critical question of their need.
Perhaps Maureen Mylander came closest in an article in which she tried
to determine whether or not the War Colleges were a wasted resource.
Mylander looked at what the Colleges were all about and why they were
founded.

She also established many shortcomings of the Senior Service

Schools, and what had been done about them.

She reviewed the Colleges'

operational costs, and examined whether or not the returns on the dollar
were worth the costs.

Finally she tried to determine whether there will be

Wa.r Colleges in the future.

She concluded: "As matters stand, the schools

are not living up to their potential"; and then she says: "Whether they
improve, or remain a costly and wasted resource, or even survive at all,
will depend largely upon how they surmount [their] obstacles."'*'

However,

^"Maureen Mylander, "The War Colleges: A Wasted Resource", The
Times Magazine, March 7, 1977, pp. 6-14.

110

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

I l l

nowhere does >she directly address whether or not any or all of the high
level military institutions are needed.

Her article, like many other

writings on these schools, merely accept their existence and assume that
they will continue to exist.

John Masland and Laurence Radway's book

Soldiers and Scholars, which is perhaps the most outstanding work on
military education, provides the best example of this omission.

The

authors summarily dismiss the question of need by saying:
Fortunately there is no question about the need
for these institutions.
Indeed the extraordinary
significance of this need is the underlying theme
of this entire book . . . . Probably their mere exis
tence in itself constitutes a considerable contri
bution to the security of the United States. If ^
they did not exist, they would have to be created.
The authors do not provide any rationale for their contentions, nor do
they provide any evidence to support their conclusions.

Since the

questions of need remain unanswered, it appears that investigating the
subject as part of the overall development process of the institutions
will provide some insight into their reasons for existing.

It also

appears that the best means of discovering the relevant facts and arriv
ing at a defensible conclusion regarding the need for these schools can
be done by comparing similarities and distinctive differences among the
five military institutions.

Before going into the similarities and dif

ferences, it would seem logical to first establish why military graduate
education is needed for senior officers.
William J. Taylor, Jr. and Donald F. Bletz contend that few would
deny that military officers in particular require extensive graduate

John Wesley Masland and Laurence I. Radway, Soldiers and Scholars:
Military Education and National Policy (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1957, p. 368.
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education and training to perform

the many tasks of their profession.

In fact, they report that the requirement for officers with graduate
degrees to perform specialized tasks in the military service has grown
3

larger; especially during the decades of the 1960's and the 1970's.
Clarence Hannon concurs.

He says "During the past 20 years, there has

been a constantly accelerating emphasis on graduate level education
within DOD, but this trend has net been idiosyncratic to the Services;
[rather it has reflected a similar trend in society at large]
To understand this requirement for graduate degrees, one must
consider the fact that the Services needs are not limited to military
oriented disciplines, such as tactics, logistics, military engineering,
operational readiness, and the like.

Rather, a significant number of

officers are needed with advance education in the pure and social
sciences; in relative new fields such as public administration, com
puter operations, criminal justice, and the behavioral sciences; and
in traditional professional fields as education, law, dentistry,
medicine, religion, business administration and business management.
Paul T. Karschnia explains it very simply.

He says "To understand his

trade properly, the officer must have some idea of other fields such
as natural sciences, law, history, politics, economics, sociology,
psychology, etc. and the ways in which these other areas of knowledge
may contribute to his own purpose.

In addition, he cannot really

3
William J. Taylor, Jr. and Donald F. Bletz, "A Case for Officer
Graduate Education," in Journal of Political and Military Sociology,
2 (Fall, 1974), 2: 253.

4
Clarence W. Hannon, Graduate Education Within the Armed Forces
(Carlisle Barracks, Pa: Army War College, 1974), p. 145.
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develop his analytical skill, insight, imagination, and judgment if
5

he is trained simply in vocational duties."

Thus, to keep pace with

the ever changing technology of war; the social, economic and politi
cal changes in society, the military officer must have an advanced
education.

During the early 1970's for example, the Services validated

advanced graduate degree requirements for oyer 25,000 officers
a year.

6

Of this total,- the Airforce needed approximately

46 percent, the Army 28 percent, the Navy 24 percent and the Marine
Corps required approximately 2 percent of the graduate positions.^
Peter Dawkins succinctly summarizes the reasons officer graduate
education is needed.

He says graduate education is needed in the

military because of: growing specialization in the many fields
military personnel becomes involved, the expanding domestic and foreign
roles of the military'officer in particular, and the increasing complexg

ity of leadership and management in military units and operations.

Paul T, Karschnia, Education, The War Colleges and Professional
M ilitary Development (Washington: The National War College Strategic
Research Group, n.d.), p. 3.

g
Validation of military graduate degree requirements is the act
of designating by job title, job description and rank those specialized
positions that must be filled by an individual possessing a specific
advanced degree. This validation takes place annually by each of the
Armed Services reviewing all those positions already in-being and those
new ones proposed for inclusion on the required list. The positions
selected after this review are reported to the Department of Defense
where with the sanction of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve
Affairs, Manpower and Logistics), they are finally approved. For a
further discussion on the validation process, see Taylor and Bletz, "A
Case for Officer Graduate Education," pp. 251-2.66.
^Taylor and Bletz, "A Case for Officer Graduate Education," p. 262.
g

Peter Dawkins, "Some Issues Involved in the Education of Officers"
in The System for Educating Military Officers in the U.S., ed. Lawrence
J. Korb, International Studies Association Occasional Papers, No. 9
(Pittsburg: University of Pittsburg, 1967), p. 160.
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There are other benefits of graduate military education that
are less tangible, but just as important in the development of good
officers.

Raoul Alcala conducted research in the area of attitudes

held by the military and concluded that the officers with graduate
degrees are less likely to hold absolute attitudes on a subject than
other officers. He further said that officers with graduate degrees tend
to have a greater range of opinions; and, finally these officers are
significantly less likely to believe that a threat to the nation from
outside sources (such as communism) would lead to war.

9

Josiah Bunting

appropriately highlights any discussion on whether or not graduate edu
cation is really needed by arguing for a liberally educated military.
He says, "The truly liberally educated soldier is the soldier who can
reconcile the necessity for training and education and be happy with
hoth."

Bunting concludes "The man who is both liberally and profes

sionally educated will be the better soldier."^
and Bletz, the Services provide

According to Taylor

for graduate education, whether it be

a liberal education or a professional education, in several ways:
First, there are fully-funded and sponsored programs
under which an officer is selected to be a full time
student for one or two (exceptionally three) years at
an accredited civilian institution to complete a
masters degree or a doctorate. • • Second, there are

Q

Raoul Alcala, "Education and Officer Attitudes" in The System
for Educating Military Officers in the U.S., Ed. Lawrence J. Korb,
International Studies Association Occasional Papers, No. 9 (Pittsburg:
University of Pittsburg, 1967), pp. 136-145.
■^Josiah Bunting, "The Humanities in The Education of the
Military Professional" in The System for Educating Military Officers
in the U . S ., ed. Lawrence J. Korb, International Studies Association
Occational Papers, No. 9 (Pittsburg: University of Pittsburg, 1967),
p. 158.
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fully-funded programs involving a much smaller number
of officers selected to attend either the Navy Post
graduate School or The Air Force Institute of Tech
nology.* • • • Third, officers can enroll in programs co
sponsored by civilian colleges and universities and
some of the professional military educational insti
tutions . . . . Fourth, a significant number of officers
complete their advance degrees on their off-duty
time and at their own expense, although some monetary
assistance is available through military and VA
sponsorship.H
Regardless of how the degree is obtained, there are those who
argue that advanced education for professional military officers is
hest obtained through civilian colleges and universities.

Adam

Yarmolinsky is one who believes that education of the military should
take place in a civilian environment.

He gives three reasons for this.

First, he says that education requires a freedom of inquiry that is
just not present in a military institution.
institutions are caught in a dilemma . . .

He contends that "Military
to the extent that they are

military, they must support a tradition of acceptance of orders, ad
herence to prescribed procedures, and deference to established hierarchy.
To the extent that they are educational institutions, their allegiance
is to [a set of values involving freedom of inquiry]".

12

freedom of inquiry is basic to the educational process.

After all,
Without it,

the teacher cannot teach, the student cannot learn, and the scholar can
not explore the frontiers of knowledge.

Yarmolinsky points out that

freedom of inquiry in the military is necessarily restricted by the

11

Taylor and Bletz, "A Case for Officer Graduate Education",

p. 262.

12

Adam Yarmolinsky, "Where Should The Officer Obtain His Educa
tion" in The System for Educating Military Officers in the U.S., ed.
Lawrence J. Korb, International Studies Association Occasional Papers,
No. 9 (Pittsburg: University of Pittsburg, 1967), p. 151.
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requirement to give swift obedience to orders.

13

Elisabeth T. Crawford

is another who believes in providing education for the military in a
civilian environment.

She agrees with Yarmolinsky that the military

Senior Service institutions lacks academic freedom.

She says it this

way:
The locus of these institutions, within the military
authority structure, however, imposes constraints on the
academic model. Among these are the problems of recon
ciling the academic principle of free intellectual
inquiry with military conceptions of propriety and re
sponsibility, especially in the treatment of political
matters
Yarmolinsky's second reason for advocating the education of the
military in a civilian college or university is that one is able to
«r •*»

)

gain fresh, new ideas as well as learn to be flexible in his thinking
whereas the military remains rigid and inflexible.^

Alcala says "For

the professional officer, civilian graduate level schooling provides
an environment that encourages intellectual growth away from the
technical and tactical concerns that completely dominate the normal
military assignments."

16

(In other words he is really saying that the

quality of military education is least compromised when taught in the
academic free environment of a civilian college and university rather
than in a rigid military institution.)

14

Crawford, Elisabeth T. "Education for Policy Roles: An Analysis
of Lectures and Reading Materials at Selective War Colleges" in Papers
Presented at the 62nd Annual Meeting of The American Sociological
Association Held August 28-31, 1967, San Francisco (Washington: Bureau
of Social Science Research, Inc., n.d.), p. 1.
15
Adam Yarmolinsky, "Where Should the Officer Obtain His Education,"
p. 151.
16

Raoul Alcala, "Education and Officer Attitudes," p. 134.
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In a military environment, there is a tendency to present the
subject matter in a framework of military values which are likely to
infect the substance of the course.

18

More than likely, it is for

this reason that when Joseph King asked over four hundred students at
the Command and General Staff College of the Army that if given a
choice, would they rather receive their advanced degrees from a civi
lian or from a military institution.

The overwhelming answer was

that they would rather receive their graduate degrees from a civilian
institution.

19

This response is in sharp contrast to those answers

given by approximately 2200 alumni of the National War College who
were asked to consider their post-graduate careers and its relation
ship to the demands of their assignments after graduation, then deter
mine would they have been better off attending the National War College
or a program at a civilian college.

The National War College graduates

by a large margin gave the nod to the Senior Service School over civilian institutions.

20

It is not difficult to assess reasons for this

difference in opinions.

The Command and General Staff College is a

mid-level educational institution attended primarily by Majors and
senior (or promotable) Captains, or by Lieutenants and Lieutenant
Commanders in the Navy.

These individuals usually have a great interest

in doing those things that will greatly enhance their careers; or what
service people refer to as "ticket punching".

If there is one thing

18^
.,
Ibxd.
19

Joseph King, "A Study of The Army's Advanced Civilian Schooling
Programs", MA Thesis (U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1973),
p. 18

20

The National War College Experience and Its Utilization: A
Study Among Graduates of The National War College and Supervisors of
Graduates (Princeton: Response Analysis Corporation, 1975), p. viii.
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about civilian graduate education that many military students on
the subject agree, it is that young officers perceive that a graduate
degree from a civilian college or university is prestigious and will
do more to help them to attain promotion than attending a service
institution.

Conversely, older and higher ranking officers (Lieutenant

Colonels, full Colonels, Commanders and Naval Captains) who attend the
Senior Service College usually believe that they will ensure their
selection to flag or general officer status by attending a Senior
Service School.

The least rank they anticipate achieving after having

gone to a Senior Service College is Colonel or Navy Captain.

Attend

ing a civilian institution provides them with little value in this
area.

The result of all of this is that there is no clear cut position

that the military takes on this question of the value of a civilian
graduate education versus a military higher-level professional educa
tion.
There is little doubt that weaknesses have existed in the mili
tary's advanced civilian degree program for a long time.

Civilian edu

cation for military personnel, for example, does not evolve in a
constituency comparable to civilian institutions.

Graduates of civil

ian institutions tand to identify with alumni associations and speci
fically with "their college" of the university.

This provides an

esprit de corps among the group that results in many tangible benefits
for both the institution and the individual.
Military officers are not likely to form a large portion of this
"good old boy network" because they are not likely to attend the uni
versity of college long enough to become identified with the institu
tion.

In some instances, such as attending off-duty studies or work/
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study graduate courses on military installations, the military indi
viduals may never see the college or university from which they graduate.
This system evokes little allegiance on the part of the officer.

On the

other hand, it is believed by some in the military hierarchy that alleg
iance to a system is an important part in the training of an individual
as a good officer.

Old friendships established at military schools,

especially the senior institutions, leads to a camaraderie, a trust in
one another, that carries over to job assignments; particulary positions
of responsibility in combat.

It is difficult to explain to the profes

sional officer that he will gain the same, allegiance from, or have the
same faith in, an officer whom he met by chance in a civilian graduate
institution as opposed to one with whom he was associated at a Senior
Service College.

William J. Taylor, Jr. puts it quite simply.

He says

"These constituencies believe deeply that the great military leaders
who emerged from the traditional military school system were great
leaders, in large measure, because of the traditional system."

21

It is

for this reason that civilian education of upper level military officers
has been given a back seat in the senior military education system by
both the military leaders and students.

A case in point can be found in

the study of National War College graduates and supervisors conducted by
The Response Analysis Corporation of Princeton, New Jersey.

When asked

to consider their post-graduate careers and then determine if they
would have been better off attending a military college or a civilian
university, only two percent of the over 2200 individuals participating

"william J. Taylor, Jr., "Alternative Proposals for Fully Funded
Graduate Education on Civilian Campuses" in The System for Educating
Military Officers in the "U.S., ed. Lawrence J. Korb, International
Studies Association Occasional Papers, No. 9 (Pittsburg: Univ. of
Pittsburg, 1967), p. 163.
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in the survey thought that they would have done better had they
attended a civilian institution.

22

Taylor and Bletz sums up the feel

ing of the military hierarchy about civilian graduate education for
senior officers this way.

They said "Beyond exposure to the civilian

community, it makes a difference who the officer studies with (sic).
The opportunity for exposure to value orientations at odds with military
conservatism and authoritarianism is far more likely in the campus classroom than in the classroom shared by military officers alone."

23

There

fore, high level military officials prefer that senior military officers
receive the "right" orientation by being trained in a strict military
environment.
There are those who argue that advanced civilian education for
large numbers of professional military officers is a luxury that the
nation can ill afford, particularly since the method of validating the
need for positions requiring graduate degrees leaves much to be desired.
Leaving the determination of need to both the installation commanders
and to the field commanders (e.g., Brigade and Battalion level comman
ders and lower) often lead to requirements that appear to be unnecessary.
For example, instances were found by the General Accounting Office (GAO)
where one or more military positions in a command were designated as
advanced degree positions when there were similar positions in the same
command with similar job descriptions that were not selected.
were no reasons given for the selection of one over the other.

There
Further,

it appears that in several instances selection was made only because of

22

The National War College Experience and Its Utilization: A Study
Among Graduates of The National War College and Supervisors of Graduates,
p. viii.
23

Taylor and Bletz, "A Case for Officer Graduate Education", p. 258.

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

121

the incumbent holding the position.

With little or no justification

offered, and because of poorly written rationale for the selection of
some graduate degree positions as opposed to those not selected, it is
only natural that the veracity of the validation system should be held
in question by staff personnel at higher headquarters and in the Con
gress.

Therefore, the need of military personnel with advanced degrees

is usually a topic of conversation that engenders much interest among
those who are opponents of the system.

A better system for the vali

dation of the needs of the.services is therefore indicated.
Civilian academic degrees have long been viewed by' many military

'

' '1•

* officers as highly respected and desirable credentials.

Many officers

therefore perceive such a degree to be but one of many "tickets" re
quired either for promotion and/or better assignments.

Advancement of

officers to positions of great responsibilities seems to support this
contention.

Although the military services have tried to discourage

this type of thinking, they have been largely unsuccessful because large
number of military officers still enroll in civilian colleges and uni
versities on their own time in quest for an advanced degree.

Further,

analysis of promotion lists indicate that there is some validity for
holding this attitude since it appears that persons with graduate degrees
selected for promotion are increasing with each passing year.
One weakness of the system is the indifference held by civilian
leaders toward military programs.

There are those who argue for the
/

"ciyilianization" (sic) of certain military positions (usually adminis
trative or service jobs) by replacing the military professional with a
civilian.

Also, there are those who question the value of offering de

grees in military subjects. All one has to do is to take a look at the
catalogs of the various colleges and universities to determine the
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value placed on military degree programs.

Outside of a few schools

like Duke University, the University of California at Davis, Ohio
University, etc. there are not many civilian colleges and universities
where one can obtain a masters degree or doctorate in strictly a military major.

24

Even at most of these institutions the concentration is

usually in military or naval history and not phases of military inte
rests that one finds at the Senior Service School.

Of course, there

are many civilian institutions of higher learning that offer isolated
military related courses leading to degrees in other fields, but the
academicians in charge of determining degree offerings haven't seen
the necessity to expand these courses into military degree programs.
Old Dominion University (ODU) is a good case in point.
For a number of years, Dr. Carl Boyd and Dr. Willard C. Frank, Jr.
of the History Department at ODU, along with a number of their col
leagues, have been offering a program of graduate studies in the His
tory of Strategy and Policy.

According to the bulletin explaining the

offering, "the strategy and policy program at Old Dominion University
is designed for members of the armed forces and others interested in
examining the problems political and military decision-makers face in
situations involving the existence or application of military power."

25

Here is a program that was developed from, and was an extension of, the
strategy and policy curriculum created by Admiral Stansfield Turner at
The Naval War College.

It was therefore like no other program offered

in a civilian institution of higher learning.

At the same time, it

These three schools are among the foremost producers of Ph.D.’s
in Military and Naval History.
For further information regarding their
programs and offerings in these areas, see: The Bulletin of Duke Univer
sity Graduate School,*1981-82, p. 153; The University of California/Davis
General Catalog (1980-81), p. 227; and Ohio Univ. Bulletin (June, 1980),
p. 232.
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offered the same instruction that one could expect to obtain in strategy
and policy at most, if not all, the Senior Service Schools.

Just as at

the Naval or Army War Colleges, participants in the ODU program could
expect to "sharpen their analytical skills while developing a more in
formed instinct for making judgments . . . t o learn, to extend their perspec
tives beyond direct experience through an intensive study of events,
leaders and decisions."
tificate.

26

This program began as one which led to a cer

The participants gained recognition for an emphasis in the

history of strategy and policy upon completion of the required courses
in maritime, naval or military history; and in diplomatic history, in
ternational affairs, and in studies in the history of strategy and
policy.

Later, credits earned in this certificate program were approved

for application toward the Masters of Art in History or in International
Studies.

However, this was the limit that the ODU administration was

willing to go toward offering advanced degrees in a military program.
Dr. Boyd and Dr. Frank put together a proposal to offer a Doctor of
Philosophy degree in Military History and Strategic Studies based on the
certificate program.

27

However, they were rebuffed in their efforts

even though the History Department at ODU gave them strong support.

The

State Council of Higher Education in Virginia, and even the administration
at ODU, could not see the advantages of offering such a program despite
the fact that the program was not duplicative of any offered in the state.
Further they could not see that the program was designed to fill an un
met need in the professional development of military officers, nor the

25

26

Strategy and Policy Bulletin, Old Dominion University, 1981.

t..,
Ibid.

27

Old Dominion History Department, "Letter of Intent for Ph.D.
in Military History and Strategic Studies", circa 1977-1978.
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fact that ODU's location in Norfolk, Virginia would have assured great
interest in the program by military and naval officers in the Hampton
Roads, Virginia area.

The fact that it would have been the only program

of its type at a civilian institution of higher learning apparently did
not make any impression on them.

This short-sightedness on the part of

civilian officials not only denied ODU a potentially prestigious program,
and probably cost the university considerable revenue, but it removed
any challenges to the programs offered at the five Senior Service Schools.
Consequently, there remains no question about the requirement for the
Senior Service Colleges from this aspect.

Their reason for existence

is substantiated since they are the only source of their type of program.
Franklin D. Margiotta aptly summarizes the position taken by
civilian leaders toward military higher education.

He points out that

"In the Air War College and the National War College curriculum,
officers are challenged by intellects that are not mustered on one
civilian campus."

28

However, this pronouncement opens questions as to

whether or not the curriculum at The Senior Service Schools is an advant
age or disadvantage.

Certainly, the fact that the curriculum at each

of the Colleges is so very similar that questions arise regarding the
need of the separate schools, and it appears to provide support to those
calling for their consolidation.
The Clement's Committee on Excellence in Education, referred to
in the preceeding chapter, repeatedly ran into suggestions for consoli
dating the Senior Service Colleges because "First, . . .many of the same

28

Franklin D. Margiotta, "A Comment on Taylor and Bletz's A Case
for Officer Graduate Education: How Much is Enough?" in Journal of
Political and Military Sociology, 2 (Fall, 1974) 2: 270.
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subjects [were] included in the curricula of all five colleges.

. .

Second, . . .the Senior Service Colleges, despite their ties to specificmission related fields (Air Warfare in the case of the Air War College,
Defense Management and Material Acquisition in the case of ICAF, etc.)
[did] not represent a level of sophistication, authority, and recog
nized expertise which substantiates a separate and discrete identity
to each college."

29

The committee generally rejected this approach,

but could not overlook the subject altogether.

The clarion call for

consolidation was based on much substance and could not be completely
ignored.

For many years, The Senior Service Schools had mirrored their

own special interests.
were alike.

Their student bodies, faculties and staffs

The curriculum of each was very much alike.

Even though

there was a constant revision of the curricula almost on a yearly basis
most of the Colleges taught the same or closely related subjects de
spite their differing missions and objectives.
gests a reason for this.

Maureen Mylander sug

She contends that the services' war colleges

wanted to share the good fortune of The National War College which by
the mid 1950's had gained a reputation as being the most prestigious
of all the Senior Service Schools.

(The fact that many officers of all

services . considered the National War College superior to the other
senior institutions led to a declaration by the Department of Defense
that all the schools were equal and officers thereafter were permitted
to attend only one of the schools to satisfy senior professional educational requirements.)

30

Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr. argues that inasmuch

29

Office of The Deputy Secretary of Defense, Report of The POD
Committee on Excellence in Education— The Senior Services Colleges:
Conclusions and Initiatives (Washington: Department of Defense, 1975),
p. 3.
30

Maureen Mylander, "The Colleges a Waster Resource," p. 7.
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as the Defense Department had seen the necessity of giving equal
recognition to each of the Senior Schools, and since the services had
determined that attendance at any one of the schools would be given
equal weight in determining promotional potential and future assign
ments, there should be no concern that the curriculum of each was the
same.

"But, if an officer gets extra value out of attending the

National War College, then the service colleges should use a curriculum
distinctive from thatuused at[the National War College]."
Admiral Stansfield Turner dissents only slightly.

31

Vice

In dismissing the

apparent claim of competition between the services' war colleges and
The National War College, he comments:

"I see no reason why the curri

cula should all be the same, even if they are all producing general/
flag officers.

We have a need of a multitude of outlooks and back-

grounds in the flag communities."

32

Such differences of opinion con

cerning curricula, coupled with short periods of staff and faculty
assignments wherein many of the new people were anxious to put their
personal stamp of influence on the institution, led to much churning of
the curriculum at relative short intervals (every two or three years).
With such constant changes, it stands to reason that sooner or later
the Senior Service Schools would wind up teaching the same or like type
courses.

This resulted in somewhat a standard curriculum, and argu

ments for such a standard curriculum were widespread.

31

Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr., "The War Colleges: Education for
What?" in The System for Educating Military Officers in the U.S., ed.
Lawrence J. Korb, International Studies Association Occasional Papers,
No. 9 (Pittsburg: Univ. of Pittsburg, 1967), p. 118.
32

Ibid., p. 127.

See note 3.
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Some officials of all services have argued that a standard curriculum, which contains required core subjects with some electives,
imbues military students with certain basics that will serve them well
whatever their future.

Those who take this position usually continue

their argument by pointing out "There are no textbooks, no identifiable
curriculum, and no halls of learning to teach military officers how to
be generals, admirals, or senior airmen."

33

As a result, military

educators tend to rely on those courses used over the years in the pro
duction of great leaders to supplement their practical experience.
As the opportunity to gain practical experiences, the primary
training ground for success of military leaders, decreases more reli
ance is placed on courses like senior leadership, human behavior, mili
tary intelligence, communicative skills, military administration and
management, logistics, command and control, and military science and
tactics to provide each student a thorough grounding in skills that can
be called upon by the individual throughout his professional career.
Practical results of providing this type standard education to poten
tial military leaders are well known.

"Winston Churchill pointed out,

in a visit to the United States in 1946, that it was the Senior Service
Schools like the Army War College that prepared the Eisenhowers,
Bradleys, Clarks, and Gruenthers for their massively responsible roles
in World War II at a time when genuine practical experience with large

33

Franklin M. Davis, Jr., "The Dilemma of the Senior Service
Colleges— A Commentary" in The System for Educating Military Officers
in the U.S., ed. Lawrence J. Korb, International Studies Association
Occasional Papers, No. 9 (Pittsburg: University of Pittsburg, 1967),
p. 108.
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units and major operations was drastically limited by the miniscule
size of the Army in which these officers were serving."

34

What

Churchill really tried to convey was that a standard war college cur
riculum had produced officers who not only had a very high degree of
confidence in their ability to deal with complex operational matters
inspite of the lack of experience, but in whom others had just as high
a confidence.

It is hard to argue against this position when one

considers that each of the leaders mentioned by Churchill were products
of such a curriculum and Army Generals Creighton Abrams, James Polk,
and Bruce Palmer; Marine General E.E. Anderson, and Navy Admiral James
Mayo, all of whom served heroically during later periods of national
crisis pursued the same type curriculum.

35

The Clement's Board lends its support to some standardization
while at the same time calling for mission-oriented courses, peculiar
to each particular college, to be the primary feature of the curricu
lum.

It declared that officers attending the five Senior Service

Schools share a number of the same educational needs; therefore, the
institutions should put forth a collective effort in building a program
relative to the common needs, and these needs should form the basis
of the common core subjects taught at each of the institutions.

36

How

ever at the same time, the committee recommended limiting the number
of courses in the common core, and advocated that more applied courses

34
J Ibid.
35Ibid., p. 110.
36

Office of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Report on the POD
Committee on Excellence in Education— The Senior Service Colleges:
Conclusions and Initiatives, p . 3.
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relevant to the institution be established.

The Committee appeared

to present a dichotomy.
One wonders, just where the board really stood.
the fence.

They straddled

One can surmise that the reason for this indecisiveness

can be found in the fact that each member of the board was not only
a policy maker with ultimate responsibility for the institutions and
procedures under review, but also that they were obligated to attain
and to maintain the best schools for their various services.

It is

only logical that they should do nothing that would tend to discredit
the institution that stood at the apex of their individual services
school system.

Yet, at the same time they had been charged with re

viewing each of the senior programs, and determining how to improve
them.

In other words, they had to bring about excellence in higher

military education while maintaining the integrity of their senior
educational institutions.

Therefore, the board members took a posi

tion in the middle and did not solely advocate either a standard cur
riculum or a mission-oriented curriculum.

This vacillation had the

effect of downplaying the importance of curriculum altogether as a
factor related to determining the need of the Senior Service Colleges.
With this out of the way, the board could easily dismiss the
calls for consolidation of some or all of the colleges, and could con
centrate on devising guidelines in both subject and in administrative
matters that would ensure perpetuation of the Senior Service Colleges
while attempting to bring excellence to military higher education.
Although this argument is plausible, it is nonetheless weak.

It

appears that something else is needed before one can completely dis
miss curriculum as a factor of need.

An argument that is most im-
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pressive, is the one that removes curricula as a criteria of need.
The notion advanced by Frederick H. Hartmann in his treatise, "The
War College in Perspective" contends "It is extremely difficult even
to determine what subject matter is taught in common from one war
college to another because the format and packaging and labeling is
all ’hand work' specially done at each institution, and often redone
each year."

37

What Hartmann is implying is that it is very difficult

to understand curriculum development in the Senior

Service Schools

because it was done differently there than in civilian institutions.
What followed was a course or series of courses combining bits and
pieces from many disciplines.

Therefore, there were really no standard

academic courses at the Senior institutions.

Rather, what one found

were hybrid composites that were peculiar to military requirements
and were put together for military use.

As a result, courses in human

behavior, management, leadership, for example, as presented in the
military environment were not the same courses that were taught in the
civilian colleges and universities.

More importantly, they were not

even the same courses taught from war college to war college because
they were put together and revised at each institution.

While they

may have carried the same or similar title, their content, scope and
even objectives were not necessarily the same.

If there is anything

from a curricular standpoint that provides compelling arguments in
supporting the need for each of the Senior Service Schools, it would
be this type of arrangement when courses would be subjected to tailoring.

37

Frederick H. Hartmann, "The War Colleges in Perspective" in The
System for Educating Military Officers in the U.S., ed. Lawrence J. Korb,
International Studies Association Occasional Papers, No. 9 (Pittsburg:
University of Pittsburg, 1967), p. 130.
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Franklin M. Davis, Jr. served as the Commandant of The Army War
College for three years.

During this time he became convinced that a

tailored curriculum provided the best course offerings for a Senior
Service School.

He pointed out that because of the wide disparity

of experience, professional perceptions, and quality among the stu
dents, it was important that their needs be looked at carefully and a
curriculum tailored to their needs.

He further contended that the

courses of study devised must challenge the student, must provide
multiple opportunities for the individual to display his initiative,
and most important of all the courses must exploit the professional
experience of the individual.

38

A curriculum devised in such a manner

would provide the individual with the maximum opportunity for study,
research and fulfilling professional interests according to Davis.
Military institutions are the most likely places to achieve this
balance.

Civilian institutions just could not afford the time and

expense related to such tailoring.
with this position.

It would be difficult to disagree

However, it points up a dilemma even for the mili

tary Senior Service Colleges.
Only the Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF) of all the
senior schools has done extensive work in tailoring.

More important,

the mission of ICAF calls for the type of courses that are more easily
tailored than those in the other institutions.

This tends to support

the contention that tailoring courses is a factor in substantiating the
need for an institution.

However, does this issue of need argue for

38

Franklin M. Davis, Jr. "The Dilemma of The Senior Service Colleges— A Commentary','" p. 111.
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keeping only ICAF and the elimination of the rest of the Senior Service
Colleges?

Ratherj what this position seems to affirm is that the other

institutions should do more tailoring of their courses not only to meet
individual student needs, but also to meet the requirements of the
institution itself.
As a result of examining curriculum as a determinant of reasons
for the existence of multiple Senior Service Schools, I have concluded
that each of the Senior Service Schools is needed to provide a specific
type of indoctrination for its own service officers.

At best, this con

clusion is tenuous in light of other contradictory findings in this
study.

However, there are some considerations that must be addressed.

First, advocates of consolidation of the senior level schools, or even
the standardizing of the curriculum at the several colleges, have based
their sentiment on administrative changes that would result and not on
educational concerns.

For example, such advocates have been more con

cerned with organizational effectiveness, management improvements, and
budgetary restraints than the subjects taught at the colleges, the rea
sons for teaching them, and the achievements of their graduates.

Second,

advocates of consolidation have never gained the necessary support of
either military or government officials to bring about a change in the
structure of the senior level educational system.

Rather, a combina

tion of practical and parochial interests of the faculties, staffs,
students and governing bodies of the several colleges, together with the
support of high ranking military leaders and distinuished scholars who
have conducted extensive research of the military education system
have served to overcome most suggestions of consolidation.

Third,

where consolidation has occurred, the result has been the consolidation
of administrative functions and not of curricular offerings.

The best
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case in point is the National Defense University composed of the National
War College, the Industrial College of the Armed Forces with more recently
the addition of the Armed Forces Staff College.

While the University

exerts a certain amount of control over the component colleges, and
even though the colleges utilizes various facilities in common and some
times cooperates jointly on some outside lectures, they nonetheless re
main relatively autonomous; particularly in the important areas of
mission and of curriculum development.

Based on the current missions

of the senior level institutions, I can not foresee their consolidation
beyond the National Defense University concept unless the defense
priorities of the nation change or budgetary considerations forces such
a move.
On the other hand, there are two findings that, in my opinion,
suggests maintaining the status quo.

The literature on senior level

education overwhelmingly supports the notion that the major purpose of
these colleges is to prepare professionals to successfully carryout the
national will.

It follows that since the national tasks assigned to the

military have been divided according to separate services, the educa
tion and training of the officers is best accomplished in accordance
with separate service needs.

Although the idea of common training needs

of officers of various components of an armed force has enjoyed some
success in a few other countries (such as Canada and Sweden), the idea
has never caught on in the United States except for the education of
officers of lower rank.

One of the primary reasons is that uniform

training of senior military officers is not practical as long as there
are separate military services.

I therefore can not foresee a need to

change the current senior level educational system unless a willingness
is expressed first to change the organizational structure of the armed
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forces.

Uniformity of goals makes it possible to unify the service

schools but differences in the implementation leads to rivalry among the
branches of service and this establishes a need for the schools.

Thus,

I have concluded that consolidation is not practical, and each senior
college is needed.

Amos A. Jordan, a distinguished researcher in the

field of officer education says this about the prospects of consolidat
ing senior level education:
The lack of enthusiasm within the services for this
approach (or even for centrally directed studies of
the question) is rooted in the virtually unanimous
view among the professionals that schooling should
be keyed directly to service personnel systems,
which are themselves based directly upon service
tasks. Thus the question is not merely one of
service or joint schools, but of the very existence
of the services themselves.39
If, then, each Senior Service School should be retained because of the
current structure of the armed forces as I have suggested, curriculum
becomes a major determinant of its need.

There are of course other

determinants of which demographics of students is another major con
sideration.
One finds that the student body of a Senior Service College is
perhaps the most outstanding feature of the institution.

Masland and

Radway emphatically calls it the most outstanding feature of The
National War College.

40

The selection of students to attend the

National War College remains the prerogative of each participating
service or agency, since the Joint Chiefs of Staff have no command
responsibilities in that respect.

The military officers selected to

39

Amos A. Jordan Jr., "Officer Education," Handbook of Military
Institutions, ed. Roger W. Little (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publi
cations, 1971), p. 241.
40

Masland and Radway, Soldiers and Scholars: Military Education
and National Policy, p. 321.
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attend The National War College usually hold the grade either of Colonel
or Naval Captain.

The civilians who attend the National War College

are of comparable rank.
47.

Their average ages are usually between 42 and

Class size at the National War College generally have been around

200 or less.

The same demographics hold true for the remaining Senior

Service Schools.

We usually find four or five officers from the other

services, the State Department and perhaps other governmental agencies
attending each of the service war colleges.

Although proper military

decorum has always been maintained, it has only been recently that even
the wearing of the uniform has been required at some of the Senior
Service Colleges.

Other than these instances, one is struck by the

fact that the student body holds very little else in common.
As individuals they come from different branches of the service and
have varied backgrounds.

They are markedly mixed in terms of experience,

qualifications, educational backgrounds, and quality of professional ser
vices. What this tells us, then, is that although the students who attend
the Senior Service Colleges are alike in many aspects, they are nonethe
less very dissimilar in many ways. Accordingly, they do not form a pattern
that would permit one to say that they belong in one senior institution
in opposition to another.

Additionally, their training needs are dif

ferent and is determined by the tasks they are likely to be assigned in
the future.

Since these tasks are based on the mission of the particular

service to which they belong it is best to train them in institutions
that are particularly akin to the service or agency from which they come.
Although some common training might be feasible, mission essential
training is not, it is the mission with its related tasks that overrides
everything else.

If, then, there is any argument in support of separate

Senior Service Schools which is defensible, it would be one that is
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based on demographics and the needs of the services.
In retrospect, one finds arguments both for the consolidation
and retention of the Senior Service Schools.

However, because of the

peculiar nature of military requirements, there appear more persuasive
arguments for retaining the schools than arguments against them.

Few

individuals question that officers of the services should be educated
to the extent necessary to carry out their assigned tasks in the
interest of the security of the United States.

There appears to be a

continuing extensive requirement for training officers in the scientific
and technological fields as well as: in the humanities, and in the pro
fessions as well as in military science and tactics.

Even though ques

tions continue to center on the extent and nature of the educational
requirements and on the number of graduate degrees required as well as
on the extent to which the cost of graduate education should be borne
by either the government or by the individual officer, there has been
little disagreement over the fact that the major controlling factor in
determining the educational requirements of the military services is
the set of tasks the nation is likely to call upon its military pro
fessionals to perform.^
The question of where should the service man be educated, in a
civilian or military institution of higher education, has generated
far more discussion than conclusive results.

Many argue for sending

the military officers to civilian colleges and universities because of
the free academic climate that prevails there, and because of the
fresh, new ideas that one can gain in that atmosphere.

41

However, civil-

Taylor and Bletz, "A Case for Officer Graduate Education,"

p. 257.
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ian academicians appear reluctant to offer graduate training in the
type of programs that the military needs and desires for its profes
sional officers.

Offering studies in strategy and policy, industrial

requirements and preparedness during periods of crises, and in the
application of air, land and sea power in support of a national strategy
appear of little interest in the civilian sector.

Rather, these fields

are left to the military and the Senior Service Colleges to cover.
Further, many military officers, particularly those holding higher ranks,
apparently view attending a civilian college or university as of little
value to them and would rather attend the Senior Service Schools for
the adyantages it apparently offers toward selection to flag and gene
ral officer rank.

Finally, while there appear to be

certain simili-

larities in curriculum and student demographics at the Senior Service
School, we find that these similarities are only a matter of degree and
not substance.

Therefore, it seem that no overriding argument could

be found to substantitate discontinuance of the programs at any of the
Senior Service Colleges.

There is, however, still substantial pressure

for consolidating some of the courses, and the precedent for this has
been set in the establishment of The National Defense University.

The

issue of consolidation of courses will be considered in the next chap
ter as it relates to the findings and conclusions of this study.
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CHAPTER V I I

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The purpose of the study was to examine the development of the
National War College and its interrelationship with the remaining four
Senior Service Schools.

Concomitant to the central purpose a secondary

thesis developed which dealt with reasons all the senior institution
were necessary.
Evidence in the study supported the central thesis that the
National War College was intended to be developed as the highest level
institution of all the Senior Service Colleges.

However, it was found

that the National War College did not attain that position.

Rather, it

was discovered that the National War College shares the apex of military
senior education with the remaining four Senior Service Colleges.
Evidence in the study does, however, provide some reasons for the
establishment and continued existences of all of the senior institutions;
perhaps because of differing missions and rivalry among the various
branches of the military.
Research design for the study was devised to include the historical
antecedents of military higher education in the United States that served
as forerunners to the establishment of the National War College.

Further,

it was contended that an analysis of factors influencing the develop
ment of each of the Senior Service Schools would help to provide insight
not only into the founding of the National War College, but also into
the reasons for the existence of each of the senior level military
138
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institutions.

Further, an examination of the roles, attitudes and

influences held by military and civilian leaders closely associated with
the establishment of the Senior Service Schools was included in order to
understand better how and why they developed as they did, and the causes
for their interrelationship.

Also, a critical look at curriculum develop

ment and the development of instructional strategies at the various
senior military institutions was added as part of the design in order
to determine development of academic standards of the colleges and to
reflect similarities and differences among the course offerings of high
level military schools.

Finally, a review of the reasons for the exis

tence of the five Senior Service Schools was made a part of the research
design in order to determine if any or all of the colleges were needed.
The basic premise in the study was that the National War College
was planned by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and was developed to be the
capstone military educational institution of the nation.

Instead, the

National War College shares the summit of professional military educa
tion with the other four Senior Service Colleges.
essentially supports this contention.

Evidence in the study

The Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1946

planned the National War College as the highest level educational insti
tution in the Armed Forces.

By the mid-1950's the National War College

had achieved an unofficial reputation as being the most prestigious of
all the Senior Service Colleges, and many officers of all services con
sidered the National War College superior to the other senior institu
tions.

This fact is supported by the findings made by the Response

Analysis Corporation, of Princeton, New Jersey.

In the study made by

the Response Analysis Corporation it was found that many military
officers as late as the 1970's still perceived that the National War
College was first in status and prestige when compared with the other
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four senior colleges.

However, it was. this very consideration by

military members of all the services which led the Department of Defense
to declare officially that the Senior Service Colleges were equal in
all respects; therefore, officers needed to attend only one of the four
to satisfy senior professional educational requirements.

To this end,

it can be concluded that the National War College was planned and deve
loped to be at the apex of the military educational system.

Further,

it was well on its way toward achieving this distinction, but was de
emphasized by the military hierarchy to the point that it officially
shares the summit of military higher education with the Industrial Col
lege of the Armed Forces (ICAF) and the three services war colleges.
Unofficially, however, the National War College still enjoys the
reputation as being the most prestigious of all the Senior Service
Schools.

The research of the Response Analysis Corporation attest to

this as does the findings of a Civilian Board of Consultants to the
National War College who in 1973 examined the question of its pre
eminence.

The Board was concerned that the status and prestige of the

college had been eroded over the years because of a decline in the
quality of officers sent to the school and because of a drop in the
number of its graduates who were promoted to flag or general officer
rank.

After extensive research, the Board was satisfied that the

College had maintained its previous lofty position as the most
prestigious of all the educational institutions of the Armed Forces.
A second hypothesis in this study was that the mission of the
National War College and that of its sister institutions required a
depth and breadth unique to each, and that this prevented either institu
tion from becoming supreme in the military educational system.

It was

found in the study that curriculum development at each of the Senior
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Service Colleges was based primarily on the mission of the particular
college, and this was intended to be the dominant factor in the curri
culum at all the senior institutions.

It was the breadth of the curri

culum at the Senior Service Schools that made each different from its
peers and made each of them unique.
It should be noted that in this respect, some evidence was found
to support the idea that interservice rivalry contributed significantly
to the depth and breadth of the Senior Service educational system.
There were instances found when interservice rivalry appeared during
the development of the National War College such as the controversy
over the selection of a name for this institution, and the fact that
each of the services insisted on retaining its own war college when
consideration was being given to establishing both the forerunner to
the National War College, the Army and Navy Staff College (ANSCOL),
and the National War College itself.

More significantly, interservice

rivalry became a direct reason for the establishment of the Naval War
College.

Other than these instances, evidence of overt interservice

rivalry was extremely scarce.

Conversely, there was an abundance of

evidence extolling interservice cooperation starting with the selection
of Tasker Bliss, an Army Officer, to be on the original faculty of the
Navy War College and continuing through the founding and development of
ANSCOL, ICAF, and the National War College.

Perhaps the most outstand

ing example of interservice cooperation was the establishment and opera
tion of the Military Education Coordination Conference (MECC) which was
an activity established on November 9, 1962 by Joint Chiefs of Staff
for the purpose of coordinating military education at the joint and
Senior Service College level.

The MECC was composed of the Presidents

and Commandants of all of the Senior Service Colleges with the Commandant
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of the National War College as Chairman.
A third premise was that simple reasons all of the Senior Service
Colleges exist seemed to be elusive.

As the motives for founding each

of the Senior Service Schools were reviewed, varied complex reasons for
their existence were found ranging from experiences of war to inter
service rivalry, and also from the desire to provide professional train
ing of military members to establishing a place merely to house a general
staff.

These, and other ideological interests discussed in the study

provided some insight into reasons for founding the Senior Service
Schools, but they did not provide, as initially hypothesized, clear cut
answers to the requirement for retaining each of the Colleges.

However,

discussions of the demands of the services for officers with graduate
degrees, and of curricula offerings of the Senior Service Schools versus
that of civilian colleges and universities, did provide some support for
the continued existence of the multiple senior institutions.

At best,

one can conclude that there is substantial support among the military for
separate Senior Service Schools, and there is a noticeable lack of argu
ments against maintaining the institutions; therefore, in spite of the
scarcity of hard evidence, there is sufficient support for continuation
of the Colleges.

Exploring the development of the National War College

and its peer institutions, and examining their interrelationship, was
a far less difficult task than determining requirement for the existence
of all the colleges.
It was discovered early in this investigation that the antecedents
of the war college system in the United States served as important his
torical forerunners to the founding and development of the National War
College and its sister Senior Service Schools.

All of these institu

tions in the United States can trace their heritage to precusors in
Europe with the Berlin War Academy serving as the bellwether institution.
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The study established conclusively that the first military educational
institution comparable to European war academies did not occur in the
United States until the Naval War College was established.

This was

followed by the Army War College, the Industrial College of the Armed
Forces and ANSCOL the institution from which the National War College
directly emerged.
rical antecedents.

There are two other findings of concern with histo
First, the Air War College, because of the late

date of its founding, does not serve as an important forerunner of the
National War College.

Second, the founding of the National War College

partially fulfills the dreams held by many prominent individuals of the
colonial period of American history for a national university.

It was,

however, the Naval War College that was the leader that brought advanced
military education to the United States.
Although established on the general basis of European war schools,
it was found that the Naval War College was the first of its kind to be
established in the world.

It had no model.

Europe were all army schools.

The military schools of

Although the Naval War College founder,

Stephen B. Luce, relied on the U.S. Army schools at Fort Monroe and
Fort Leavenworth for much of his inspiration, he did not copy these
schools in fostering the idea of a true war college.

He emphasized the

study of national strategy as a combination of sea and land power.
appeared more in the European tradition.

This

Nonetheless, it was clearly

shown that it was the Army that had success with its post-graduate
training and the requirement for the same type training in the navy that
appear to be the reasons for establishing the Naval War College.
The founding of the Army War College was less educational than
bureaucratic according to findings of the study.

The interim creation

of a general staff and the establishment of a facility to house that
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staff became the immediate reasons for founding the Army War College.
There were revealed some subsidiary reasons that its founder, Elihu
Root, and its chief patron, Tasker Bliss, had for wanting an army war
college.

These included expansion of higher education for Army person

nel, the development and organization of a united army education system,
and the provision of a coordinating agency for the dissemination of
authorative military information.
The founding of ICAF and ANSCOL, like the Army War College, did
not evolve directly from educational requirements of the services.
Rather, the primary reason for their establishment was experiences of
actual war; ICAF because of industrial and logistical failures experienced
during World War I, and ANSCOL because of the requirement for training
in joint operations during World War II.

If the reasons for the found

ing of the Senior Service Colleges were few, the roles, attitudes and
influences of individuals involved in Iheir founding and development were
many.
One of the interesting findings of this investigation was that
the senior military institutions had many enemies as well as friends
during their formative years.

The "technicists" are a case in point.

These individuals were primarily military officers who wanted to empha
size training in technical skills at the expense of general military
knowledge.

Then there were Congressmen, Senators, and Service Secre

taries who opposed the Senior Service Colleges.

Even some of the

students selected to attend the schools felt that they had been shang
haied and did not support continuation of the Colleges.

However, it

was found that the supporters of the Colleges were more persistent and
intent on prevailing.

From Henry W. Halleck who served as Commanding

General of the Army during the Civil War to Emory Upton who made a trip
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around the world to study the educational systems of other countries,
supporters of higher military education in the United States were reso
lute.

Luce and Alfred Thayer Mahan were the prime movers in getting

the Naval War College started.

The primary patrons of the Army War Col

lege were Root, Bliss, and William H. Carter.

Henry "Hap" Arnold was the

driving force behind ANSCOL while John L. DeWitt and Henry W. Hill made
that institution a functioning reality.

These supporters of higher

education in the military faced up to old animosities against post
graduate military education and the desire by many to maintain technicism as a basis for military professional development; and, they overcame
the indifference and hostility of the enemies of senior education.
They got their schools started.

The problem then became what to teach

and how it should be presented.
Curricula and instructional strategies were important to the
growth and development of military higher education in that they became
the factors that tended to distinguish the Senior Service Schools from
others in the educational system of both the military and civilian in
stitutions of higher education.

The findings revealed that it was the

curriculum at each of the service institutions that made it different
from its peers and made it unique in higher education.

The findings

support the contention that at few civilian institution of higher educa
tion could a military officer of high rank receive instruction on the
full range of factors, considerations and circumstances that bear upon
their studies that one can obtain at the military Senior Servie Schools.
At the beginning of these senior military colleges, work done by
students in attendance was voluntary except perhaps attendance at lec
tures.

However, as time passed the work became more academic.

Naval War College is a case in point.
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Throughout much of its early development, curricular emphasis at
the Naval War College centered around tactica],,.studies.

However; the

situation changed dramatically, after the close of World War II when
the curriculum was broadened to include many matters not strictly naval
or even military.

Course objectives were raised from purely tactical,

command and staff concerns to a much higher level of decision making.
Courses were offered in subjects such as Strategy and Policy, Defense
Decision Making, Management, Foreign Affairs, Human Relations, and
Human Behavior as well as traditional non-tactical subjects as Inter
national Law, History, Economics, and Sociology.

The new curriculum

emphasis marked a return to the original concepts of both Luce and
Mahan who believed in the study of national strategy and policy as an
essential element in understanding the art of war.

To meet this end,

the Naval War College poineered in using the lecture, the "applicatory
method" of resolving problems, case studies, and war gaming as the
major instructional strategies.
It was found in the evidence that in spite of efforts to modernize
the curriculum at the Naval War College, there was increasing criticism
of the efforts.

For example, excessive attention to the Soviet Union

and to the Soviet Bloc countries was deplored.

Other main criticisms

of the curriculum included the superficial treatment of its many sub
jects, a rapid succession of visiting lecturers, an over concentration
on the contemporary scene, and a corresponding under emphasis on the
historical and sociological context in which current events were trans
piring.

It was against this background that Vice Admiral Stansfield

Turner, in the early 1970’s, inaugurated a new course of study which
included requiring students to take examinations, the giving of grades
to students for the first time, and also requiring more student
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research, writing and case studies.

In addition, Admiral Turner reduced

the number of guest lecturers, eliminated the associated cooperative
Masters degree program with George Washington University, established
the procedures of studying strategy through historical cases rather
than through international relations or political science, shifted
emphasis away from broad issues of international relations into areas
of more exclusive concern to naval officers, and he included the
officer's wives in certain study programs to interest them in their
husband's careers.

The changes at the Naval War College were no less

dramatic than those at the Army War College.
Deficiencies were recognized by the A m y War College long before
the Navy became cognizant

of deficiencies at it College.

College took measures early to revitalize its offerings.

The Army War
The A m y War

College "70 Study" of 1965 was a continuation of the Haines Board Study
of 1964.

The U.S. Army War College Mission and Curriculum Study of

1970, and the Norris Report of 1971 were follow-on studies.

The re

sults of these in-depth investigations and analyses of the curriculum
were an increase in management studies, the application of behavioral
science in leadership and management, greater use of automatic data
processing, and a greater opportunity for individual research and study.
One of the most important changes taking place in the Army War College
Curriculum was the Long Range Development Plan (LRDP) undertaken when
Major General Franklin M. Davis, Jr. was Commandant in the spring of
1971.

The LRDP was in response to Davis' question concerning "How the

school should respond to its responsibilities over the next decade in
terms of curriculum content, instructional concepts, faculty develop
ment and college organization"?

The task of the LRDP, therefore, was

to structure a curriculum which would anticipate and respond to
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civilian and military changes in the world and ensure that the course
would equip graduates to lead and master the changes rather than be
driven by them.
It was found that while the Army and Navy had set the standards
for the teaching of strategy and policy subjects and for the training
of students in decision-making, the other Senior Service Schools con
tinued their distinctive curricular offerings of industrial subjects
and courses dealing with air power.

The curriculum of the Air War Col

lege, for example, used the theme "airpower as an instrument of national
policy."

In carrying out this theme, the Air War College departed from

the example set by both the Army and Navy.

The Air Force decided to

focus on the current air force missions and the capability to accomp
lish these tasks especially as they relate to the NATO community.

The

Air War College was, therefore, less concerned with teaching its
students high level strategy, policy and decision making than to ensure
that they understood how Air Force operations influenced the national
policy, strategy and decisions.
The ICAF curriculum was really unique unto itself because it was
the only one of the Senior Service Schools dealing exclusively with
resource management.

Further, because of its type of curricular offer

ings, the ICAF students possessed a high percentage of master and
doctoral degrees on entering the institution than did their peers at
the other high level military schools.

It was also found that the ICAF

courses were more like those offered in civilian colleges and universities
because of their orientation toward business management and practices.
However, because of these differences from the other Senior Service
Schools and the sophistication of its students, ICAF found that it had
a greater problem in designing its courses to fit the needs of every-
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one; therefore, this military college did extensive research in hoth
tailoring courses to the background of its students, and determining
methods to avoid duplication of previous education of their students.
Further it was found that the curriculum of the National War
College was used as a prototype for courses leading to excellence in
research and creative thinking.

The curriculum was, therefore, devoted

to broadening the knowledge and abilities of the students and to creat
ing within the student confidence in the art of decision making.

These

attributes constituted the peak of excellence in higher education in
the military.

The emphasis placed on excellence was due in part to

efforts made by the Department of Defense Committee on Excellence in
Education (commonly referred to as the Clements Board).

Members of the

Clements Board determined the mission for each of the Senior Service
Schools, established instructional strategies, and most important of
all specified the kind of core, mission-essential and tailored elec
tive that were considered to be the most logical for insuring educa
tional excellence.

Mission-essential courses were determined to be

the predominate element of the curriculum.
There is little doubt that the Clements Board contributed to some
standardization among the Senior Service Colleges and gave credence to
those calling for consolidation of the senior military institutions.
In a large measure these institutions were similar.

Members of

faculties, the student bodies, instructional methods, and even organiza
tions were similar to each other.

An attempt to establish reasons for

continued existence of all of the military colleges was facilitated by
revelation of the separate and distinct missions assigned to each of
these schools.

Educational requirements of the military are controlled

by the set of tasks the nation is likely to call upon its professionals

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

150

to perform.

Since each of the service tasks are likely to be different,

the education of the officers of each service should also be different.
Civilian institutions of higher education have not felt the teaching of
military subjects is their responsibility and, therefore, the military
institutions have provided the advanced military training.

Finally,

military officers realize that they receive status toward promotion to
senior rank if they attend a military post-graduate school rather than
a civilian institution.

In light of the evidence examined in the study

it seems reasonable to state that there are substantial reasons for the
continued existence of each of the Senior Service Colleges.
In 1975, it was determine by the Clements Board that the National
War College (NWC) and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF)
should continue to be colleges in their own right but should be brought
together in the form of a University of National Defense as soon as
possible.

This was accomplished on January 16, 1976 when the National

Defense University (NDU) was established and resulted in an umbrella
office of the President, a combined staff, and a new board of visitors
to govern the new institution.

Further, the libraries of the two con

stituent colleges were combined, management and system functions of
each school became one support activity, external programs and research
activities were combined, and the new institution was given budgetary
responsibilities.

Vice Admiral Marmaduke G. Bayne, the first president

of the National Defense University felt that such consolidation had
resulted in a strong reservior of military educational excellence.
However, at the same time the individuality and strength of the two
separate component colleges have been retained.

It appears to this

writer that this consolidation succeeded primarily because the National
War College and ICAF were both located at the same physical site.
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Further, both were already under the jurisdiction of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff and were not closely associated with the philosophy of either
of the three services.

Finally, their missions were to teach courses

that transcended service tactical and operational requirements.

Because

of these considerations, it was not only prudent, but also relatively
easy, to accomplish the consolidation.
with the three services war colleges.

This could not happen so easily
The differences in their

philosophies and missions would prevent establishing a common curriculum.
Interservice prejudices and rivalry could be so great that they would
prohibit a consolidation.

The only way that this writer can foresee a

consolidation of the services war colleges with each other or with The
National Defense University is after consolidation of all of the country's
armed forces into one service.

Consequently, the present arrangement

appears adequate for military higher education given the current cir
cumstances and conditions.

However, there is one thing that is feasible

based on the findings of this study.

That is inasmuch as the National

Defense University has the required stature, prestige and the mission
requirement, it should be officially designated the capstone of the
nation's military educational system with all the attendant responsi
bilities and rewards such a designation would entail.

In this context

it would appear that admission to this capstone institution might
naturally follow completion of the senior institution of the services
rather than serve as an alternative to them.
In conclusion, the National War College was developed to be the
apex of the military education system but it has never gained that
official designation.

Instead, it officially shares the apex of

military higher education along with the four other Senior Service
Colleges.

It is concluded further that each Senior Service School has
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been viewed as requiring a depth and breadth in its offerings unique to
each military service and that each institution’s mission contributed
to this end.

Finally, it is concluded that each of the separate institu

tions should be retained as long as there are separate services and the
schools have separate missions.

It would seem to follow, however, that

in today's world of combined military missions requiring interservice
cooperation at the highest levels, an educational capstone for military
education could be considered not only beneficial but essential.

The

National Defense University, if allowed to perform the function for
which it was established, should meet such a need.
It would also seem to follow that future military mission require
ments and budgetary considerations might eventually override parochial
military interests and traditional interservice rivalry thus requiring
a reorganization of the armed services.

If this should occur, it might

be necessary to review these finding and conclusions with a view of
conducting a follow-on study on whether or not all the Senior Service
Colleges should be retained.
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Abstract
DEVELOPMENT OF THE NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE AND PEER INSTITUTIONS: A COMPARA
TIVE STUDY OF THE GROWTH AND INTERRELATIONSHIP OF US MILITARY SENIOR
SERVICE COLLEGES
Vernon Eugene Johnson, Ed.D.
The College of William and Mary in Virginia
Chairman:

Professor Paul Unger

The purpose of this study was to investigate reasons for establish
ment of the National War College, its interrelationship with other
Senior Service Schools, and to assess why the multiple institutions con
tinue to exist.
The study contained three hypotheses. First, the National War
College was planned and developed to be the capstone of the nation's
military educational system.
It never achieved that position.
Instead
it has shared the summit of professional military education with the
other four Senior Service Colleges.
Second, the National War College
and each of the other Senior Service Colleges had unique missions which
prevented any institution from becoming surpreme in the military educa
tion system.
Third, although one could establish the interrelationships
among the Senior Service Colleges, one could not assess readily the
reasons the multiple institutions existed.
The present investigation is significant because the interrelation
ship that exist among the National War College and the other Senior
Service Schools seem to be misunderstood by the civilian sector and
ignored by the military.
The study attempted to clarify those relation
ships for both elements.
It was hypothesized that by investigating the historical antece
dents of military higher education in the United States one could better
understand the development of the National War College and its inter
relationships with the other Senior Service Colleges.
It was also the
contention of the author that an analysis of factors leading to the
development of the Senior Service Colleges would provide insight into
the reasons all the senior institutions exist today. Additionally, the
author believed that one would have to investigate the roles, attitudes,
and influences of military and civilian leaders as well as curriculum
development and instructional strategies at the Senior Service Colleges
before one could fully understand why they developed as they did.
It was concluded that all the Senior Service Colleges are re
quired, and the present arrangement appears to be the best for military
higher education given the current state of desires of military officials
and indifference to military advanced graduate education by the civilian
sector.
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